

concluded. There is no doubt about the yeas and nays having been ordered, and it will be so announced.

Mr. GALLINGER. It is sometimes a difficult matter to know when debate does close in this body.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I recall very distinctly just to give a word on that point—

Mr. GALLINGER. That is ancient history.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. It was quite a little while ago. I started out to say that sometime, I think in 1908, the ordering of the yeas and nays was resorted to as a means of foreclosing debate, and once or twice since that time that method has been resorted to. I do not mean to suggest that it was in the mind of any Senator at this time, but upon the Aldrich-Vreeland currency bill and upon the Lorimer contest in the Senate I do mean to say that that method was resorted to as a means of preventing a continuation of debate. I think the ruling and attitude of the Vice President upon this question are most excellent and conform entirely to the letter and the spirit of the rules of this body.

[Mr. LA FOLLETTE addressed the Senate in support of his amendment. His entire speech is printed in the Senate proceedings of Thursday, July 20, 1916.]

— RECESS.

Mr. SWANSON. I move that the Senate take a recess until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 28 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until to-morrow, Thursday, July 20, 1916, at 10 o'clock a. m.

SENATE.

THURSDAY, July 20, 1916.

(Legislative day of Wednesday, July 19, 1916.)

The Senate reassembled at 10 o'clock a. m., on the expiration of the recess.

Mr. CLAPP. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Ashurst	Hardwick	Overman	Sutherland
Beckham	Hollis	Page	Swanson
Bryan	Husting	Pittman	Taggart
Chamberlain	Johnson, Me.	Reed	Thompson
Clapp	Johnson, S. Dak.	Robinson	Tillman
Clark, Wyo.	Jones	Shafroth	Underwood
Culberson	Lane	Sheppard	Warren
Dillingham	Martin, Va.	Sherman	Williams
Fletcher	Martine, N. J.	Simmons	Works
Gallinger	Myers	Smith, Ga.	
Gronna	Nelson	Smith, S. C.	

The VICE PRESIDENT. Forty-two Senators have answered to the roll call. There is no quorum present. The Secretary will call the roll of absentees.

The Secretary called the names of absent Senators, and Mr. McCUMBER, Mr. NORRIS, Mr. RANDELL, and Mr. VARDAMAN answered to their names when called.

Mr. PITTMAN. I wish to state that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. THOMAS] is absent on public business connected with the Senate.

Mr. LODGE, Mr. POMERENE, Mr. JAMES, and Mr. TOWNSEND entered the Chamber and answered to their names.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifty Senators have answered to the roll call. There is a quorum present.

WOMAN SUFFRAGE—CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Mr. President, before the discussion of the naval appropriation bill is resumed I ask the indulgence of the Senate to say a word about Senate joint resolution No. 1, which proposes an amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting any State from denying or abridging the right of citizens of the United States to vote on account of sex. I shall not enter upon a discussion of the general subject of woman suffrage—it is not an appropriate time for that. The premises by which we establish the justice and wisdom of a democracy, and consequently the justice and wisdom of universal manhood suffrage, likewise establish the justice and wisdom of universal womanhood suffrage. Any argument which I may use to justify my own right to vote justifies, as it seems to me, the right of my wife, sister, mother, and daughter to exercise the same right. If there had been drawn an east and west line through the center of the State of Pennsylvania, and the law had always been that those living south of the line should vote and those living north of the line should not, it would never be a sufficient answer to the unenfranchised men of the

North demanding equal suffrage, that by granting the demand we should simply double the vote. Very likely by such a division we should obtain a fair average of the ability, civic righteousness, and intelligence of the State, but the division, nevertheless, would be so arbitrary and unjust that it could never persist against enlightened public opinion. But, after all, such a division along a geographical line is not greatly more arbitrary than the existing separation of voters from nonvoters by the line of sex. Such a division is purely artificial, and is certain to disappear, just as the other superstitions which in the past have denied women equal opportunities for education, equality of legal status—including the right of contract and to hold property—and all the other unjust and intolerant denials of equality have disappeared, or are disappearing, from our laws and customs. The sentiment in favor of the enfranchisement of women is growing rapidly and definitely. Its ultimate triumph, I think, is sure. The sooner it becomes an accomplished fact, the sooner the splendid, patriotic, intelligent women of the country will be enabled to devote their energies to helping us solve the perplexing social and governmental problems with which we are confronted, instead of expending these energies in the passionate struggle to secure the right to give us this help. It is said, however, that the question is purely a matter for the several States to determine, and that is quite true under the present provisions of the Federal Constitution. The Chicago platform definitely commits the Republican Party to the extension of the right of suffrage to women. This constitutes a tremendous step forward, and must result in giving to the movement an impetus which will carry it, if not to immediate success, at least very far toward immediate success. The platform recognizes the right of each State to settle the question for itself, which is, of course, merely to recognize the obvious. The national party, however, has not committed itself upon the subject of a constitutional amendment which, if adopted, would take from the States the power, which the platform declaration recognizes now exists, to impose a sex qualification upon voters. Upon this matter the platform is silent, and therefore leaves every member of the party free to determine the question for himself.

The real question which, therefore, remains is whether the proposed amendment would constitute such a fundamental invasion of the rights of the State as to take from it all reasonable justification. The Constitution provides very definitely for its own amendment. The power of Congress to propose and of three-fourths of the States to adopt includes amendments of every conceivable character. The power is plenary and without qualification except in one particular, which is "that no State without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." This single exception serves to emphasize the fact, if emphasis were necessary, that the framers deliberately intended that the Constitution should be open to amendment in every other conceivable respect.

It is perfectly idle to complain that three-fourths of the States, containing less than half of the population, may impose unwelcome provisions upon the remaining one-fourth of the States, containing more than half the population of the country. That is the compact under which the Union exists and by which each State bound itself when it entered the Union. It must be said, however, that although the power of amendment is unlimited except in the single respect mentioned Congress is, nevertheless, bound to exercise a wise discretion as to the amendments which it proposes. If it be true that the amendment proposed by the present resolution is manifestly without wisdom, or if it undertakes to deal with a matter clearly and fundamentally the subject of exclusive State control, then it ought not to be adopted by Congress. It may be said, however, in the first place, that the demand for the submission of the proposed amendment is not only insistent but widespread. It is safe to say that many millions of voters in the United States as well as an additional many millions of unenfranchised citizens desire its submission. In the face of a demand of such proportions the objections to the amendment should be of the most cogent and compelling force to justify Congress in refusing affirmative action. I submit with the utmost earnestness not only that no such objections exist but, to the contrary, that the reasons are persuasive in favor of affirmative action. In the first place, there is precedent in the fifteenth amendment, which prohibits the States from denying the right of suffrage on account of race. If the fifteenth amendment was justified, the proposed amendment is certainly justified with far greater force. Both of the great political parties having indorsed the principle of woman suffrage, the sole remaining question is, How shall the principle be realized in practice? It is true that the present Constitution leaves to the States the power to fix the qualifications of voters, but it will not do to say that

the Federal Government is not concerned in the character of the qualifications to be prescribed. The concern of that Government is great; conceivably it might become vital. The President of the United States indirectly and the Members of both Houses of Congress directly are selected by the voters whom the States qualify. Surely a government the character of whose activities may be profoundly affected by those officials who are selected from time to time to discharge them is interested in the kind of people who are to have the sole power of selecting the officials. It is not true that the qualification of the electorate is entirely a matter of State concern. It is a matter which concerns both the State and the General Government. The Federal Government has already the power to regulate the time, place, and manner of holding elections. That power has been wisely exercised to bring about uniformity as to time and in many respects as to the manner of holding the elections. The result has been to curtail State action in some degree, to be sure, but it has been also to bring about uniform methods of much usefulness. I see no reason why the proposed amendment, if adopted, would not be likewise beneficial in bringing about a uniformity of suffrage qualification in the one important respect where uniformity is now so strikingly and, I think, unfortunately lacking.

Mr. SHAFROTH. I wish to suggest to the Senator from Utah, in whose remarks I fully concur, that it is as much an exercise of the rights of the States, after they adopt the constitutional amendment, to enforce it as it is the right of a State to reject the franchise before the adoption of the amendment. There has been strong objection urged to the adoption of a constitutional amendment granting the franchise to women, on the ground that the elective franchise is a subject inherently in the province of the State, and might force onto a State a policy which might be detrimental to its interest. If that objection were valid, we could never adopt any constitutional amendment without the consent of every State. Therefore there is no such thing as an inherent right in a State to prescribe the qualification of electors as against such a constitutional amendment. It may be inherent until the constitutional amendment is adopted, but the adoption of the amendment is the very delegation of the authority, and to contend otherwise is to deny to three-fourths of the States their rights. The question, then, for the Nation is purely as to the justice of the cause of equal suffrage, and as to that the arguments are overwhelmingly favorable.

NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 15947) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes.

Mr. LANE. Mr. President, I have received a great many protests against the expenditures which will be made under this bill. Many of them, I presume, have been instigated by people and associations who have ultra peace theories for the purpose of bringing to bear their influences upon Senators. As to that I do not know, but I do know that hundreds of such protests have come from good people who believe that the enormous expenditures proposed to be made at this time for purposes of preparedness are not justified. I do not entirely agree with that view; and in reply to them, and by way of ascertaining what their real feelings might be, I have put the suggestion to them that this country ought to be able to defend itself against all comers; that it is the duty of the Government and of the people to place itself in such a position that no foreign nation would dare attack us for any cause or for any reason whatever.

On the other hand, I have urged that I myself did not believe in building up a navy for purposes of aggression; that if I had my way about it I should have carefully examined the condition of the country, and then should make an appropriation to make every harbor on both coasts invulnerable, and build a type of battleship which would be prepared to protect this country from invasion; that it would not make any difference to me how much it might cost to do so; that that was our duty, but for defensive purposes only; that I would build those vessels at Government plants; and that it was my opinion that the Government should manufacture its own armor plate, its own guns, its own ammunition; build its own battleships and colliers and equip and put them to sea, without the intrusion of any question as to profits being made or a propaganda being urged upon the people for such preparation for private gain.

I have found that all of my correspondents have agreed with me to that general proposition. I do not think there is a man in the United States, a taxpayer, however poor he may be, who would question the expenditure of any amount of money which this Government would expend for defensive purposes, if he

believed that the money would be honestly expended, that the people would receive a dollar's worth of material for every dollar expended and a dollar's worth of value for every dollar expended. If that were the problem, there would be no question at all in the mind of anyone. The people of the country do not find fault with expenditures if the money is properly expended. There is, however, a doubt, and there has been a doubt—just how created I do not know, and yet I do, too, in a way, for I have had the doubt myself in some respects—in regard to these enormous expenditures not only in the Navy Department but in other departments as well.

For instance, yesterday the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE]—and I say it with all due respect to him—quoted the statement made by some general, and seemed to rely upon it, that our coast defenses were invulnerable; that no foreign vessel of war would dare approach our shores in an attempt to invade this country. I wish to premise my remarks by saying that I think the Senator from Wisconsin and the Army or Navy official, whoever he was, who made that distinct statement was mistaken, for the reason that last year I took it upon myself to visit a couple of the fortifications on the Pacific coast. I visited the fort at San Diego, for instance, and I should now like to call the attention of the Senate to this, if I may.

These appropriation bills come in here, and the majority of us are ignorant of the reasons which have called for the appropriations which they contain. The hearings on the appropriation bills are held before committees of the House, and we have so many committee meetings of our own and so many other things to attend to that it is impossible for us to inform ourselves as to the reasons which underlie each specific appropriation. I think that is true as to the average Member of this body, and it is necessarily so.

At any rate, I noticed that at San Diego there was a portion of a circle against which the fort had no defense whatever. There were behind it a range of hills, and on the other side of the hills was the old harbor of San Diego, if you please—the port of the old, original settlement of San Diego, where the priests had founded their mission over a hundred years ago. From behind the hills, out of sight of the guns of the present fort at San Diego, the ships of a foe could shell the city of San Diego out of existence, without much, if any, molestation at all from the fort which we now have located there. The guns of the fort at San Diego carry 7 miles, just a trifle farther than you can shoot a bullet from a modern Mauser rifle, while the guns of foreign war vessels carry from 12 to 14 or 16 miles. So a fleet of foreign vessels could lie off the port of San Diego to-day—for the condition, I suppose, has not been changed since last year—and shell it out of existence; and the gunners assigned to man that fort would be helpless; they could defend neither the fort nor themselves. Therefore, practically the fortification is of no value whatever. As a matter of fact, it is a useless expenditure to maintain it in its present condition. There is no sense in paying out thousands of dollars a year for the upkeep of a fortification which has no value.

It is worse than useless for the reason that uninformed citizens rely upon it for protection. They had ammunition enough on hand at the time I was there last year for three-quarters of an hour's constant fighting.

It was the knowledge of that condition—and that was the actual condition existing at that fort at that time—which makes me dubious about this large appropriation for even the defenses of this country. It throws a doubt and casts a shadow over them which has also gone out into the minds of the people. There are thousands and hundreds of thousands of people in this country who do not believe in this naval bill at all. The fact is the majority of the people of this country, if it were put to a vote, would not vote for a dollar, unless they were assured that the money was to be expended for self-defense only, for the construction of vessels and munitions in Government plants, and then only upon the assurance that they would get full value for the money expended.

At the mouth of the Columbia River there are a few guns which have a range of 10 miles, while the guns of an enemy battleship will carry 14 or 16 or 18 miles, and perhaps 20 miles. The expenditures for the fortifications at the mouth of the Columbia River are not utterly useless, for the reason that there are headlands on each side there from which artillery could secure a better play upon a ship coming into the harbor than is the case at San Diego. The conditions, however, at the mouth of the Columbia are not at all what they should be; so that any man who says that this country is properly defended does not get my indorsement for the statement, for I do not believe it to be a fact. Just how far the same condition extends to the fortifications on the Atlantic coast and elsewhere, where I have not visited, I do not know; but I do know the conditions

which exist at those two important points of defense of the Pacific coast.

I notice an item in this appropriation bill which also gives rise to further doubt in my mind. I question the wisdom of the expenditure, although I do not question the motives of the gentlemen who have recommended the appropriation, for I do not think they understood it, and I want to call your attention to its importance, for, if the Members of the legislative body do not understand the conditions as they exist, how can they wisely make expenditures looking to preparedness for the defense of this country? Take Puget Sound, one of the finest bodies of water in the world, and one of its largest harbors, capable of floating all the navies in the world. There is untold depth of water there. The largest vessel that exists or ever will exist can safely go through the Straits of Fuca, which is the entrance to Puget Sound.

Puget Sound extends inland, say, 165 miles, and well up in the sound, over a hundred miles from the entrance, lies the navy yard at Bremerton. There is an appropriation here of a million dollars or \$2,000,000 to outfit that navy yard so that there can be constructed the largest sized battleships. I do not doubt their ability to do the work, and probably it can be done at a cost that is reasonable; but I will ask Senators to look at the situation. The Straits of Fuca are not more than 20 to 21 miles wide. On Vancouver Island, at the mouth of the straits, fronting upon and controlling the straits, is a great British fortress, known as Esquimaux, with shops and docks up to the very best standard. Every vessel, every dreadnaught, built by this country inside of the sound at the Bremerton yard must go out through the straits to reach the sea or else confine its operations to the inland waters of Puget Sound, and to get to sea it must go under the guns of a foreign nation, by their consent and with their good will, and with that only. A canoe can not be propelled out of that sound, much less a man-of-war, unless it has the consent of the British Government. It seems to me that an expenditure of a large sum of money for the construction of dreadnaughts and for their repairs, at a point which to reach you must pass under the guns of a foreign nation, and those the best guns made in the world, is not a wise expenditure of money.

Just how far that condition prevails throughout the bill I do not know. I am not familiar with the conditions on the Atlantic coast, but I do know that the condition which I have described exists on Puget Sound, and nobody will successfully dispute the fact. That, of course, has given me reason to wonder about other items in this bill with which I am less familiar.

It has seemed to me, too, that we could prepare this country for defense up to a point which, as I have said already, would have rendered it impregnable, at less cost if we should invest our money in mines, in torpedo boats, in coast-defense vessels, and not in the construction of so many battle cruisers and dreadnaughts. Just what this nation wants with a large fleet of battle cruisers at this time I do not entirely understand; and that for the reason that, while the battle cruiser is a swift-going man-of-war, adapted to protect shipping and to run down and destroy the ships, if necessary, of a foreign nation, this country has no ships to protect; therefore they are not for defensive purposes, surely. The great bulk of the freight which comes to this country and which leaves it is carried in foreign vessels. Such battle cruisers would be valuable, no doubt, to run down the merchant vessels of foreign nations, but we have no shipping as yet which calls for any protection of that sort; and it has seemed to me—and this is my own notion, my own idea; you can take it for what it is worth, and it may strike some of you as not being worth very much—that the better type of vessel—and the best investment this country could make would be the construction of some high-powered, heavily armored vessel, with a heavily armored sloping gun deck, which lies low in the water for coast defense purposes, and not swift, light-armored cruisers.

The Germans have given a hint—it now lies anchored at Baltimore—which is valuable to the people of this world as to what the future type of war vessel will be, and will have to be, in fact. That type will not be encumbered with top hamper; it will not lie high in the water, but lie low, with decks almost awash, with a "low visibility" and a protected deck built at such an angle that the shell of an enemy will hit it a glancing blow. That type of vessel will come, and will come out of this war between England and Germany before another year has elapsed, if the war continues that long, and the very wise hint is taken by the German Nation. A vessel which is invisible at a distance of 2 miles, which presents no target to its enemy, which carries guns equally as powerful as the greatest battleships, and, in addition, carries torpedoes, would be almost an invincible one and one which would be worth half a dozen of the type of vessels which present a large surface as a target.

Any person who has ever practiced with a rifle or had occasion to use one in hunting in the mountains, or used it upon

different kinds of targets, knows that with a .30-30 you can bore a hole through a piece of sheet iron just as easily as you can through a piece of pasteboard, if it is so set as to present a fair surface. He also knows that the heavy edge of a tin can, if it is presented at an angle to that .30-30 rifle, will cause the rifle ball to glance off and ricochet and do no damage at all. It will leave a container that you could again fill with water and carry it in safety without spilling a drop of it.

Some day that little old fact, which has been known since Archimedes made his lever, will get in under the skulls of some of the gentlemen who design battleships, and they will build a ship which will be a battleship in truth and in deed—a vessel with great speed, with guns as powerful as those of any other vessel of war—disappearing guns, if you please—and one that makes a poor target for an enemy to shoot at.

I had hoped that in this large expenditure of over \$300,000,000 a few millions—or at least, a few dollars—might be laid by for an investigation for an experiment with a type of ship which would be an improvement over any which we now have, or any other nation has, afloat. You will have noticed during the war between Germany and England, you can not help but have noticed, that the great superdreadnaughts of both of those nations lie close inshore, with a fleet—a swarm, if you please—of torpedo boats, fast and slow, light and heavy draft cruisers, and all kinds of other vessels on guard around them to keep somebody from coming in there and blowing them out of the water.

They are not just what this Government ought to be purchasing at this time to the tune of any two or three hundred millions of dollars. There should be money in this appropriation for building something better and a different type, in my opinion.

Of course I wish to quote my opinion to you rather modestly. I do not claim to be an expert, but I have used the rifle a great deal—more than most of you. I have handled it for over 40 years, and I know what a rifle bullet does when it hits the target, and what kind of target it is easy to hit, and what kind of a target it is hard to hit and penetrate. I know that no man hemmed in with a wounded bear coming head-on to him, with its sloping skull, need rely upon his .30-30 or his Mauser or any other gun unless he shoots low and gets the bear in the eye, and if he is in close quarters, he wants to be sure he lands his bullet there when it charges front-on to him if he loves his life. One inch either up or down or aside may mean death.

I know enough about shooting to know that a vessel which lies low in the water and has sloping decks is a hard one to hit or to penetrate; and I had hoped for something of that sort. I do not know just what I am going to say to the people who have wanted an appropriation for defensive purposes only, who have wanted fortifications that were well-nigh invulnerable for defense only, if I vote for the appropriation of hundreds of millions of dollars seemingly for offensive purposes principally, when half the amount would have protected this country to an extent which would have rendered it invulnerable. Expenditures go on; they are made without the full knowledge and careful weighing in the balance of their merits by the men in the Senate and the men in the House who vote those appropriations which their importance requires. It looks to me as if some time in the near future we must establish a board of efficiency and test out and boil down our method of making these appropriations and expending the people's money, and getting the business of the country into a condition where the people will get value received for the taxes which we impose upon them.

I have called attention to this matter, not with any desire to criticize any of the members of the committee. I believe them to be good men. I believe that they are doing what they think is their full duty by the country. I think they believe that the country is in danger of invasion; and with them I believe that if the attempt were made to invade the country by a first-class power, at least on the Pacific coast, the invasion would be successful. I do not believe that we are in a condition on that coast to protect ourselves. For over a thousand miles the coast of Alaska is open to any man that wants to take it. He could enter it with a scow, if you please, with an old-fashioned 6-pound cannon, and take any port on that coast, barring, perhaps, the head of Prince William Sound.

Every other port is open. Our great coal mines are there, our Government-owned railway, a coal supply ready to drop into the laps and hands of any nation which cares to take it, and in a position, after they once made a landing, where it would be almost impossible for us to expel them. All up and down the Pacific coast from the Straits of Fuca clear through to San Diego there is not a fort upon it but that a landing force could land at another point in behind it and take it from the rear, and

do it without any successful resistance on the part of the people of that country. And then what? Then, with the natives backed up against the Cascade Range, hunting an outlet inland, if you please, trying to cross the desert to the Rocky Mountains, every tunnel through the mountains blown up and railroad communication cut off at the hands of any skillful enemy—and it would be done promptly—what would happen and how long would it take for relief to reach them from this country?

No; I am not of the opinion that the country should not appropriate money for its defense. I am of the opinion that it should expend millions, and you can appropriate as many millions as are necessary and I will vote cheerfully for that, if it is to be expended for that purpose. But to build battle cruisers and battleships, which are usually obsolete in 10 years and become useless and worthless junk in that time, when we are on the eve of devising a new type of vessel, one of which is already in our ports, within an hour's journey of the place upon which I stand, the living evidence of what will and must come in the near future, it seems to me is not a wise expenditure.

I have not an abiding faith in the assertion that we have made preparation in the past which will safeguard the interests of this country in the future. We have, it seems, expended more money—or, at least, the statement is made, and I have not seen it successfully disputed—upon our Navy in the last 10 years than Germany did upon hers or than Japan has upon hers, and, I have even heard it stated, more money than England had expended upon hers, or about as much, and have but little left to show for the expenditure. If the money of the future is to be expended in the manner in which the money of the past has been expended, we will continue to remain unprepared.

Conditions among the people are such, the cost of living is so high, the workingman has to figure so carefully as to his expenditures, that it would be criminal to place so great a tax upon him as this bill will call for, unless there is absolute and pressing need for the expenditure. We do not need the largest navy in the world. We do need a sufficient navy for our own defense. Also we must defend Hawaii and the Philippine Islands, and the last will take as large a fleet as it will to defend the whole Pacific coast. If we would free the Philippine Islands, what a blessing it would be to both countries.

I have put in an amendment asking for the establishment of a torpedo-boat and submarine base at the mouth of the Columbia River, for the reason that the Columbia River has two great headlands almost within gunshot of one another, which control the entire entrance to that harbor. If a reasonable and just expenditure were made for the protection of such harbors as that, for the protection of Grays Harbor, which controls Puget Sound, for the protection of suitable harbors in Alaska which would protect our interests there, such expenditures would be wise ones, and I would be glad to vote for them, and could do so with a clear conscience. But when it comes to expending money for the building of large plants which will be at the mercy of foreign nations I question such expenditures, and it gives me doubts as to many of the other items in the bill with which I am not so familiar.

TORRENS SYSTEM OF TITLE REGISTRATION.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. President, out of order I ask permission to introduce a bill. I want to say, briefly, that it is a bill establishing the Torrens system of title registration in the District of Columbia. It is a system that puts the validity of registered titles beyond the possibility of question. All questions relating to the soundness of the title are settled at the time of admission to registration. The owners of land, whether in the city or in the country, may obtain credit at far less expense and with far more expedition under this system than under the system now generally prevailing. I trust that this measure will be adopted for the District and that it will serve as a model for States that do not now have the Torrens or some similar system. No land-credit system can realize its highest possibilities unless registered titles are made certain and indefeasible.

The bill (S. 6687) to provide for the settlement, registration, transfer, and assurance of titles to land, and to designate a court of land registration, with jurisdiction for said purposes, in the District of Columbia was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

CHILD LABOR.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I am quite solicitous that the bill that is now under consideration shall be considered as speedily as possible, as there are so many other matters of important legislation that of necessity will come before this body. One of those matters is the child-labor law, which most of the Senators, if not all, of the Senators on this side of the

Chamber warmly favor. We desire very much, indeed, that before adjournment shall be taken that important measure shall receive the careful consideration of this body.

In that connection I have in my hand a considerable number of telegrams that have come to me this morning, urging consideration for that bill; and in view of its importance I ask that the briefest telegram of the number may be read by the Secretary.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read the telegram, as follows:

[Telegram.]

NEW YORK, N. Y., July 19, 1916.

Hon. JACOB H. GALLINGER,
Senate Chamber, Washington, D. C.:

I earnestly urge upon you the passage of present child-labor bill by the Senate. This is a measure of justice for the children, who are unable to help themselves and who look to the Federal Government for relief.

JOSEPH M. PRICE, 399 Broadway.

Mr. GALLINGER. I will only add that these good people who are telegraphing me can well save the expense of sending telegrams, because I think they ought to know my attitude on this question, which I have several times expressed.

Mr. KENYON and Mr. NORRIS addressed the chair.

Mr. GALLINGER. I yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. KENYON. I should like to ask the Senator—as he is the leader of the Republicans in this body and I suppose has some communication with the steering committee on the other side—if the program of the steering committee contemplates the passage of the child-labor bill at this session? Can the Senator enlighten us on that point?

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I can not give a definite reply to that question. Certain Senators representing the minority have had one very pleasant conference with the Democratic steering committee; and at that time it was not definitely decided by the majority that this bill should become a part of the legislative program which they had in part outlined and which they were further to consider.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I want to say, as a member of the steering committee, that they have had this legislative program under consideration a number of times; and it is hoped that that bill, as well as the immigration bill, may be disposed of and a number of other pressing matters of legislation. The only question with the committee was as to what bills could be disposed of, in view of the lateness of the session and the probability of an adjournment some time about the 1st of September; but that bill is on the list that they hope they may be able to dispose of.

Mr. KENYON. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator from Oregon when it will be determined by the steering committee whether or not the child-labor bill will receive consideration at this session of Congress? I understand from the Senator that it has not been determined as yet.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. They have not determined upon the taking up of any bill absolutely. They have only expressed preference for certain measures that are pending before the Senate and the hope that they may be acted upon. Of course, the appropriation bills have the right of way. They come up first.

Mr. KENYON. The child-labor bill is not one of those for which preference has been expressed, but merely one of those which it was hoped could be passed?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. It is one of those for which preference has been expressed.

Mr. KENYON. By the steering committee?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. But no promise was made to take it up absolutely, and no promise was made to take up any of them, because the appropriation bills have the right of way and it is impossible to tell.

Mr. NORRIS. May I ask the Senator from Oregon a question? I read in the papers that there is to be a caucus of the majority Members, which is to be assembled next Tuesday night. I should like to ask the Senator from Oregon if that is correct?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I have not been advised of it, Mr. President, as yet.

Mr. JONES. I should like to ask the Senator from Oregon a question. Of course I am not a member of the Democratic caucus and I do not know what took place, but I judge from the newspaper reports that the Democratic caucus decided that the so-called corrupt-practices act is of more importance than the child-labor bill, and therefore put it ahead of it. Is that correct?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I do not know what the newspapers say about these things. I have seen some reports in the newspapers which were pretty accurate reports of what took place in executive sessions of the Senate as well as what took place in a conference of the Democratic Party. I do not know what the Senator may have seen. I do not think that preference has been declared in favor of that bill or any bill as against the child-labor bill.

Mr. JONES. The newspaper report stated that the caucus decided to take up the appropriation bills, the revenue bill, and the shipping bill, and the corrupt-practices act, and so on, in the order named as their preference. The child-labor bill was not given as one of the bills in the preferred list. That was the newspaper report. Of course, I know how correctly they get the proceedings of executive sessions, and I was wondering whether they got the proceedings of the Democratic caucus as correctly as they do the proceedings of the executive sessions. I assume that they got it correctly and that the caucus did decide, for instance, that the corrupt practices is of far more importance to the people of this country than the child-labor bill.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. No such action was taken by the Democratic conference. I may say that so far as I am concerned, I am willing to stay here until December to get rid of all this proposed legislation. I am in no hurry to go home now, and if I could carry out my own wishes in the premises, I would insist on staying here. But Senators know as well as I that the appropriation bills are taking up more time than anybody thought it would be possible for them to take. Take the naval appropriation bill; it ought to have been disposed of last Saturday, and here we have passed the middle of the week and it is not finished yet. The Army appropriation bill is to follow, and if it will take the same length of time it will be about the 1st of August before it is disposed of. So in the very nature of things, the legislative program must be curtailed if we are to adjourn by the middle of August.

Mr. FLETCHER. Mr. President, I call for the regular order.

NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 15947) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, in the pending amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE] I think there ought to be a few words added, and I was going to offer an amendment. I do this because I was impressed with what the junior Senator from Missouri [Mr. REED] said yesterday in objecting to this amendment. He made one objection that it seemed to me was well founded, and also that could be remedied by a slight addition in the amendment.

The Senate will remember that the Senator from Missouri called attention to the fact that there were two parts to this amendment. One would be as follows:

That no battleship, battle cruiser, scout cruiser, torpedo-boat destroyer, or submarine herein appropriated for shall be employed in any manner to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature.

The Senator from Missouri called attention to the fact that with this law enacted it would prohibit the Government of the United States from using these ships for the collection of a claim or indemnity due to the United States Government, and I think very well pointed out that such a condition would not be desirable. The other part of the amendment reading from there on is as follows:

Or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States.

The balance having been stricken out by an amendment I offered yesterday. That part, when it comes to coercion for asserting the claim of right to a grant or concession is one that must exist in order to have the inhibition to apply in favor of a private citizen, copartnership, or corporation, but that limitation would not apply if the construction placed upon the entire amendment by the Senator from Missouri is right, and it would not apply to the first part of the amendment that I read.

I believe that is a good objection, and that part of the amendment ought to be limited the same as the latter part of the amendment is limited to any claim in behalf of a corporation or individual.

Therefore, Mr. President, I move to insert after the word "nature," in line 4, the words "of any individual, firm, or corporation."

I believe if that amendment is agreed to, and I can see no possible objection to it, it would make the same limitation to the first part of the amendment that exists as to the latter part of the amendment, and would meet one of the objections

pointed out by the Senator from Missouri, and that, I believe, is well founded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. NORRIS] to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE].

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I should like to have the amendment read complete, as it would be if the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska were adopted.

The SECRETARY. After the words "class or nature," at the end of line 4, insert "of any individual, firm, or corporation," so that as amended the amendment would read:

Provided, That no battleship, battle cruiser, scout cruiser, torpedo-boat destroyer, or submarine herein appropriated for shall be employed in any manner to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature of any individual, firm, or corporation, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States.

Mr. REED. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. NORRIS. I yield the floor if the Senator wishes to take it.

Mr. REED. No; I just wish to ask the Senator a question.

Mr. NORRIS. All right.

Mr. REED. I ask the Senator why it would not be well in carrying out this idea to enlarge the amendment a little and make it read:

And no part of the military forces of the United States shall ever be employed to protect the right of any American citizen.

I think that would cover the case in broad language.

Mr. NORRIS. That may be the Senator's idea, but it is not mine. He may be right and I may be wrong.

Mr. SWANSON. Mr. President, I wish to suggest that this is an amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE] and it would be well before it is amended that he should be sent for.

Mr. NORRIS. I have no objection, if he does not happen to be here, but he will no doubt be here before we vote on it. There is no hurry about it.

Mr. President, I wish to say just a word in regard to the question of the Senator from Missouri. Personally I believe in the amendment the Senator from Wisconsin said he was going to offer the day before. Of course, he realizes, as I think we all do, that the amendment suggested the day before and gave notice of would require a suspension of the rules, but it would apply both to the Army and to the Navy and to the ships that we already have in the Navy and to any that we might build in the future. The amendment he then said he would offer and the one which to my mind would bring the relief and the one which we ought to adopt reads as follows:

Provided, That the Army and Navy of the United States shall not be used to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States against any foreign Government with which this Government is at peace until said citizen, copartnership, or corporation shall have exhausted his legal remedies in the courts of the foreign Government or if a denial of justice after the exhaustion of such legal remedies being alleged the foreign Government shall decline an offer on the part of the Government of the United States to submit the case to arbitration.

Mr. President, that would be an amendment to my mind that would be effective and one that ought to be incorporated in the law of the United States. I do not believe, Mr. President, that any man who goes into a foreign country and invests his money ought to be entitled to come to the Government of the United States and demand that our Army and our Navy be sent out to protect his financial interest or his claim or his concession, at least until he has exhausted his right in the courts of that country and then that country has declined to arbitrate the matter. It does seem to me that if we are going to build up a navy and an army for the purpose of enforcing the payment of private claims and the collection of private debts, we ought to announce in the beginning that instead of building it up for peace and protection at home we are building it up for aggression and to be used for the sake of making money on the part of men who risk their money in investments in foreign countries.

I am not saying anything against the man who invests his money in a foreign country—I want to protect him in it—but he must first rely upon the courts of that country. If they are in such a condition that they can not operate or do justice, then there ought to be an arbitration; and if the Government in which the claim exists is willing to arbitrate, then that arbitration ought to settle it, and in no case ought we to take the Army or the Navy to enforce the claim or collect the debt until that process has been gone through with and they have declined to arbitrate.

The Senator from Missouri the other day made an objection to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin, and one of the points, as I said, that he made was that it would prohibit the use of these particular ships in the collection of debts due to the United States Government. I have offered an amendment that will eliminate that objection. It seems to me that ought to make it less objectionable to those who are opposed to the amendment.

I will say I am sorry the Senator from Wisconsin has not offered the amendment I have read and that he gave notice day before yesterday he would offer. If it could be done, I would be glad to offer it as a substitute for the amendment that is pending, although I presume that would be subject to a point of order, because it is much broader than the amendment that is pending. I do not like, in the absence of the Senator from Wisconsin, to press it.

Mr. KENYON. I was going to suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Will the Senator allow me? I was going to take the floor.

Mr. KENYON. I will not suggest the absence of a quorum then, although I suppose Senators would like to hear the Senator.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I do not care to yield for that purpose.

Mr. KENYON. I withdraw the suggestion.

Mr. TILLMAN. I wish to ask the Senator from Connecticut to yield to me to have some printing done.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I will yield to the Senator.

Mr. TILLMAN. I am very much obliged.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. TILLMAN. I ask unanimous consent for publication in the RECORD in large type, without reading, of an article in the issue of July 20 of the Manufacturers' Record, of Baltimore, entitled "Mr. Schwab on armor-plate matters and a reply." It will be very instructive. I want a history of this armor fight and the struggle we have had to get Government armor at a reasonable price to be found in as small a compass in the RECORD as is possible. I have marked the pages which I ask to have republished in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. TILLMAN. I am very much obliged to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, I make no objection to the Senator's request, although a request on the part of the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. PENROSE], that the statement issued by the Bethlehem Steel Co. stating their position should be printed as a public document was denied the other day.

Mr. TILLMAN. I did not object to it. If I had been here I would have insisted that it should go in. But the Senator from Pennsylvania yesterday put in the RECORD a full page of the Washington Post, an advertisement, by the way—

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I am not saying that the Senator objected.

Mr. TILLMAN. I am glad to have all the light we can possibly have on this armor matter, because it influences the sentiment of the country more and more.

Mr. NORRIS. If the Senator from Connecticut will yield, I will state that the statement of the Bethlehem Steel Co. was printed in the RECORD of yesterday's proceedings.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. It is a work of supererogation to ask me to yield, because Senators get up anyway and say just what they have a mind to whether I yield or not. They say "if I yield," and then they take the floor and suppress me without waiting to find out whether I yield or not.

As to the Senator from South Carolina, what I said was not that he objected to the statement of the Bethlehem Steel Co. being printed as a public document or a Senate document, but that some Senator did object yesterday to such a request, but not the Senator from South Carolina. I make no objection, however, to the request of the Senator from South Carolina.

There being no objection, the matter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"MR. SCHWAB ON ARMOR-PLATE MATTERS AND A REPLY.

"The average armor-plate requirements of the United States for the past 20 years have been about 10,000 tons." This statement, made in an advertisement of the Bethlehem Steel Co., is correct. With an average demand on the part of the Government for 10,000 tons a year, it has not been necessary to dismantle any one of the three existing armor-plate plants. The Iron and Steel Directory, issued by the American Iron and Steel Institute, gives the annual capacity of the Carnegie armor plant as 15,000 tons and of the Bethlehem Co. as 10,000 tons; and the Mid-

vale Steel Co. wires the Manufacturers' Record that its capacity is about 10,000 tons of armor plate per year. This makes a total, if these plants were run to their full capacity, of 35,000 tons a year. They are operating, with no suggestion of being dismantled, on an average consumption by the Government for 20 years of 10,000 tons annually. The Midvale plant was established much later than the others.

"If they were now run to their fullest capacity—and theoretical capacity in a case of this kind is rarely ever reached by any industry—these concerns could turn out 35,000 tons of armor plate per year. The naval program, however, in the bill which, without material change, will be passed by Congress will require 50,000 tons, according to the estimate of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department. Under this bill an average annual consumption by the Government of 10,000 tons a year for the last 20 years, as so strongly emphasized by the Bethlehem Co., could be more than trebled for the armor-plate people and still leave an excess demand fully equal to the proposed armor-plate plant of the Government. Moreover, as this Government plant could not be built and put in operation within two years, probably—and some anticipate a longer time—existing armor-plate plants would be taxed beyond their capacity to meet the needs of the Government under the bill for an enlarged Navy. Bearing on this whole question, we present the following correspondence, made necessary by the tremendous campaign of advertising which the Bethlehem Co. is carrying to keep the Government from building an armor-plate plant."

[From Mr. Schwab to Manufacturers' Record.]

"BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION,

"111 BROADWAY, TRINITY BUILDING,

"New York, N. Y., July 10, 1916.

"Mr. RICHARD H. EDMONDS,

"Editor Manufacturers' Record, Baltimore, Md.

"DEAR MR. EDMONDS: Absence from the city has prevented an earlier reply to your letter of June 21.

"I regret that you have found it so necessary to urge the abandonment of private manufacture of armor plate and the substitution thereof of a Government plant. In view of the fact that the present private industry was established at the behest of the United States Government, we are unable to see the fairness or the justice of supplanting that enterprise with a Government plant, especially when no needs can thereby be served in the direction of national defense or of economy.

"Your suggestion that the present armor plants are dependent entirely on Lake Superior ores is wholly without foundation. In the first place, it takes very little ore to make all the armor plate which is necessary for the United States Navy in a year. There are ample deposits of ore for such purpose in central Pennsylvania. Besides that, there is always a large amount of pig iron at the various iron and steel plants throughout the country, and the available supply of pig would at any time be sufficient to manufacture all the armor which might be required. Further than that, we are not dependent upon the Soo Canal to obtain ores even from the Lake Superior region. Such ores can very easily be brought by railroad to Duluth and from there direct, via Chicago, to either Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, or Bethlehem. Such ores can be brought quite as easily to any of these three points as to Alabama, where you suggest that a Government plant be located.

"There is the further fact to consider that if, as you suggest, access of the United States to Lake Superior regions, via the Soo Canal, should be cut off and the armor-plate plants near the seacoast, such as at South Bethlehem and at Philadelphia, should be in possession of an enemy, it would be safe to assume that our entire seacoast would then have been captured and our Navy rendered powerless. It would then be impossible to construct a naval ship on the seacoast, and armor, whether manufactured at Pittsburgh or Alabama, would be useless.

"I hope you will appreciate from the foregoing that the argument on the ground of ore supply for a Government plant at some point away from the coast and not depending on Lake Superior or foreign ores falls to the ground.

"Though every man ought to express his views exactly as he has them, I can not but feel that the opposition of the Manufacturers' Record to private armor manufacture is based upon misinformation and faulty analysis of the facts as they are. If we can set you right, it would give us pleasure to do so. With that end in view, we shall be very glad to supply you with any information in our power.

"Very truly, yours,

"C. M. SCHWAB."

[From Manufacturers' Record to Mr. Schwab.]

"JULY 14, 1916.

"MR. CHARLES M. SCHWAB,
"Chairman Bethlehem Steel Co.,
"111 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

"DEAR MR. SCHWAB: Acknowledging the receipt of yours of July 10. You quite misinterpret the position of the Manufacturers' Record. We have not urged the abandonment of the private manufacture of armor plate. On the contrary, we would regret to see any armor-plate plant dismantled, and we believe that there is no reason for the dismantling of any plant now in existence; nor would there be, in my opinion, any reason for doing this even if the Government built a plant, for the requirements of the Navy for armor plate will in the future for some years to come be so much greater than in the past that the output of the Government plant, even when it has been built, will probably not more than take up the excess in the increased demand over the average of the last 8 or 10 years. As your plant and others have not been dismantled during the last 8 or 10 years, I can not see that there would be any possible ground for dismantling them solely because the Government built a plant.

"The country has very wisely come to a realization of the necessity of a large increase in our Navy, an increase so great as to require a very large increase in the production of armor plate over even the largest output of any one year in the history of armor-plate making. With the assurance, therefore, that existing plants would have at least as much armor-plate business as you have ever had in any one year, and with the assurance of its being continuous for years to come by reason of the growth of the Navy, can you find justification for claiming that the building of a Government plant would necessitate the dismantling of yours? It seems to me there would be room enough for all.

"I wish to emphasize, therefore, that I have not in any way whatsoever urged the abandonment of the private manufacturing of armor plate. I have not made a single suggestion looking to any step which would necessitate the dismantling of existing plants nor to the lessening of the amount made by existing plants for the United States Government.

"We have strongly urged the building of an armor-plate plant somewhere in the Central South or West, free from dependence upon the sources of ore upon which all existing armor-plate plants depend, and beyond the danger line of invasion. We have repeatedly asked through the Manufacturers' Record if you individually, or all armor-plate makers collectively, would be willing to build a plant in the Central South or West, provided the Government agreed not to build an armor plant.

"We have asked if you would do this as a means of insuring the Nation against the possibility of the danger which it confronts by reason of the location of existing plants. Neither you nor any of the other armor-plate people have replied in any way whatsoever to that question.

"I have persistently taken the ground that if the iron and steel leaders, the armor-plate and munition manufacturers of the country, refuse to recognize the danger of existing conditions in iron and steel, it is absolutely incumbent upon the Government, unless it desires to be guilty of criminal folly to the Nation, to build such plants far away from the coast and from the Lakes.

"I have persistently urged that the best point should be selected regardless of any sectional interests, whether that point be in the South or in the West.

"Conditions have greatly changed in the last two years. Things that seemed correct then are now seen to be wholly incorrect. The duty of the Government to the Nation demands that it shall not permit existing conditions to continue. Broadly speaking, the entire munition-making business of the United States and the armor-plate industry are located in a limited area, which, as any naval or Army officer will tell you, could easily be captured under existing conditions. If that were done, there would be no opportunity for years to come to develop munition making or armor-plate production in other sections, and we can not for years to come so enlarge our Navy as to overcome this danger.

"You suggest that if the conditions which have been outlined in regard to the possibility of the capture of the East or the shutting off of Lake Superior ores had been brought about our Navy would have been rendered powerless, and armor, whether manufactured at Pittsburgh or in Alabama, would be useless.

"Suppose for a moment that the Navy had been defeated and the North Atlantic coast had been captured by the enemy. That would not necessarily mean the capture of the Pacific coast, and there are some shipbuilding facilities, including your own large Union Iron Works, of San Francisco, where armor plate would be very necessary in an effort to strengthen the

Navy on the Pacific coast, so that that region, at least, might be saved from the destruction which had come upon the Atlantic coast.

"The time is necessarily coming, too, when the South, with more than one-half of the coast line of the United States, will have to be recognized as the greatest undeveloped asset of the Nation, and its defense by the development of naval shipbuilding on the South Atlantic and Gulf coast will have become recognized as a necessity to national safety.

"The building of an armor-plate plant in the Central South or West would enable the Nation to supply armor plate to the shipbuilding interests of the Pacific coast and to those on the South Atlantic or Gulf coast that might not have been captured by the capture of the northeastern coast of the United States.

"You can readily understand, of course, that the first blow at this country would be to capture our iron-ore supplies or shut off the shipment of iron ore via the Soo Canal and the capture of the munition-making sections. Upon sections so open to invasion as are these the full force of an enemy would be concentrated, and we have nothing in the way of a navy or army which could by any possibility for years to come defend us against a strong, well-equipped nation. In the meantime we are continuing to carry all of our preparedness eggs in one basket, and that easily reached by the stone of an enemy.

"You are, of course, familiar with the fact that it was the capture of the large iron and steel producing interests of Belgium and France which so seriously handicapped those countries. The iron and steel interests of France, as you know, were located in the northern and eastern part of that country. Within a few weeks after war had been declared they were in possession of the Germans. You have doubtless read a report of the United States Department of Commerce recently issued, in which, referring to this situation, it is said:

"As shortly after the outbreak of hostilities the great metallurgical centers of the northern and eastern districts of France were occupied by the enemy and possession taken of the rich ore mines and the important furnaces and rolling mills that are located in that region, a large proportion of the steel and iron supply of France was eliminated."

"I suppose you have also read the statement by Mr. William L. Saunders, one of the vice presidents of the Naval Consulting Board of the United States, and, as you know, one of the foremost engineers of the country, in which he said:

"It has been said that the German Army went through Belgium because it was the shortest way to Paris. This may be true, but a reason of more importance presents itself in that Belgium is rich in coal, iron, and factories. They are not used for the benefit of Germany and might have been used to supply munitions to her enemies. Most of the mineral wealth of France is laid in her northern boundaries, and these are now held by Germany. The same is true of French industries. Galicia is rich in oil, Poland in coal, and the largest iron deposits of Russia are in the Donets Basin, which borders on Poland. German conquests have therefore been directed to places where mines and factories are located, the plain intent of this being to utilize these resources during the war and to be in a position on the declaration of peace to retain some hold upon them."

"Familiar as you are with all of the conditions of our own unpreparedness, you, of course, know full well that if we were at war with Great Britain the entire Lake Superior district could be captured overnight, and not a ton of ore could we get through the Soo Canal or from the mines of that district.

"Our importation if iron ore would, in the event of war, unless we had attained a position to be able to command the seas, and that is not possible for many years to come, if ever, necessarily instantaneously cease upon the declaration of war against us by any strong power. The iron ore that you and others bring from abroad would not then be available.

"If it be said that there is no possible danger of this condition coming about, then we would immediately have to say that there is no necessity for building a navy nor creating an army, since if war can never come upon us there is no reason to prepare against it.

"You and other iron and steel men are staking every dollar that is invested in the iron and steel and munition interests dependent upon Lake Superior or foreign ores upon our never getting into a war with Great Britain. I trust that in this you may be justified and that the awful curse of war between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations of the world may never come about; but is the Nation justified in taking a risk which you and your associates in iron and steel making feel disposed to take as to your individual investments? Indeed, are you justified yourselves in doing it in view of the uncertainties of the future?

"You are, of course, also thoroughly familiar with the fact that if Germany should win in the present war and should desire to recoup its losses by levying tribute on this country we would be defenseless. You are also, I take it for granted, familiar with the report, fairly well established as authoritative, I think, that if we were engaged in foreign war and our Navy had been defeated no effort would be made by the Army under existing conditions to prevent the landing of a foreign foe on our shores. It is understood, so I am reliably informed, that our Army officers recognize that to undertake to prevent the capture of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston would under such conditions be merely committing murder of the existing Army and making it impossible to build up an Army in the interior with which eventually to repel invasions.

"If these suggestions are chimerical, will you not bear in mind that they are not near so chimerical as would have been suggestions about all of Europe being engulfed in war if they had been made just two years ago?

"I am, of course, aware of the fact that it takes a very small amount of iron ore or pig iron to make the comparatively few thousand tons of armor plate annually produced in this country. I know that Pennsylvania produces a few hundred thousand tons of iron ore a year out of the 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 tons that it consumes. But can you conceive that if such chaos had been produced as would prevail in the iron and steel and railroad industries of the country if the Lake Superior supply had been cut off that there would be any possibility of armor-plate making or munition production under such conditions in the sections dependent upon these ores? Chaos would reign in all the region which now depends upon the Lake Superior district for about 90 per cent of its iron ore. How triflingly small would be the few hundred thousand tons mined in Pennsylvania or the limited production of New York under such conditions! The orderly running of business could not then be continued, and the making of munitions of war and of armor plate in existing centers would be impossible.

"The suggestion of railroad transportation of Lake Superior ores seems to overlook the fact that there would be no ores coming out of Lake Superior if that region were in possession of an enemy. If we still retained the Lake Superior district, but the Soo Canal had been blocked, it would not be possible for the railroads, confronted with war conditions, added to such congestion as they have had recently, to shift from water to rail transportation a sufficient supply of ores to be of material value in the maintenance of the iron and steel interests. This point, I think, you will find fully covered in the Manufacturers' Record of last week by Mr. James Bowron, president of the Gulf States Steel Co., as well as editorially.

"My suggestion has not been, as you seem to indicate, that an armor plant should be located in Alabama.

"It is possible that Alabama would be a good point, but I have not specifically mentioned that State, nor, indeed, any other State. I have broadly contended for the building of an armor-plate plant and munition-making plants beyond the Alleghenies, somewhere in the South, Southwest, or Central West, wherever experts may decide the best point or points to be found. As the South and Southwest have nearly one-third of the Nation's population and more than one-half of the Nation's coast line, as they have great stores of iron ore and coal available for iron and steel development and the manufacture of munitions of all kinds, I have appealed to the broad patriotism and to the purely selfish interests of the iron and steel men and financiers of the country to turn their attention to the development of these industries away from the limited area in which their interests are now concentrated.

"Personally I would prefer to see such work done by private capital; but if private capital absolutely refuses to change existing conditions, which are dangerous to the welfare of the country, then in my opinion it behooves the National Government to build such plants in order to safeguard the life of the Nation, and in doing so the Government would safeguard the investments of the very iron and steel men and financiers who up to the present time refuse 'to throw out this anchor to windward' and help to save themselves in the storm that may some day come upon them.

"I rejoice in the magnificent work that you and your associates have done at Bethlehem, and which you are now preparing to do at Sparrows Point (Baltimore). I am especially interested in your plan for the extension of the shipyard at Sparrows Point commensurate with the increasing shipbuilding needs of this country for merchant ships as well as for ships of war. In all of this I bid you Godspeed, for the work that you are doing is of national importance.

"Nevertheless, I would ask you to bear in mind that back of the coast lies the great heart of the Nation. If you and other

leaders in iron and steel fail to recognize this fact and continue to keep all of the iron-and-steel and armor-plate and munition-building business along the coast (Atlantic and Lake), there may some day come a storm which will be to such interests and to this Nation what the storm of German invasion has been to France and Belgium. I am trying to save the country—and that means the saving of you and your associates in iron and steel and kindred interests—from that situation.

"You have been a great leader, Mr. Schwab, in the creation of the vast iron and steel interests of this country, but has not the time come when, looking at this situation from the broad viewpoint of a patriot as well as that of an iron and steel maker, you can afford to take the lead in bringing about a great iron-and-steel and munition-making industry somewhere in the heart of the country as an insurance against the dangers which confront the Nation so long as these interests are centered on the coast? Your leadership in such a movement would be heralded throughout the country as that of a far-seeing business man doing a splendid patriotic service of national importance. I shall be glad to see you hold this position before the Nation.

"Very truly, yours,

"RICHARD H. EDMONDS, *Editor.*"

"VOLUME OF TRAFFIC THROUGH SOO CANALS.

"The total traffic passing through the Soo canals, American and Canadian, for the three months, April, May, and June, amounted to 21,775,262 tons through the United States canal and 5,694,045 tons through the parallel Canadian canal, or a total of 27,469,307.

"Of this amount there were 14,430,739 tons of iron ore eastbound through the United States canal and 4,043,789 tons eastbound through the Canadian canal, a total of 18,474,528 tons in three months.

"The eastbound grain traffic amounted to 113,837,643 bushels, of which 70,354,250 bushels passed through the United States canal and 43,483,393 bushels through the Canadian canal.

"There were also 1,953,556 barrels of flour, the bulk of which went through the United States canal.

"The heaviest item in westbound traffic was coal, which amounted to 4,372,197 tons, the bulk of which went through the Canadian canal.

"The total tonnage passing eastbound and westbound through the canals for these three months was 27,469,307 tons.

"The total wheat crop of the United States of last year, amounting to about 1,000,000,000 bushels, by far the largest crop ever produced, would make an aggregate of 30,000,000 tons, or only a little more than the amount of traffic that passed through the Soo Canal in three months. And yet some of our iron and steel people have taken the ground that if the Soo canals were blocked this traffic could suddenly be thrown upon the railroads, and that they could bring down from the Lake Superior region the iron ore which now comes out of that district via the Soo Canal.

"The total tonnage of ore alone through the Soo Canal will this year amount to about 55,000,000 tons, the amount depending upon the productive capacity of the mines and the shipping facilities, for the demand is in excess of even these figures if ore should prove available. In other words, the iron ore which passes through the Soo Canal is equal in tonnage to twice the wheat crop of last year, with its billion-bushel yield.

"It looks as though our iron and steel people have scarcely given serious thought to the subject. The railroad people certainly know better.

"Moreover, much more than half of the tonnage of the three months passed through the Canadian Soo Canal, a fact not to be overlooked."

[To Baltimore Sun from Manufacturers' Record.]

"JULY 17, 1916.

"EDITOR THE SUN, Baltimore, Md.

"DEAR SIR: Chairman Schwab and President Grace, of the Bethlehem Steel Co., in the Sun of to-day undertook to deny the correctness of statements made by the Manufacturers' Record in regard to the dependence of armor-plate making upon Lake Superior ores. They stated that there are ample ore deposits in Pennsylvania from which to secure all the ore needed for armor-plate making if the Lake Superior ore supply had been cut off by an enemy.

"Chairman Schwab and President Grace are men of such broad business caliber and so accustomed to deal with business questions from a broad standpoint that I marvel that they have permitted an advertisement such as that appearing in the Sun to be published over their names. The statements in it would indicate that either they have very little basis on which to found their arguments against the Government's armor-

plate plant, or else the writer of their advertisements did not understand his business.

"It is true that there are some large deposits of iron ore in Pennsylvania; no one denies that fact. Pennsylvania annually produces from about 350,000 tons to 500,000 tons of iron ore, there having been a steady decline in the output of Pennsylvania iron ore from 739,000 tons in 1910 to 400,000 tons in 1914 and to 363,000 tons in 1915. Pennsylvania is consuming about 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 tons of iron ore a year, and rapidly increasing the amount, while its own iron-ore production is steadily decreasing.

"The total ore production of Pennsylvania is considerably less than 2 per cent of the amount of ore consumed in the furnaces of that State, the other 98 per cent coming from the Lake Superior district, with the exception of the limited amount of foreign ore, the total imports of which for the entire country in 1914 were 1,350,000 tons, and for 1913, 2,590,000 tons. In 1914 the imports of foreign ore through Philadelphia were 762,000 tons, or 400,000 tons more than the total production of iron ore in Pennsylvania in that year.

"The amount of iron ore and pig iron annually used in the making of armor plate is, of course, small, since armor-plate tonnage is not in itself a big item, and no one for a moment questions that there is more iron ore in Pennsylvania than would be needed to take care of armor-plate production, provided nothing should be considered except armor-plate production in time of war. It would, however, be the height of absurdity to suppose that if 90 to 95 per cent of the entire iron-ore consumption of the United States, and certainly 98 per cent of the amount consumed in Pennsylvania, were cut off by the capture of the Lake Superior district by an enemy, or the destruction of the Soo Canal, that the other 2 per cent produced in Pennsylvania could be spread out to take care of the iron and steel interests of the State, of which armor-plate making is only one small item.

"Under such conditions there would be chaos in the iron and steel and munition trade of the United States, and the vast structure of iron and steel plants in Pennsylvania and on the Lakes dependent upon Lake Superior ores would crumble like a house of cards. Armor-plate making, like the other iron and steel interests of Pennsylvania, would go by the board in this chaos.

"Of the total production of iron ore in the United States, between 85 and 90 per cent comes out of the Lake Superior district, and practically all of it passes through the Soo Canal. About 1,300,000 to 2,500,000 tons of foreign ore come into this country from Cuba and other foreign countries, the amount varying according to the activity in the steel trade. The total amount of steel produced from the Lake Superior and foreign ores is about 95 per cent of the total steel output of the United States, the other 5 per cent being produced by the South, the Southwest, and the Pacific coast section. Thus in the event of a capture by an enemy of the Lake Superior district between 85 and 90 per cent of the ore production of the United States would instantaneously cease, so far as this country is concerned. The entire output of its ores would then go into the enemy's country, to be used to produce weapons of destruction against us.

"Of course, under such war conditions the importation of foreign ore would be cut off, because it would not be possible for us for years to come to be strong enough to command the seas.

"The more this subject is studied the more important will it seem to be. Every argument advanced by the Bethlehem Steel Co. and others in the effort to prevent the building of an armor-plate plant by the Government, or the development of munition making away from the coast, only illuminates the whole situation and shows the overwhelming danger of existing conditions.

"I trust that this country and Great Britain will never be at war, but no one can say that such a dire disaster to the world will never come about. If it should happen, Great Britain with its Canadian soldiers could overnight take possession of the entire Lake Superior district and prevent a single ton of ore from coming out of that region to feed the furnaces of this country. It would not then be possible to develop iron mines with an output sufficient to enable us to make any contest whatever against our enemy, as we would practically have been captured body and soul and would be compelled to yield to any terms the conqueror dictated.

"Are we willing to continue in that position?

"In other sections of the country, the South and Southwest and the Far West, there are vast stores of iron ore which could be profitably developed in order to bring about a well-rounded industrial growth to insure us in time of war against the danger which I have outlined.

"If the iron and steel leaders of the country persistently refuse to recognize this situation, it becomes the duty of the Government to safeguard the Nation's life and build not only armor plate but munition plants in sections far away from the Atlantic coast, from the Lakes, and from all sections dependent upon Lake ores. As a Nation we would be guilty of criminal folly to sit still and make no move to meet this condition.

"In their advertisement Messrs. Schwab and Grace state that as the capacity of the proposed Government armor-plate plant would be greater than the average consumption of armor plate during the last 20 years, it would supplant private plants and leave no business for them. I confess to great surprise at a statement so weak as this being used as an argument.

"It seems to indicate a lamentable lack of arguments. The average consumption of armor plate during the last 20 years has been small as compared with the amount that will now be needed under the plans for vastly increasing our Navy. To undertake to base an argument against a Government armor-plate plant on the average annual output of armor plate for the last 20 years is so absurd as to suggest that neither Mr. Schwab nor Mr. Grace ever saw the statement before it was inserted over their names in the advertisement of the Bethlehem Steel Co. I give them credit for never having been individually responsible for so silly an effort at argument. They are men of noted ability, and have too broad a knowledge of conditions to undertake to measure the consumption of armor plate in the future by the average consumption of the last 20 years. The world has changed in the last two years, and this Nation is changing with it. The Navy of the future will make the little Navy of the last 20 years seem triflingly small, and, of course, Mr. Schwab and Mr. Grace are fully aware of this.

"In another advertisement the Bethlehem Steel Co. takes the ground that if the section in which the three armor-plate plants are located should be captured, our Navy would have been by that time destroyed and armor plate would not be needed. In this the company overlooks the fact that we might still have a navy existing on the Pacific coast, and that there are large shipbuilding plants on that coast to which armor plate could be sent from an interior plant which had not been captured.

"It is not to be supposed that if our Atlantic coast navy had been destroyed and Pennsylvania and New York captured by an invader that the rest of the country would sit down supinely and do nothing unless we had failed to build munition plants and an armor-plate plant back of the mountain ranges, which would form a line of defense.

"If we permitted existing conditions in armor-plate and munition making and the iron and steel business generally to continue, we would have no basis on which to make a fight if Pennsylvania and New York had been captured; and the rest of the country, with 90,000,000 people or more, would be utterly helpless, because the Government of to-day had been recreant to its responsibility in its failure to develop munition making and armor-plate making in the central part of the country, in order to lessen our dependence upon conditions as they now exist.

"For the magnificent development work of Mr. Schwab and Mr. Grace, for whom I have the highest personal regard and whose genius I greatly admire, I would give to the Bethlehem people the highest praise; but when a matter so vital to the Nation's life is at stake, those who fail to study the situation and try to drive it home upon public attention would be recreant to their responsibility to their country's welfare.

"Very truly, yours,

"RICHARD H. EDMONDS, Editor."

"THE ARMOR-PLATE QUESTION AND THE INABILITY OF EXISTING PLANTS TO SUPPLY THE GOVERNMENT'S NEEDS.

"[Special Correspondence Manufacturers' Record.]

"WASHINGTON, D. C., July 17.

"Officials of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department estimated to-day that if the naval program, as finally adopted, includes three dreadnaughts and four battle cruisers, there will be need for approximately 55,000 tons of armor plate, or 35,000 tons over and above the capacity of the proposed Government armor-plate plant.

"The Bethlehem Steel Co. says that the average requirements of the United States Government for the past 10 years have been about 10,000 tons annually. If the private plants have been able to exist upon contracts amounting to 10,000 tons annually, they will be able to get along much better handling the surplus over the 20,000-ton capacity of the proposed Government plant. The surplus under the new program is bound to be much greater than the amount of business given to the private

plants during the period when they had a monopoly of the business.

"Even though there should be but four battle cruisers in the program as finally adopted, it is estimated that each would require about 8,000 tons of armor plate, or a total of 32,000 tons. With the proposed Government plant handling about 20,000 tons, there still would be a surplus of 12,000 tons for the private plants, which is more than they formerly had.

"Members of Congress are beginning to charge that the reason the armor-plate companies are making such a desperate fight is because they have in sight now a business several times as large as they formerly had.

"Owing to the changes in the qualities of armor which have occurred in the years that the art has been developing, it is not possible to make an exact comparison in the cost of armor year by year, and, as changes have occurred year by year, the designations used to distinguish different types of armor have remained practically the same. Armor which this year might be designated as class B armor could be totally different in its composition from so-called class B armor of five years ago. While there are four different grades of armor—class A, class A-1, class B, and class C—now in use, by far a larger proportion of armor purchased is known as class A armor. This armor represents probably 80 or 85 per cent of the total purchased of any one order. Armor now designated as class A armor is that which is used for the side armor of a ship, and armor for this purpose has, of course, constituted the bulk of every purchase in preceding years. While it may have been known as simple steel, harveyized armor, or krupp armor, and did vary from year to year in its composition, it was designed for side armor. Only on this basis can the closest approximate comparison of the bids submitted on armor be obtained. The following table gives this information:

Bidder.	Date of bid.	Price bid per ton.
Bethlehem	June 1, 1887	\$556.79
Carnegie	Nov. 20, 1890	538.35
Do.	Feb. 28, 1893	500.43
Bethlehem	Mar. 1, 1893	504.46
Do.	June 1, 1896	558.93
Carnegie	do.	554.37
Do.	June 3, 1896	400.00
Bethlehem	June 9, 1898	400.00
Carnegie	Aug. 30, 1899	400.00
Bethlehem	Oct. 4, 1899	400.00
Carnegie	Nov. 26, 1900	420.00
Bethlehem	Nov. 28, 1900	420.00
Do.	Feb. 28, 1903	420.00
Carnegie	do.	420.00
Midvale	Dec. 15, 1903	398.00
Bethlehem	Dec. 31, 1903	420.00
Carnegie	Jan. 9, 1904	420.00

"It will be observed that from 1898 to 1899 four contracts were awarded, two to Bethlehem and two to Carnegie, each at the same figure, \$400 a ton.

"Between November 26, 1900, and April 3, 1905, four contracts were awarded to Bethlehem and four to Carnegie, each at the same figure, \$420 a ton; but it will be noted that in 1903 the Midvale Co. submitted its first bid of \$398 a ton, \$22 lower than the prevailing rates paid to the two concerns which then divided the business.

"The next four orders, placed in 1905 and 1906, were at a lower figure, due to the entry of Midvale into the field of genuine competition, but in 1907 and thereafter until March 1, 1913, we find each of the three companies submitting identical bids. Midvale has stated that when they underbid their competitors in 1906 the department declined to award them the entire contract, and divided it among the three concerns, and that thereafter there was no incentive to underbid their competitors. How equally the department shared its orders among these three concerns and how equally they profited from them is shown by the awards made from 1907 until February, 1913:

	Total tons.	Value of orders.
Bethlehem	23,588	\$10,110,404
Carnegie	23,541	8,640,783
Midvale	21,571	9,261,117

"The first bids submitted to Secretary Daniels were for the battleship *Arizona*. The bids of each bidder were identical to a penny with one another, and with the bids just previously submitted to the outgoing administration. The magic spell which

had for 15 years directed with unerring foresight the harmonious agreement which distinguished this competition had not yet been dissipated.

"Secretary Daniels promptly rejected all bids, and has secured as a result of his vigorous protest better prices on armor for the *Arizona* and subsequent vessels than those prevailing when he entered office. Had he continued to pay the prices last charged his predecessors, the armor he has ordered would have cost the Government \$1,110,084 more, but his vigorous protest has saved this sum to the Nation.

"The Government as a manufacturer is not hindered by the necessity for profits. Its sole concern is to make an article as perfect as it can be made with the money available; not to produce an article which, while less perfect, would meet specifications and insure a larger profit. Experience has shown to be justified the expectation that Government products are the equal, frequently the superior, of private products as regards quality; and that the Government can manufacture economically has been demonstrated by the Navy Powder Factory, the Navy Torpedo Works, and its plant for the production of mines. Smokeless powder of the general character at present in use was first purchased in 1897 at \$1 a pound. The price of 53 cents a pound which appears in 1912 was fixed as the limit to be paid for powder by Congress, after the cost of powder manufacture had been carefully investigated by a congressional committee, of which Hon. SWAGER SHERLEY was chairman.

"The annual capacity of the private armor-plate plants, for their combined output would not, under normal circumstances, probably exceed 30,000 tons. Should four battle cruisers and three dreadnaughts be constructed, therefore, the supply of armor plate would not keep pace with the demand by half. Whether the Government finally decides to erect its own plant or not, it is obvious that unless the other private armor plants are established to supply the Navy there will be a serious crimp put in the plans for a larger Navy. Such a sudden large increase in naval power as is planned by the present bill would overtax the output of all existing plants.

"THE BETHLEHEM CO.'S SPECIOUS MISLEADING PLEA.

"In advertisements spread broadcast throughout the country the Bethlehem Steel Co. makes the following statements:

"The Manufacturers' Record of Baltimore has urged the adoption of a Government armor plant on the ground that existing plants would be dependent in case of war upon Lake Superior iron ore which is shipped through the Soo Canal.

"These are the reasons why there is no validity in this contention:

"1. It takes relatively very little ore to make all the armor plate required by the United States.

"2. There are ample deposits of ore in central Pennsylvania to take care of all necessities should the Lake Superior supplies be cut off.

"3. If the Soo Canal is closed, Lake Superior ores can easily be brought by rail from Duluth to Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, or Bethlehem, where armor factories are located.

"4. If these three cities were in the hands of an enemy in war time, it is safe to say that we could not build battleships on our seacoast, so that armor factories would then be of no avail."

"Recently Senator TILMAN wrote the Manufacturers' Record that he was glad that the Bethlehem Co. was spending some of the profits of the past in this liberal advertising campaign. It has, indeed, been the most remarkable advertising campaign that has ever been carried on in this country, so far as we know, but it has been, we believe, the most unwise campaign and at the same time the most badly directed and badly worded advertising campaign which we have ever seen.

"In the statements made it was said:

"It takes relatively very little ore to make all the armor plate required in the United States."

"That, of course, no one denies. But since Pennsylvania produced last year only 360,000 tons of ore out of the 25,000,000 tons or thereabouts it consumed, the local production would be wholly unequal to the needs of the iron and steel industry of that State. Less than 2 per cent of Pennsylvania's iron-ore consumption is produced in Pennsylvania.

"This statement also says:

"There are ample deposits of ore in central Pennsylvania to take care of all necessities should the Lake Superior supplies be cut off."

"Does this mean that these supplies would be sufficient for 'all necessities' of armor-plate making, or for the iron and steel interests of Pennsylvania generally? The wording is unfortunate, and calculated to be misleading.

"The third statement says:

"If the Soo Canal is closed, Lake Superior ores can be easily brought by rail from Duluth to Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, or Bethlehem, where the armor factories are located."

"If the Bethlehem Co. can find a means of suddenly shifting to the railroads of the country the 50,000,000 tons of iron ore that now are handled by water transportation through the Soo Canal, it will have wrought a miracle which all the railroad people of the country have never been able to accomplish. To suggest the thought is in itself all the proof that is needed of the impossibility of doing it. It is too absurd for a moment's consideration. Moreover, how about the possible capture of the whole district by an enemy?"

"In the fourth statement it is said:

"If these three cities were in the hands of an enemy in war time it is safe to say that we could not build battleships on our seacoast, so that armor factories would then be of no avail."

"In this statement the Bethlehem Co. overlooks the fact that there is a seacoast on the Pacific coast of the United States, and that there are several great shipyards capable of building battleships on that coast, and the fact that if Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Bethlehem had been captured this might not necessarily mean the capture of the Pacific coast cities, nor of the Gulf coast cities. Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Bethlehem do not comprise the United States, nor does even the State of Pennsylvania."

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, the Senator from Nebraska states that he wants the prohibition against the use of any of these vessels in enforcing a right to a claim limited to claims and property interests of individuals and firms and corporations; he does not want the prohibition to exist against any claim or concession that the United States Government may have.

Mr. President, I do not think that that is a valid line of distinction. The claims of the United States Government are simply the claims of the people of the United States in the aggregate, and if the United States Government has a concession for oil fields in Mexico for the purpose of supplying its vessels with oil fuel and the claim is put in jeopardy or the franchise is about to be confiscated in violation of law I do not see why the vessels of the United States should be allowed to protect that claim of our Government, but should not be allowed to protect exactly similar claims of some smaller number of our citizens who have invested their money. In other words, I do not see why the property of all the people of the United States should be protected by the Government of the United States but the properties of all the parts of the people should be neglected and prohibited by law from being protected by the United States vessels which the people are taxed to maintain.

Mr. President, I may be old-fashioned and out of date but I have flattered myself, and I confess I have taken some pride in the supposition, that the Government to-day as a whole stands, and even in its weakness and infancy stood, ready to protect the rights of American citizens in their persons and property wherever they might be in the world. If there is now some new philosophy which has grown up by which that belief of mine is no longer tenable, if the Government is to legislate that the nations of the world may freely, and in safety, repudiate their obligations to our citizens, and may then hold up to the United States of America, which is trying to enforce and protect the property rights of its citizens, a statute of the United States prohibiting the use of the vessels of the United States from enforcing our legal rights, I am very sorry.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President—

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Just a moment—until after the individual citizen has been compelled to go into a foreign court and conduct a lawsuit; and then to come to his Government and say, "I have been denied justice in that land," and then that Government, which has denied him the justice, must also refuse to submit the question to arbitration. That amounts to a practical repudiation of the doctrine that the rights of an American citizen must be respected everywhere in the world. Now, I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. NORRIS. Would the Senator from Connecticut say that an American citizen, let us say, in England, who claimed some right there and who was denied that right by somebody in England, ought not, in the first instance, be compelled to go into the courts of England for the protection of his right?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, the Senator from Nebraska is talking about something that does not exist in this amendment. The amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin provides that none of these vessels shall be allowed to protect the right of any American citizen in Mexico or in any South American country, and it carefully avoids any reference to any European power or Asiatic or other power.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President—

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. NORRIS. The question I asked the Senator from Connecticut was based upon his argument. The Senator was talking about the very thing as to which I asked him the question. As I understood the Senator, he said that to compel an American in a foreign country to go to a court to get his rights and then ask for arbitration was not right, but that we ought in the first instance to enforce his rights with the Army or with the Navy.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, my opposition to this amendment is based upon this existing situation: This amendment selects certain countries in the world, and says that the United States Navy, or such portion of it as is provided in this bill, shall not be used—whatever it may mean, and I think its language is very unfortunately arranged—to compel the collection of any pecuniary claim or to enforce the right to any concession or grant. I really do not know exactly what is meant by enforcing the collection of a pecuniary claim; but, perhaps, the idea is plain enough. However, the fact is that there is now an existing situation in Mexico which we all regret. Mr. Carranza may at any time issue an arbitrary edict confiscating every mining, agricultural, and every other kind of concession owned by an American citizen or by an American corporation in Mexico; and if this amendment is adopted the people who own such concessions, who have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in them, who have never done anything but improve the country where their investment is made, and who are trying to operate their properties peacefully—under this amendment those American citizens will be compelled to go down and to submit their rights to Mexican courts, which are absolutely controlled by the dictator Carranza. Then the United States Government—which, under the amendment offered by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. NORRIS] could send down a squadron of its vessels, if it was its claim, to reinforce the diplomatic arm of the Government when our State Department had demanded that that confiscation should cease and that the rights of the American Government should be respected—could not send one of its ships to Vera Cruz or to any other port merely to make a demonstration to convince that dictator that the American Government meant what it said through its State Department and that he must stop his confiscation, but that American citizens must be relegated to the Mexican courts.

We all know how much judicial authority there is now in Mexico; I do not mean that the situation in the other South American Republics is similar to that in Mexico, but I do mean that this amendment, if adopted, would put us as to them upon the same basis on which it puts us as to Mexico.

Mr. President, we all know the difficulty that American business men have in collecting the debts due to them from many of the South American Republics. I myself have had some experience in attempting to get the just dues of my constituents, which were finally paid after arbitration; but for 20 years you could not get a response out of the South American Republic to which I allude. There was nothing but shifting and evasion and mañana until an imperative demand was made upon them by the President, through the Secretary of State, and an ultimatum was issued, and finally very reluctantly, after 20 years, they were compelled to submit that matter to arbitration when an award was given.

Mr. President, this amendment will accomplish no good purpose. We have already incorporated in this bill a provision which was offered by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. CUMMINS] yesterday afternoon stating that it was not the policy of this Government to enter upon an imperialistic career, and that we wanted to settle disputes honorably by arbitration, so far as possible. No intelligent person believes that the United States is going to run amuck among the nations of the world or that we are going to attempt to enforce any unjust policy. The fact is that the views of this Nation upon such questions are so far in advance of the views of other nations that it is almost unsafe for us, unless we are prepared to sacrifice our own interests, to put our humanitarian views into exercise.

I think very likely to-day it is the policy of the State Department not to go to war to collect a private claim; but this amendment would prevent us sending a squadron of battleships to accompany a representation of our State Department to any South American Republic. Worse than that, it would also be considered by debtors in South American Republics as a notice by the United States Government that they may freely repudiate their obligations to American citizens, and that no demonstration, no evolution of a naval vessel, can be allowed under this statute. That is the effect which this amendment will have. What other nation of the world has seen fit to attach to its military bills proclamations of this kind? Why should we encourage the men who are our debtors in South American Republics to repu-

diate their obligations? This amendment will have no salutary effect whatever.

Now, I desire to read the amendment—I do not know whether it is the right amendment, but I read it from the RECORD—offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE] yesterday afternoon:

Provided, That no battleship, battle cruiser, scout cruiser, torpedo-boat destroyer, or submarine herein appropriated for, shall be employed in any manner to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States against the Government of Mexico or of any Central or South American Government.

I do not know exactly what "to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim" means, or what is meant by the expression "to enforce any claim of right to any grant." I do not know how a vessel could be used to enforce a claim of right.

Mr. CLAPP. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me, my recollection is that the reference to specific countries was stricken out by an amendment to the amendment, and that in the amendment as now pending the reference to specific countries has been eliminated.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I assume, of course, that the Senator is correct, but I did not know that those words had been stricken out yesterday afternoon.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Those words were stricken out.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. So that now it is a prohibition against the use of the vessels of the Navy authorized by the pending bill in such matters as to any country; it applies to all nations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair will state, for the information of the Senator from Connecticut, that—

Mr. CLAPP. I simply made the suggestion because it occurred to me that the Senator from Connecticut had not been advised of the amendment to the amendment.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I had not been advised of that, and I was reading from page 11313 of the RECORD, where the Senator from Wisconsin offered the amendment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair will state, for the information of the Senator from Connecticut, that by an amendment on yesterday, beginning with the word "against," these words were stricken out: "against the Government of Mexico or of any Central or South American Government."

Mr. BRANDEGEE. But it still applies, of course, to South America and Mexico?

The VICE PRESIDENT. It applies everywhere.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. And what I have said applies equally well—only it applies to all the world besides.

Mr. President, under that amendment it will be impossible for the United States to protect any of its citizens or corporations in their rights in Turkey, for instance, in time of peace. The Sultan of Turkey could do as he pleased about American property, and so forth, unless an American citizen should go to Turkey and begin a lawsuit, and then Turkey could refuse to arbitrate the matter.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Connecticut yield to the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LEWIS. Might I be pardoned if I interrupt the Senator with respect to the parliamentary status of this amendment? I had understood—and I am sure the Chair must be right, and has the RECORD before him—that the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. NORRIS] tendered an amendment to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE], merely comprehending all of South America and Central America, in addition to the country named in the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin. Might I ask in what amendment was Europe and every other part of the world included, Mr. President?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I will answer the Senator, Mr. President, by saying that he has entirely reversed the proposition. The amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin, as offered, was limited in its operation to Mexico, Central America, and South America. The amendment of the Senator from Nebraska has stricken out the words limiting it to those countries, so that it now applies to all the world.

Mr. LEWIS. Such is the status of the amendment now that it has no limitation, but applies to the world generally?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. It does. Without mentioning any country, it simply provides that these vessels shall not be used to collect any claim or enforce any property right.

Mr. LEWIS. Which is equivalent to prohibiting America from using its vessels anywhere under the circumstances set forth in the amendment?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Yes; for the collection of any claim or enforcement of any right concerning any franchise or concession held by any American citizen or corporation abroad any-

where. I see no call for such an amendment, Mr. President. I can see no reason why, if it is to be adopted at all, it should not apply to the whole world, for I think we ought not to withhold any demonstration against certain nations by our naval vessels by law, leaving it open to make such demonstrations against other nations. I can use no reason why we should to this bill add this kind of an amendment, which is sure to be thrown in our faces in the first diplomatic controversy that may arise concerning any property right; and I hope that the amendment will not prevail.

Mr. WORKS. Mr. President, as a matter of principle the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin appeals to me very strongly. My mind revolts at the idea of attempting to collect a debt, either public or private, by force or by putting in fear.

On the other hand, it is the duty of the Government to protect its citizens in their rights, and one of those rights may be the collection of a debt from another Government or the citizen of another Government, where the citizen has no remedy whatever unless his rights are enforced by his own Government. While I should be sorry to see the Government of the United States using the ships of its Navy to collect the debts of its citizens, I think circumstances may arise—in fact, I think they have arisen on occasions—when it will be absolutely necessary for this Government to take that course, in order to protect the rights of its own citizens.

I should not like to see that right on the part of the Government, or the duty that is imposed upon it, taken away; and for that reason, Mr. President, I shall feel myself compelled to vote against this amendment, however much I may agree with the sentiment that is contained in its provisions. I think it would be an unfortunate thing for the Government to allow it to go out to the world that the debts of its citizens in foreign countries may be absolutely repudiated and that the Government will take no such step as will be efficient in order to enforce the collection of such debts.

Mr. KENYON. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will call the roll. The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Bankhead	Gallinger	Lewis	Sherman
Beckham	Harding	Lippitt	Shields
Brandegee	Hardwick	McCumber	Simmons
Broussard	Hughes	Martin	Smith, Ariz.
Bryan	Husting	Norris	Stone
Catron	James	Oliver	Sutherland
Chamberlain	Johnson, Me.	Overman	Swanson
Chilton	Johnson, S. Dak.	Page	Taggart
Clapp	Jones	Penrose	Thomas
Clarke, Ark.	Kenyon	Pittman	Tillman
Culberson	Kern	Polindexter	Townsend
Cummins	La Follette	Pomerene	Underwood
Dillingham	Lane	Ransdell	Vardaman
Fletcher	Lee, Md.	Sheppard	Walsh

Mr. SHEPPARD. I desire to state that the Senator from Georgia [Mr. SMITH], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. SMITH], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. WARREN], and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. GRONNA] are absent on official business, being conferees on the Agricultural appropriation bill.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifty-six Senators have answered to the roll call. There is a quorum present. The question is on the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. NORRIS] to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE].

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, the Chair advises me that the pending question is upon the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska. I understood that the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska to the amendment which I offered on yesterday had been accepted by the Senate.

Mr. NORRIS. The amendment that I offered yesterday was accepted.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. If I am in error about it, I should like to be advised.

Mr. NORRIS. But I have made another motion, to add, after the word "nature," in the Senator's amendment, where it says, "any kind, class, or nature," the words "of any individual, firm, or corporation," so as to limit the claim in that way. If the Senator has the amendment before him, it makes the same limitation in regard to the first part of the amendment which the Senator already has as to the latter part.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I have it in my mind; and, if I may be permitted to do so, I will accept the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska as perfecting my amendment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator has permission to accept it. The question now is on the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin as modified.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President—

Mr. LEWIS. Before the Senator proceeds, we could not hear the modification over here, and would like to know what it is. What modification is it?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will please read the amendment as modified.

The SECRETARY. On page 172, after the word "paid," in line 13, it is proposed to insert:

Provided, That no battleship, battle cruiser, scout cruiser, torpedo-boat destroyer, or submarine herein appropriated for shall be employed in any manner to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature of any individual, firm, or corporation, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE resumed the speech begun by him on yesterday. The entire speech is as follows:

Wednesday, July 19, 1916.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, we are about to pass in the Congress of the United States a military program that will impose upon the people of this Nation the greatest tax burden for an alleged preparedness against an alleged danger that has ever been known in any country at peace with all the world.

Sir, one year ago Congress appropriated for all military purposes—that is to say, for the Army, the Navy, the coast defenses (fortifications), the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, and pensions—the total sum of \$429,234,515.

And now, within the short space of 12 months, for precisely the same military purposes, it is proposed that we shall appropriate \$844,319,152.

Mr. President, there is not a man in the United States Senate who would have had the hardihood one year ago to propose such an increase or to suggest an appropriation of such magnitude for military purposes. And there is not a Senator on this floor who would have dared to vote for such an appropriation—not one.

And yet one year ago the European war was at high tide. Then, as now, we contemplated with horror the spectacle of one-half the people of the world at the throats of their fellow men; and everything that could strike terror to the hearts of human beings was taking place on the battle fields across the Atlantic. Everything that could appeal to the Congress of the United States to make an extravagant and unprecedented expenditure of the people's money for military purposes existed 12 months ago just as much as it exists now. But at that time \$429,000,000 was appropriated. It is proposed practically to double that appropriation now. What has occurred to change the perspective?

I will tell you, Mr. President, what has occurred since. The stage has been set, the scenery has been put in place, the music has been attuned, the curtain has been run up, everything that could possibly play upon the emotions of the American people has been set to work and paid for in order that this result might be produced: Picture shows; works of fiction, running serially in the magazines; advertisements; editorials, alleging that our country is in danger from a foreign foe; the columns of the newspapers given over to a spurious propaganda, and all with the definite object of terrorizing the public and forcing the enactment of legislation for the great military and naval program now before the Congress.

I see about me many Senators who represent the States where there are great munition plants. The larger the appropriations for military purposes the better satisfied are these Senators. But how about the taxpayers who make no profits out of the manufacture of munitions of war? Eight hundred and forty-four million dollars is the measure of the load which goes upon the bended backs of the American people this year, and why? If it is necessary now, why was it not necessary one year ago? You had all the military power of Germany, all the military power of England, of France, of Russia, of Italy, of Austria-Hungary full in your eye at that time. You knew their battle-ships; you knew their naval strength. Why did you not then propose this great increase in appropriations for the Army and Navy?

Why, because the national imagination had not then been fired; had not then been worked up to the pitch of patriotic fervor that would countenance committing the country to this extraordinary and unjustifiable expenditure. The efforts of the vendors of the instruments of death to enhance their profits, to make new and continuing markets for their products, had not then borne fruit. Their campaign for the past year has been prosecuted with all the power organized wealth can command. What is the result? Congress is in a panic. Their program is accepted. One year ago it would have been pitched out of the window as a piece of impudent graft.

REASON FOR PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM.

Mr. President, the interests that are behind this preparedness program in the United States do not fear Germany, do not fear

England, do not fear any nation on this earth; but they do want a large Army, they do want a large Navy. It fits into the commercial, industrial, and imperialistic schemes of the great financial masters of this country.

Senators may think it expedient to vote for this increased appropriation at this time. The people may be under a certain vague fear and in doubt now, but when they see that their fears have been played upon, when the tax burden comes, when the weight begins to press down, when you double on every member of the family the cost of sustaining this military program, then you will be called to account, then you will have to answer their stern, deliberate, second judgment.

The danger of an attack upon our country has been made to appear very real and very imminent. It has been painted in lurid colors—moving pictures showing New York's splendid edifices toppling to destruction, under the shots of enemy guns, the enemy garbed to convey the idea that they are Germans; volumes written to show New York and New Orleans and San Francisco already captured; that the foreign hordes are sweeping across the country—have these volumes been sent to you, Senators? I have received them. Who do you suppose pays for all this? Why, the Du Pont Powder Co. had a hand in it; the Bethlehem Steel Co. doubtless made its contribution of millions of money. It was paid for out of the bloody profits made from shipping arms and ammunition abroad within the last year.

True, the American people may be influenced by the advertisements of the Bethlehem Steel Co., may be swayed by the headlines and editorials of the great metropolitan press. They may be deeply moved, the blood may tingle and the pulse quicken to the strains of hundreds of bands playing as hundreds of thousands of men and women march in parade; but when it is known that many American citizens felt impelled to march in fear of a penalty—the loss of wages or of being discharged—it alters folks' attitude as to the impressiveness of such demonstrations.

I came to the Senate one morning, prompted to introduce a resolution of investigation regarding the preparedness parade here in Washington, because I was in receipt of complaints from many of the Government employees, who were made to feel that they were being coerced to march. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. LANE] told me only a few days afterwards that when riding up on the street car in the morning he heard two plainly dressed men discussing the fact that against their will they had been compelled to march in the parade. Many other instances have doubtless come to the attention of other Senators. The same situation prevailed elsewhere. I have been informed that in Chicago and other cities workmen were coerced to march in the parades by their employers. While the masses of marchers and the spectators were doubtless sincere in expressions of enthusiasm, nevertheless these parades are a part of the deliberate scheme to move the American people to sustain these enormous appropriations for an increased Army and an increased Navy.

What do we want of an increased Navy and an increased Army such as this great military program provides? What changed conditions warrant doubling the appropriations of a year ago?

Mr. President, there is absolutely nothing in the situation, nothing in the conditions that can be made to justify placing this extortionate tax burden upon the people of the United States. There is not one substantial reason why this Congress should double the appropriation for military purposes at this time.

OUR COAST DEFENSES.

It is claimed that we are preparing for defense, not for aggression. Logically, we should inquire first of all as to our coast defenses, should we not? What about our coast defenses?

The highest authority on this subject is Gen. Erasmus Weaver. He is a member of the General Staff, a member of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, and a member of the Joint Army and Navy Board. In his testimony given a few months ago before the House Committee on Military Affairs he said:

We have the best coast defenses in the world. The guns now mounted and those contemplated will give us an entirely satisfactory defense.

Again Gen. Weaver, testifying before the same committee, recommended that 11,000 men, including officers, should be added to the Coast Artillery. Representative McKELLAR, a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs, questioned him further:

Mr. McKELLAR. If we conclude to carry out your recommendations and give you the 11,000 men, then, as I understand you, you would have a perfect system of coast defense that you think would be adequate for any purpose?

Gen. WEAVER. Yes.

Mr. McKELLAR. Your idea is that your guns are sufficient now?

Gen. WEAVER. The guns now mounted and those contemplated will give us an entirely satisfactory defense.

Mr. MCKELLAR. You do not take any stock in this idea that the ships of foreign nations carrying guns of longer range can silence your guns?

Gen. WEAVER. No.

Gen. Weaver's statement has been given little, if any, publicity in the press of the country; and yet he is the highest authority, and his integrity and ability entitle him to supreme confidence. If some subordinate officer of the Army or Navy urges an unlimited increase, his testimony is blazoned on the front pages of the great dailies of the country, which, responding to the advertising power back of immense preparedness, also surrender their editorial good will to their advertising space. A business man who may know nothing of military equipment, if he boasts for big preparedness appropriations, gets the front page. But Gen. Weaver's testimony, of such profound interest to the people of the country, would have been buried in oblivion of the Government report, except as it has been cited by two or three Congressmen in the debates and printed by the few surviving public-spirited newspapers and magazines.

I call another high authority as to our coast defenses. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, late head of the Army, testified before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives that—

During the last 30 years the Government has spent approximately \$200,000,000 for our coast defense.

Think of it! We have already expended \$200,000,000 upon our coast defenses. We are this year adding \$40,000,000 more to that amount.

I do not speak in disparagement of expenditures of this class. I give them my cordial support. Coast fortifications, coast artillery, and a sufficient mobile force of soldiers for coast and border defense I will as strongly support as any other Senator here. They are for defense. They can not be used for over-seas conquest; they can not be used to coerce weaker nations in the interest of speculative investors in foreign countries. They offer little or no inducement for powerful war traders to lobby Congress for extravagant appropriations. They constitute one class of expenditures for preparedness which makes for peace instead of war.

OUR GUNS SUPERIOR TO THOSE AT THE DARDANELLES.

You Democrats can save your party a bad score in your record if you will go back to the position that the President took one year ago, when, with the assembled Congress before him, he said that he would not consent that our country should be made a military camp.

Gen. Miles retired—but retired with an experience that strengthens and seasons the judgment testified on this subject. He had seen war, the real thing, covering a period of nearly 50 years of the history of the United States. Listen to what he says:

I am prepared to say that our coasts are as well defended as the coasts of any country and with the same class of high-power guns and heavy projectiles. They are better in some respects than the guns that are mounted at the Dardanelles, which have resisted the most powerful ships of war of the British and French Navies.

The results at Alexandria, Port Arthur, and at the Dardanelles furnish sufficient evidence that guns on board ships are no match for coast fortifications and submarine guns.

I cite the testimony of another authority of the highest rank as to our coast defenses being able to withstand the attack of any navy in the world. Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, chief of the Atlantic Fleet, the ranking officer of our Navy, says:

It has been recently forcibly demonstrated that ship attacks on forts are futile. This war has conclusively demonstrated what every military strategist knew before, that it is impossible for sea craft to successfully attack land fortifications.

Against the opinions of the doughty warriors of the Senate, great though their military wisdom may be, I put the judgment of Gen. Weaver, who says that "we have the best coast defenses of the world"; the judgment of Gen. Miles, who says that "our coasts are as well defended as the coasts of any country, with the same high-power guns and heavy projectiles, better in some respects than the guns mounted at the Dardanelles, which have resisted the most powerful ships of war of the British and French Navies"; and the judgment of Admiral Fletcher, who says that "this war has conclusively demonstrated that it is impossible for sea craft to successfully attack land fortifications."

Ah! But the military geniuses of the Senate suggest that the enemy may land an army at some point on our open and unfortified coasts.

THE TWO OCEANS—NATURE'S DEFENSES.

But hold fast to your fears, Senators, and be of good cheer. There is still hope for our country. Gen. Miles offers some relief from utter despair. I quote from his testimony as to the ability

of a foreign enemy to "land an army upon our open and unfortified coasts." He says:

I will suppose an un-supposable case. Suppose they could put an army on a fleet of 500 ships and move it across the Atlantic without being disturbed by any naval power, and they could land. They certainly could not go into any port. They could not go into our ports any more than they could go through the Dardanelles. That has been demonstrated. Our forts are equipped and fortified as well as the Dardanelles. Suppose they got that far—as to landing at some remote point—if we could not gather enough men in the Army and militia and by other means to destroy that army before they could send their ships back and get another load, I would want to move to some other country.

Mr. President, I am curious to know how many Senators have studied the testimony of experts on the question of attacking an enemy country three or four thousand miles distant. We have been warned and badgered and frightened that invasion from some unknown source might happen to us in this country, and I think perhaps it has temporarily produced in the public mind a state of apprehension and dread.

Telfer-Smolett, of the English Army, is recognized as an authority on over-seas military expeditions. He made a special study of this subject, and was accorded a gold medal on his thesis. I wonder if Senators have any conception of what a job it is. It would take, according to this English military authority, 270 troop-transport vessels to move an army of from 72,000 to 96,000 men—that is, two corps—including two divisions of cavalry, across the sea to make an attack. Now, just think of it a moment! These 270 transports and other necessary ships would constitute the greatest collection of vessels in one body that has been seen together in the history of the naval operations of the world. If Germany wanted to send an army of a hundred thousand men—and Germany is the scare country for the munition makers and preparedness propagandists—if she wanted to send over to this country a hundred thousand men from her shores, a distance of 4,000 miles, she would necessarily have to have 270 transports, and then she would have to add to that fleet the necessary vessels for heavy artillery and all of the military equipment that would go with an army of a hundred thousand men. She would have a fleet moving across the Atlantic, when distributed so that they could sail without peril to each other, of some 5 or 6 miles in extent for the front line and from 10 to 12 miles in depth. These unarmed vessels, carrying an army of only 100,000 across from the other side to assail us, would have to be literally surrounded by a navy, and then there would be every possible peril of their destruction by mines and submarines—leaving the master ships and other sea craft of our Navy wholly out of consideration.

Never in the history of the world, according to my reading, has an army been moved over-seas and landed in any enemy country under hostile guns. The only time when it was ever undertaken was when the English attempted to land their army at the Dardanelles—as a military undertaking the most melancholy failure of the whole war.

Rear Admiral Knight, member of the General Board and president of the Naval War College, gave some testimony before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, which is very important on this point. True, he was not testifying as to the difficulties of a European power or of Japan attempting an over-seas expedition to land an army upon our coast. He was testifying as to sending an army, conveyed by our Navy, over to defend the Philippines. But while the distance would be greater for such an expedition to the Philippines than for an over-seas expedition from Europe or Japan against our country, nevertheless the admiral's reasoning as to the difficulties attending an over-seas expedition applied to an attack on us by a foreign power is distinctly in point.

IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE GREAT ARMY OVER-SEAS.

He said that it was practically an impossibility to convey an army across 7,000 miles of water to prosecute a campaign. I do not want to misquote him. Let me get his exact language.

Admiral Knight, being questioned on this subject by Representative CALLAWAY, a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House, answered:

It would take me a very long time to go into that subject at all satisfactorily. Mr. CALLAWAY, and show you the difficulties under which a fleet 7,000 miles from its home ports would labor. Ships break down. Out of a large number of ships a certain number are bound to be crippled in one way or another. The supplies needed to maintain the fleet would be very extensive. Five or six hundred thousand tons of coal would be needed as a minimum for a very short campaign there. That coal must be delivered and transferred from colliers to ships. It can not be done at sea, except under the most favorable possible conditions. It must be done in sheltered waters. The bottoms of the ships would gradually get foul. They ought to have docks where the bottoms can be cleaned. They are subject in their progress over that 7,000 miles, throughout a large part of the time, to the possibilities of attack from the enemy's torpedo craft and other craft of that kind. Their lines of communication, after they get to the point 7,000 miles away, are constantly liable to interruption and would inevitably be interrupted; and yet they depend on those long lines, stretching away back

to the home ports, for the very vital things necessary to their life—for coal and supplies and reinforcements. If reinforcements become necessary, and all sorts of things. A fleet going out there would be accompanied, necessarily, by a tremendous attendant fleet, a train, as we call it, of auxiliary ammunition ships, hospital ships, and so forth.

The problem of conducting such a train as that in going thousands of miles through hostile waters is probably the most serious problem that could possibly be put up to a commander in chief.

The personnel, the officers and men, of a fleet moving under those conditions would be subject to conditions which are so trying that it is very difficult to picture them without some little experience. Constantly on the watch, constantly threatened, constantly on the alert to guard against some danger which may come out of the darkness or out of the fog at any moment upon them, after moving that distance they would be broken down, they would be tired, they would need rest. They would have no secure place to rest. Your fleet would get out there with its material in very bad condition, its personnel in perhaps worse condition, and when it got there it would have no place to go for refitting or for any purpose whatever. It would be not unlike the proposition which confronted Admiral Rojestvensky when he went out to the east and met the Japanese fleet, and you know what happened to him. He had a larger fleet than the enemy had, distinctly.

I would not like to be considered as attempting anything like a complete answer to your question, nor could I give such an answer without talking here all day.

He has presented only a few of the many reasons why an enemy can not transport a large army thousands of miles over-sea to attack another country; and when it is proposed to put upon the American people the expense of maintaining a great navy, under the pretense that it is to protect our coast from invasion, the evidence is against the proposition. There is no rational reason for it. No evidence, from history or from military authority can be called to support it.

AN INSUPERABLE UNDERTAKING.

Now listen to a further questioning of the admiral by the Representative:

Mr. CALLAWAY. I want to get a concise statement. You consider the enormous dangers of transporting a fleet across a great expanse of hostile water—

Admiral KNIGHT. And maintaining it.

Mr. CALLAWAY. And maintaining it.

Admiral KNIGHT. Yes; I think those dangers are almost insuperable.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Almost insuperable?

Admiral KNIGHT. Yes.

Mr. CALLAWAY. And the maintaining of it is necessary to the conduct of war?

Admiral KNIGHT. Yes.

Mr. CALLAWAY. And you say those difficulties are almost insuperable?

Admiral KNIGHT. The difficulties are almost insuperable.

There you have it.

Our coast defenses are the best in the world; our guns many of them superior to those at the Dardanelles, and those at the Dardanelles defied the combined power of Great Britain and France, and made that first attempt in the history of the world to land an over-sea military force under hostile guns a disastrous and humiliating failure to Great Britain, costing a tremendous, needless loss of life, and the expenditure of vast sums of money and shaking confidence of the world in all naval calculations.

But, Mr. President, more than this, the transportation of an army of only 100,000 men, with horses, field guns, mammoth siege guns, equipment, and ammunition, including a base of supply thousands of miles over-seas to be landed in this country, is a monster undertaking without a precedent or a parallel. According to all military authorities which I have been able to consult, it is agreed that such an expedition must be kept together; that it must be subject to the delays incident to the development of latent difficulties in the motive power of each vessel, to storms at sea, to attacks in transit, and that the convey of one such expedition alone, to say nothing of the return trips necessary to reinforce such an army, is involved in such an infinite number of hazards as to render the undertaking practically insuperable.

COUNTRY IS VICTIM OF A CONSPIRACY.

Gen. Miles says "it is an unsupposable thing." Admiral Knight says "the dangers of transporting a fleet across a great expanse of water and maintaining it are almost insuperable." I say, then, that plain common sense and military authority confirm the stubborn fact, which history teaches and our experience fortifies, namely, that the two oceans are a great natural barrier against an over-seas expedition to land an army of invasion upon our coasts.

And when it is remembered that our coast defenses, protecting all our great harbors, inlets, and cities, are impregnable, that submarines can patrol all our coasts, that mines can be laid wherever needed, that transportable field guns of the greatest range and power can be expeditiously transported to any part of our open coasts—leaving out of consideration our Navy as a weapon of defense, on which we have expended \$1,655,928,647 in the last 15 years, which is more than any other nation in the world except England has appropriated for like purposes—remembering all this, it seems to me that a just consideration for

the taxpayers of the country ought to halt us in this mad race to become the greatest military Government in the world.

Mr. President, I think I would fight—I never have been accused up to the present time in any kind of a contest of letting the other fellow see my back—and I am as ready as any man to go into the ranks to fight, when there is something to fight for; but I object, Mr. President, to a game, a plan, a conspiracy to force upon this country a big army and a big navy, to use the treasure of the country, and if need be the lives of its people, to make good the foreign speculation of a few unscrupulous masters of finance.

OUR NAVY.

The proof is overwhelming that our coast defenses are sufficient to withstand any over-seas attack. The proof is overwhelming that a three or four thousand mile over-seas military expedition against us is practically an insuperable undertaking. The proof is likewise overwhelming that with modern submarines and modern anchored marine mines and portable long-range guns, we have in fact no such thing as an open and undefended coast line. Let us see about the strength of our Navy.

The supreme thing in the Navy, we are told, is the battleship. That is the reason why we have 10 of them loaded onto us here in this bill that were not in the bill as it passed the House. The battleship is the standard of the strength and power of the Navy. We are told—a little bit vaguely, I venture to say (maybe another naval engagement will revise that telling)—but we are told now, by the exponents of a big navy and a big army and an unlimited expenditure of the people's money to pay for it, that the recent naval battle at Jutland demonstrated that the battleship is to be taken as the test of naval strength. Now, accepting that, let us see where our Navy stands, and what it is our duty to do.

Mr. President, at the present time we have in our Navy 42 battleships, and Admiral Blue says:

We have more auxiliary craft than any other nation maintains in time of peace.

Eighteen months ago—now, that is not very long in navy building—Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, was examined before the House Committee on Naval Affairs of this Congress. Mr. President, that committee made a very thorough investigation. Three massive volumes of testimony were taken to ascertain the conditions upon which to predicate legislation.

ADMIRAL FLETCHER MAKES IMPORTANT ADMISSIONS.

Mr. BUTLER is a member of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. Remember that he had the head of the Atlantic Fleet of the United States on the witness stand:

Mr. BUTLER. We have been put down as second, third, or fourth in the number of ships. Is not that true?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is about our relative position—second or third.

He did not put us down to fourth place. He got as close to it as he could. He strained a bit to put us down to third place, as will appear afterwards.

Mr. BUTLER. Where do we stand, Admiral?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have not personally gone into that, but I have estimates that place us about third at the present time.

That is better than fourth. Now, I want you to watch the testimony of the admiral for a little while.

Mr. BUTLER. Are we strong enough to offer a decided resistance at this time against any nation?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not against all nations.

What do these men of the Navy want? It is their business. They are prejudiced witnesses and their testimony in this important event is to be considered in that light. They want a big Navy. Aside from the selfish considerations of promotion and all that, it is their training; it is their life. We would be the same in their position, I have no doubt, but I beg of you to take that into account in considering their evidence.

Mr. BUTLER had asked:

Are we strong enough to offer a decided resistance at this time against any nation?

The admiral replied:

Not against all nations.

Is not that a curious answer? Mr. BUTLER followed it up:

Mr. BUTLER. I do not mean in a combination.

Admiral FLETCHER. Not against the most powerful nation.

Mark his answer: "NOT AGAINST THE MOST POWERFUL NATION."

Did any of you see this statement of the admiral that we need fear but one nation, played up in the newspapers? For over two years Germany has been held up as a threat to this country. Admiral Fletcher admits here plainly, and he says

more plainly further on, that there is but one navy in the world superior to ours—the navy of England.

You have been terrorized about Germany's navy. Have you forgotten that the German Navy is but little more than one-half the size of the British Navy; that it was held in limbo under the guns of Helgoland during 18 months or more of this war? It took the greater part of the British Navy to tie it up. Is there not a lesson in that for us? Germany, with a navy only a little more than half as big as that of Great Britain, by adding to it the modern accessories of defense, prevented Great Britain from landing on German soil.

Thursday, July 20, 1916.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, yesterday I had just begun to present the facts with respect to our Navy by quoting from the testimony taken by the committees of Congress. Now, Mr. President, I want to offer a little more evidence, expert in its character, as bearing upon the strength of our Navy as compared with the leading navies of the world.

Congressman Witherspoon, lately deceased, a former member of the committee of the House, possessed, I believe, more accurate and technical information with regard to our Navy and the navies of the world than any man in public life. I find his questioning of expert witnesses of special value and importance in getting at the truth. I read from his examination of Admiral Fletcher. This was a little more than 18 months ago. At that time we had 40 battleships in our Navy. We now have 42.

Mr. Witherspoon took up, one after another, the navies of the world and subjected Admiral Fletcher to a cross-examination as to our comparative strength when tested as against the navy of each one of these nations; and I want to go over that. First he takes England, and he says:

ENGLAND.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Admiral, I understand you to state, in answer to Mr. BUTLER's questions, that we are not able to defend ourselves against the most powerful nation. Did I understand you correctly?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. How many battleships has England got?

Admiral FLETCHER. According to this table here [indicating] England has 20 dreadnaughts built.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. The total number? How many has she in all?

Admiral FLETCHER. This table puts it at 60.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I did not ask about that statement. I have seen that old statement before. I do not care anything about that statement. The Navy Yearbook puts the number of English battleships—completed, building, and authorized—at 72. Now, your idea is that if those 72 ships were pitted against ours, we could not be able to resist them; is that it?

Admiral FLETCHER. We could resist them; but we would probably be defeated.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. That is what I mean; we could not resist them successfully.

Admiral FLETCHER. No; all else being equal.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. It has been told this committee by high authorities in the Navy Department—among others, Admiral Vreeland—that if we had a war with England, on account of its relations with other nations in Europe, it could not afford to send more than 50 per cent of its ships against us. Do you believe that is so?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is a question of policy and of political conditions in Europe, upon which I would not pretend to pass judgment.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then your statement that we could not resist England would be on the assumption that she could send her entire fleet, or more than one-half of it, against us?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; she would control the sea if she could keep there a more powerful fleet than ours.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Or not afraid with war with the rest of the world; not afraid to take all the ships away from her own coast and to send all of them, or a large majority of them, against us? Your statement is based on that?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir. It is based on actual superiority.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, on the assumption which certain naval experts have told us is correct—that she could not send more than 50 per cent of her 72 against us—you would not say then that we would not be able to resist them successfully, would you?

Mark you, Mr. President, at the time this testimony was given we had 40 battleships and England had 72. The question submitted to the admiral by Judge Witherspoon is:

On the assumption * * * that she could not send more than 50 per cent of her 72 against us, you would not say then that we would not be able to resist them successfully, would you?

Admiral FLETCHER. I would not like to pass judgment upon a supposititious case of that kind.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. What I am asking you about—without going into it more carefully—is this: You do not mean to say that we could not successfully resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. Could not successfully resist a power like England if she utilized only half of her force against us?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes, sir.

Admiral FLETCHER. That question I would not like to pass judgment upon.

Senators, that may impress you as being a frank answer. It does not quite seem that way to me.

Let us go a little further with this witness:

Mr. WITHERSPOON. It would be a pretty close question, and you would not want your statement which you made to Mr. BUTLER to apply to that condition?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am unable to say.

GERMANY.

Well, Judge Witherspoon gave him up on England and took up Germany next. I want you just to follow his answers on Germany:

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, according to the Navy Yearbook, Germany has battleships, built, building, and authorized, 39. That is, according to the last Navy Yearbook. Would you say that if she could send all those ships against us we would not be able to resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. I would say that we ought to, if we have the greater force.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; we ought—certainly we ought, and we could.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir. The greater force should win.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; we could.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think so.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, it has been stated to us that if Germany was at war with us she could not afford, either, to send more than one-half of her ships against us.

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I am not asking whether you do or do not. Assuming that she could only send half her 39, would you not say that we could successfully resist that number?

He came up to the scratch that time:

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; I would say that, if all our force is available to meet her.

Think of it! The Admiral wanted "all our force" of 40 battleships in order to successfully resist one-half of the German battleship force—or 19 German battleships.

FRANCE.

Let us go along with Admiral Fletcher. Now he takes up France.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, take France. This Navy Yearbook says that France has a grand total of battleships, built, building, and authorized, of 29—11 less than we have.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Would you not say, if she sent all of hers against us, we would be able to successfully resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; our forces available being the greater.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. And if she only sent one-half of them, we would not have much of a fight, would we?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; we ought not to.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. That is the way I look at it.

JAPAN.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Here is Japan, which according to the Navy Yearbook, has only 19 battleships, or 21 less than we have got. If Japan should send all of her 19 against us, do you not think we would be able successfully to resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. I should say so, if our forces were free to meet them at the time.

Mr. TILLMAN. The Panama Canal was closed at that time. That is why he put in that "if."

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Yes.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. And if she did not send but half of them, there would not be much of a scrap, would there?

Admiral FLETCHER. Probably not.

RUSSIA.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, here is Russia, that the Navy Yearbook says has a grand total of 15 battleships, completed and building. If she should send all of them against us, would you not say that we could successfully resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

And he did not qualify it at all. He just stiffened up, you know, to meet that, and said, without any equivocation or qualification whatever, that we could meet those Russian battleships; and I am gratified that he admitted that much, anyhow.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. And if she sent half of them, there would not be any fight at all, would there?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not much.

ITALY.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Here is Italy that has a grand total, according to the Navy Yearbook, of 17 battleships. We could successfully resist them whether she sent all of them or a part of them, could we not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I think so.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; I do, too.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, Austria-Hungary, according to the Navy Yearbook, has a grand total of battleships, built and building, of 10. We could successfully resist them, could we not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think so.

ENGLAND ALONE TO FEAR.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then what nation is there that we are not prepared to successfully resist? There is not one on earth, is there, Admiral—not a single one?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, Judge, I think there is.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, which one? I have gone through the big ones. Tell me which one.

Admiral FLETCHER. I should say England has a navy so much more powerful than that of any other nation in the world that she could easily keep control of the seas.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. England. Well, what other one, then?

Now, note his answer, and let it stand out plainly in this record.

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think that we need greatly fear any other single nation.

So this German bugaboo goes down before the testimony of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. There is no other nation, except England, that in your judgment we could not successfully defend ourselves against; I mean, except England.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is correct. Yes.

We have the truth at last. Let the whole country know it. Without any additions to our Navy whatever, it is to-day superior to that of any nation on earth excepting England.

Mr. THOMAS. Does the Senator believe there are half a dozen newspapers in the United States that would have published that testimony?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. No; I believe not. I think it has never been published to the people of the country.

Mr. THOMAS. I will state that I saw it in but one periodical, and that was Pearson's Magazine.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. That is a fearless magazine. Its policy is to keep free from advertising influence. It has done good work on this preparedness issue.

SHIP FOR SHIP WE EQUAL ENGLAND.

Now, Mr. Witherspoon starts in to show that, ship for ship, gun for gun, our Navy is superior to that of England's—not in numbers, but ship for ship.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Has England got any such powerful ships in her navy as we have, or have you ever studied that?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.
Mr. WITHERSPOON. Have you ever taken up the English ships and compared them with American ships, so as to form your own judgment as to whether she had any such ships as we have? Do you think she has?

Admiral FLETCHER. She has many ships which are very nearly of the same power as our own ships of the same time of building.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Let us see about that, now. I do not believe she has, although you know more about it than I do.

He was pretty liberal with the admiral.

In this Navy Yearbook, which gives us a list of the English battle-ships, I find that the last five dreadnaughts that England has built or is building are named the *Royal Sovereign*, *Royal Oak*, *Ramillies*, *Revolution*, and *Revenge*, each of which has a tonnage of 26,000.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.
Mr. WITHERSPOON. And we have two ships, the *Pennsylvania* and No. 39, which have a tonnage of 31,400, and then we have authorized three more which are to have a tonnage, as I understand, of 31,800.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty-two thousand.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Thirty-two thousand tons. In other words, the tonnage of the *Pennsylvania* and No. 39 is 5,400 more than that of the last five English dreadnaughts that are building, and the last three dreadnaughts that we are building have a tonnage of 6,000 tons greater than the last five English ships. Do you mean that those ships are equal to ours?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I do not say that.
Mr. WITHERSPOON. Do you regard them as inferior to ours?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; as near as we can estimate it.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I do, too; and the armament of those five ships is eight 15-inch guns, while the armaments of the five American ships is twelve 14-inch guns. Which is more powerful armament, eight 15-inch guns or twelve 14-inch guns?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think the twelve 14-inch guns more powerful, but I am not sure that opinion is concurred in by all authorities.

AMERICAN SHIPS SUPERIOR.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then, according to your judgment, the last five ships in both navies show a superiority of the American ships to the English ships?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Have you compared the English ships, ship by ship, with ours, to form the same kind of judgment as to which is superior as you have just formed in reference to the last five?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not in detail; no.

I think Judge Witherspoon would have been quite warranted in saying to him—he ought to have that information—that as the head of the active Navy of this country he ought to know what the Yearbook could tell him regarding the navies of the world.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Have you compared the English ships, ship by ship, with ours, to form the same kind of judgment as to which is superior as you have just formed in reference to the last five?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not in detail; no.

I will undertake to say that Judge Witherspoon knew exactly.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then you can not give a judgment as to which has got the more powerful, ship for ship, England or America?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; not in detail. In a general way it has been our policy, and the committee has appropriated money to build ships heavier than the ships of foreign countries.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then, understanding your testimony, after reviewing it, do you want us to understand that England is the only nation on earth that has a navy that we could not successfully resist?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is the fair conclusion. Yes, sir; at the present time.

So at last our first admiral admits that England has the ONLY NAVY ON THIS EARTH WE CAN NOT SUCCESSFULLY RESIST.

I am sure Senators who have been following me thus far will be very glad to know the views of Admiral Badger upon this question of the enlargement of our Navy, and what its rank and standing is.

ADMIRAL BADGER'S TESTIMONY.

On the same day that Admiral Fletcher gave the foregoing testimony Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger, a member of the General Board and lately commander in chief of the Atlantic

Fleet, testifying before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, was interrogated by Representative Witherspoon, as follows:

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, Admiral, in your first statement I understood you to say that our Navy, ship for ship, was as good as the navies of other countries.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I want to ask you if it is not a fact that, ship for ship, they are better?

Admiral BADGER. I can not answer that absolutely. I believe they are as good or better. They are not inferior.

Mr. Witherspoon then examined the witness and elicited from him the information that, comparing the last five German and American ships under construction, ours, ship for ship, were larger and heavier vessels.

After which the following question was asked:

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then the fact of ours being so much larger than Germany's shows that they are better or we are wasting money in building them larger, are we not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. We are building them to be better than the German's. That is the idea in building them larger, that they shall be better than corresponding ships of other nations, if possible.

Representative Witherspoon further conducted the examination of Admiral Badger, comparing the American Navy with the German Navy ship by ship as to tonnage, thickness of armor, and destructive force of armament, eliciting from the witness in an examination extending over many pages the statement that ship by ship and gun by gun our Navy was superior to that of Germany. He concluded this interesting examination with the following:

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then there would not be any question about the superiority of our Navy; is not that so?

Admiral BADGER. There are a few other points, but I do not think it is necessary to go into them.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, I wanted to get your view about that, because I do not like to hear Americans running around and talking about the German Navy being superior to ours. I know it is not so.

Admiral BADGER. You have not heard me say that.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. No; and I am glad that it is so. I hope you never will say it, because there is not any truth in it.

I do not believe any Senator would find himself justified by his constituents if he went back to them in the coming November and proclaimed that he had voted for a policy that contemplated the building of the largest navy in the world. I do not believe he would be sustained in his course of action. That, however, is the plan upon which we have set out. That is the scheme of the gentlemen who are back of this legislation. The president of the War College, a member of the General Board, Rear Admiral Knight, made it perfectly clear in testimony given only a few months ago before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives that the plan upon which we have started is the building of a navy equal or superior to that of England.

Now, I propose to put that testimony into the Record. I shall not make any impression upon the Senate with it, but it shall be of record that the plan upon which we have started, the scheme of appropriations for which the Senate proposes to stand in this bill, is the building of a navy equal to or greater than that of England.

PLAN A NAVY EQUAL TO ENGLAND'S.

In February, 1916, Rear Admiral Knight was questioned by Representative OLIVER, of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, and he answered as follows.

Mr. OLIVER. Just as briefly as you can, will you tell me just how many capital ships you calculate we should build by 1925?

Dreadnaughts and the armored cruisers constitute the so-called capital ships of any navy, as I understand it.

Admiral KNIGHT. In my mind, it has been impossible to arrive at a definite figure, because the results of this war may very seriously modify the standard toward which we are working.

Mr. OLIVER. I understand that general statement.

Admiral KNIGHT. I mean, for instance, now, the largest navy in the world is that of Great Britain.

Mr. OLIVER. Yes.

Admiral KNIGHT. It is quite possible that a good many of her ships may be destroyed before the war is over. If she should be victorious in the war, in spite of losing a good many of her ships she would still remain with the largest navy in the world—the largest, although it would be much smaller than it is now.

Mr. OLIVER. What I would like to have you do is to state what is the standard you have in mind that we have to build to. Perhaps that might be modified later, lessened by what you have stated; but what have you in mind, conceding perhaps there will not be any great amount of vessels destroyed whose places will not be taken by others; what had you in mind as the standard to which you would be aiming?

Admiral KNIGHT. A navy equal to that which Great Britain had at the beginning of the war.

Mr. President, that is the plan back of this legislation. We are to build a Navy equal to that of England at the beginning of the war, and that with the prospect that England's Navy will be reduced in strength as a result of the war.

Continuing this testimony:

Mr. OLIVER. How many capital ships do you calculate you will have to build in order to have a Navy of that strength? I will ask you how many additional capital ships you will have to build?

Admiral KNIGHT. Approximately 20 dreadnaughts.

Mr. OLIVER. Twenty more dreadnaughts?

Admiral KNIGHT. Twenty more dreadnaughts.

Mr. OLIVER. How many battle cruisers?

Admiral KNIGHT. In addition to the 9 I am recommending for this year's program, I would say 6, making 15 in all.

Mr. OLIVER. Thirty-five capital ships.

Admiral KNIGHT. When I said what Great Britain had at the beginning of the war, I meant built and building.

Mr. OLIVER. How many scouts would you say?

Admiral KNIGHT. We have none now. I would say 24.

Mr. OLIVER. How many submarines additional to the 75 that we now have?

Admiral KNIGHT. Seventy-five more.

Mr. OLIVER. Seventy-five more. How many torpedo boats?

Admiral KNIGHT. We have now 75 boats. I would say 75 more.

In answer to Representative CALLAWAY Admiral Knight testified:

Mr. CALLAWAY. Admiral, you stated a while ago that we would have to have 20 battleships, 15 battle cruisers, and accompanying craft in the way of scouts, torpedo boats, and submarines to make our fleet equal to what England's is now; that we would have to have those in addition to what we now have. Did you take into consideration in that what England might add in the meantime, or would we have to carry on a separate building program equal to England's building program?

Admiral KNIGHT. I expressed the opinion that in order to be on a par with England in 1925 it would be necessary for us to build between now and that time the number of ships which you have named, and I do not believe that it will be necessary for us to build more than that by 1925, in order to find ourselves on a level with England at the expiration of that time.

WOULD MEET ENGLAND'S PROGRAM.

It is perfectly evident, Mr. President, from the testimony of Admirals Fletcher, Badger, and Knight and from the recommendations of the Senate committee that we are inaugurating a naval program which is to impose upon the people of this country tax burdens equal to those the people of Great Britain have to carry in order to maintain their navy.

Mr. CALLAWAY, questioning further, says:

Mr. CALLAWAY. I am talking now about actual facts. I understood you to say that we would have to add that many to what we now have to make our fleet equal England's fleet as it now is.

Admiral KNIGHT. In other words, I believe that the fleet of England in 1925 will probably not be stronger than it is to-day.

Mr. CALLAWAY. The number of ships that you suggested we would have to add to ours to make our fleet as great as England's is based on what England now has?

Admiral KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CALLAWAY. If she went on building in addition to that, we would have to meet her building program, would we not?

Admiral KNIGHT. We would.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Now, Admiral, do I understand you to say that you believe we would not have to keep up the rate of building, after we had caught up with England, that has been the rate during late years going on, because the other countries will not be able to continue their building?

Admiral KNIGHT. I think that after this war two things will happen to England. I think England will find herself with a much smaller number of ships than she has now, and I think she will be so poor that unless some threat is directed against her she will hesitate to spend large sums of money in enlarging her navy in what will seem to her an unnecessary way.

HALF OF BIG PROGRAM IN THE BILL.

Mr. President, that seems to me to be rather an important consideration that might have prevailed with the Senate committee. They are putting into this bill one-half of this program. They are committing the country to an expenditure of a sum of money that will provide 10 battleships within the next five years. This is 1916. Admiral Knight says that in order to make a navy equal to England's by 1925 we should build 20 of these great battleships or dreadnaughts. One-half that number is provided for in this bill as amended by the Senate committee.

COMMITTEE ADOPTS ADMIRAL KNIGHT'S PROGRAM.

I think that proves conclusively that the Senate committee is following the plan of these admirals—the plan of the General Board, committing us to a policy that means a navy equal to England's.

Mr. TILLMAN. I will say to the Senator that the Committee on Naval Affairs had no such idea as that.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, the chairman of the Naval Committee may not have any such idea, but the Committee on Naval Affairs has put into the bill one-half of the dreadnaughts that the president of the War College said would be necessary to make our Navy by 1925 equal to England's in dreadnaughts in 10 years from the time he gave his testimony, and, as proposed by the Senate committee, we have here a proposition to vote for one-half of these dreadnaughts at this time, these to be built within five years.

The committee bill requires that we build in the next 5 years one-half of the dreadnaughts that Admiral Knight says we

should build in 10 years, if we are to equal the navy of Great Britain.

I tell you, Mr. President, here is indubitable evidence, whether the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate may understand it or not, that they are committed to the policy which Admiral Knight lays down of imposing upon the American people the enormous burden of a navy equal to that of England.

I propose to show to the Senate that there is not a reason on earth why we should have such a navy. Admiral Knight himself says here that by the end of this war conditions will be so changed that England will be reduced in power. Listen to his testimony a little further:

Mr. CALLAWAY. I am talking now about actual facts. I understood you to say that we would have to add that many—

That is, 20 dreadnaughts and 15 battle cruisers, or 35 master ships.

I understood you to say that we would have to add that many to what we now have to make our fleet equal to England's fleet as it now is.

Admiral KNIGHT. In other words, I believe that the fleet of England in 1925 will probably not be stronger than it is to-day.

And I want to say that Mr. CALLAWAY, a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, has impressed me as a man of superior ability and great industry. No one can read the testimony taken by the committee of the House of Representatives and come to any other conclusion.

Mr. CALLAWAY. The number of ships that you suggested we would have to add to ours to make our fleet as great as England's is based on what England now has?

Admiral KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. TILLMAN. England has lost a good many ships since then.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Yes; England has lost many ships since then, and Admiral Knight says in his testimony that he anticipates such losses.

Mr. TILLMAN. And she has built a good many.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. About that, I will say to the Senator from South Carolina, we do not know very much.

Mr. TILLMAN. We get it from the newspapers.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. The newspapers do not know very much as to what is going on over there. It is behind the screen of censorship. England would not permit any more than Germany will permit the world to know its losses and its construction during this war period.

But, Mr. President, you may be sure that the warring nations are taxed severely to keep their navies up to the condition that existed when the war started. Admiral Knight says that they will not be able to do it. He says that England's Navy will be weaker at the end of this war than in the beginning, and that if England is victorious it will be victory obtained by a very much reduced navy.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jones in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Mississippi?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Certainly.

Mr. VARDAMAN. If the Senator will permit a suggestion, I would remind him that England realizes that she does not need a larger navy now. She is so pressed for money and men to meet her enemy on the ground that it is not reasonable to suppose that she is now investing money in building ships.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, that is a most rational suggestion and I think it is borne out by the expert testimony.

ENGLAND'S NAVY TO BE SMALLER.

Admiral Knight says that to make our Navy equal to the navy of England by 1925 it is only necessary to have 20 battleships in 10 years from the time of giving that testimony. We here are committing ourselves to half of that program. Yet he follows it in two minutes with the statement that England will come out of this war, in his opinion, with a greatly reduced naval strength. He says:

I think England will find herself with a much smaller number of ships than she has now.

When this war is over will she go on building, will she go on increasing? No; he says not. He says that she will be so poor that "unless some threat is directed against her she will hesitate to spend large sums of money in enlarging her navy in what will seem to be to her an unnecessary way." Then later on he says he does not think that the other nations of Europe will be in a position to impose that threat upon her.

Mr. CALLAWAY. What would you think England would consider such a threat against her as would justify her in increasing her navy though it be burdensome?

Admiral KNIGHT. That threat which has been directed against her by the other powers of Europe during the last 10 years, in which at least one of the great powers has been avowedly trying to overtake her, the feeling being in England that this was a direct threat against her.

Now, listen to what follows:

I do not think that this is likely to be duplicated after this war, because the war is going to wipe out in one way or another the conditions which led to that rivalry.

OURS TO BE LARGEST NAVY.

Now, what does this mean, Senators? If this testimony has any significance at all, and it comes from high authority, it means that the Committee on Naval Affairs has committed us to a program of building a navy as large as England's navy was before the war. Yet the testimony of the very man who recommended that policy is that England, at the end of this war, will not have as big a navy as she has now or any reason for maintaining as big a navy as she had at the beginning of the war. So the logic of the whole business is that we shall come out of this affair at the end of 10 years with the biggest navy in the world, bigger than that of England. Is not that it? Is not that fair reasoning?

I know how measures pass the Senate. I suppose it is pre-ordained that this burden is to be imposed upon the American people. Twelve months ago the Secretary of the Navy denounced it. Twelve months ago the President of the United States was against it. He was plainly against any program of this sort. With the financial power of the great nations of the earth weakened, if not broken, there is every reason why we should not have this program forced through Congress. It is unjust, it is a great wrong. It is the beginning of a greater wrong. When we once start upon a plan of this sort, I do not know how we are ever to get back to a basis that is rational.

I perhaps might speak in this connection of the lessons which we have obtained from this war—the new uses which have been found for the submarine, the power as a weapon of defense of the marine mine.

I remind Senators that with a navy less than half the size of the British Navy, through mines, submarines, and coast fortifications, Germany has defied the power of England, with all its naval strength, to land a soldier on German soil.

Mr. President, until this body has some other testimony before it the overwhelming proof on the record is that our Navy is superior to any other navy on the face of the earth, excepting that of England. That was so even when this war had not depleted the financial strength and the naval power of any one of the belligerents in this great world war. It has gone on with such destructive forces at play unrestrained as was never before witnessed in the history of the human race. After two years is it not fair to assume that, even as to England, there may be some question as to whether or not we may not be superior to her in strength if we wait until this contest is over?

What do we want a Navy equal or superior to England's for, anyway? Are we to make war on England? Is England to make war on us? If so, we ought to begin at once to fortify along the 3,000 miles of border between this country and Canada. No preparedness advocate has had the gall to suggest such a thing. The mere suggestion is enough to show the hollowness of the pretext that lies back of the scheme to saddle upon the people of this country a Navy equal to England's.

Ports can not serve the purposes of the financial interests that want a Navy to back up foreign loans. If they could, we would have had a proposition before us to build forts and dig trenches and mount guns along the Canadian border.

EUROPEAN NAVIES REDUCED BY WAR.

Mr. President, nobody, so far as I know, has suggested that England is preparing to make war upon us or has intimated a suspicion that any nation other than Germany or Japan is preparing to do so. I do not know why Germany was singled out as the one belligerent in this great struggle going on over there that might come upon us to destroy us, but, anyhow, we have a Navy greater in strength than that of any other Government on the face of the earth except England, and England has a debt burden upon her at this very moment amounting to one-third of the total value of her property. England has her navy where it is in jeopardy of destruction so long as this terrific conflict goes on. Almost every day the dispatches bring word that some naval vessel has gone down.

I have a list before me of a number of the battleships, dreadnaughts, battle cruisers, and other vessels of the English and German Navies which have been sacrificed in this struggle. It is a newspaper list and I can not answer for its accuracy.

It is a list of large first and second line ships lost since the war began, and is as follows:

British.

DREADNAUGHTS.

Audacious, 24,800 tons, sunk by mine, coast of Ireland.

BATTLE CRUISERS.

Invincible, 17,250 tons, sunk by Germans.

Queen Mary, 27,000 tons, sunk by Germans.

Indefatigable, 18,750 tons, sunk by Germans.

BATTLESHIPS.

Bulwark, 15,000 tons, sunk by German submarine.
Formidable, 15,000 tons, sunk by German submarine.
Irresistible, 15,000 tons, sunk by Turkish mine.
Ocean, 12,950 tons, sunk by Turkish mine.
Gollath, 12,950 tons, sunk by Turkish mine.
Triumph, 11,800 tons, sunk by German submarine.
Majestic, 14,900 tons, sunk by German submarine.
Lord Nelson, 10,500 tons, sunk by Turkish forts.

ARMORED CRUISERS.

Good Hope, 14,100 tons, sunk by Germans.
Warrior, 13,550 tons, sunk by Germans.
Aboukir, 12,000 tons, sunk by German submarine.
Hogue, 12,000 tons, sunk by German submarine.
Cressy, 12,000 tons, sunk by German submarine.
Monmouth, 9,800 tons, sunk by Germans.

German.

DREADNAUGHTS.

Westfalen, 18,600 tons, sunk by British.

BATTLESHIPS.

Pommern, 13,200 tons, sunk by British.

ARMORED CRUISERS.

Blücher, 15,000 tons, sunk by British.
Scharnhorst, 11,600 tons, sunk by British.
Gneisenau, 11,600 tons, sunk by British.
Friedrich Karl, 9,050 tons, mined in Baltic.
York, 9,050 tons, mined.

This list was published two days after the battle of Jutland, but it is not complete and omits a number of vessels afterward officially reported as lost.

None of us can know how much England has added to her naval strength. Admiral Knight says that England will have a much smaller navy at the end of the war. The strain that came upon her was not to build up that side of her military power in this contest. She needed soldiers for the land service; she needed men to put into the trenches. She already had command of the seas. With her resources taxed and with her men drained by voluntary enlistment, so that she finally had to impose conscription upon her country, I undertake to say that it is fair to assume that she has not put any of her resources at this time into increasing her naval armament. She has more navy than she has been able to use.

Mr. TILLMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin allow an interruption?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUSTING in the chair). Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from South Carolina?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Yes.

Mr. TILLMAN. While the information which we can get from Europe is very imperfect, as everybody knows, because of the censorship, the best information that our Navy Department has is that England has been building battleships right along, and so has Germany. We have attachés over there whose business it was to find out.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Well, I know that there have been some loose statements of that kind made. I know that some member of the House committee, ambitious for a large Navy, sought to elicit from one of the witnesses whose testimony I have been reviewing the statement that England was building a battleship every month; but the witness answered that it was preposterous; that she had never built a battleship every month of the year when she was free from all other military obligations. We have been retaining our relative position with England, I think, when we have been building only one or two battleships a year. We have not been falling behind. We have been appropriating more money for our Navy than has any other Government on earth, except England, year by year ever since 1900. A comparison of the amounts expended by the United States and Great Britain for naval purposes year by year for the last 15 years show that we have not only held our own but that we have gained slightly in relative strength.

CHANGES POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Mr. President, we are at the forks of the road. We have to decide now what we are going to do. If we are going on record for a Navy as big as or bigger than that of England, vote for the Senate amendment to the House bill. It is the first of two steps to complete that program. It is a little more than one-half of the amount necessary to be expended in 10 years, as testified to by Admiral Knight.

But let us consider this—when we have done that, what then? Supposing we build until we equal England, supposing that, with our geographic isolation, which has always been a better protection to us than a navy, we enter upon this policy which has been the policy of England, what then? Where will we stop? When you have built to match England, England will build more; Germany will build more; you will drive them into that position. Do you want a little expert testimony on that? The committee in the other House took some. Before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives

Admiral Vreeland, testifying, in response to questions asked by Representative GRAY, a member of the committee, made it quite clear that naval building in rivalry with foreign Governments, once entered upon, is an unending contest, limited only by the amount of taxpaying which the people of each of the rival nations can sustain without collapse. I quote from the testimony:

MR. GRAY. I wish to inquire of the Admiral if it is not the policy of other Governments to increase their navies with all the other leading powers?

Admiral VREELAND. It is, sir.

MR. GRAY. What would be the advantage to us or any other powers if the navies were increased equally by all the nations of the world? Would there be any advantage to us or to any other power?

Admiral VREELAND. Not if you mean in the same ratio.

MR. GRAY. Would not the same grounds exist after an increase for a further increase?

Admiral VREELAND. It would seem so.

MR. GRAY. There would be no advantage gained by any nation, then.

INCREASES MEAN MORE INCREASES.

Jump this appropriation from two hundred and forty-odd million dollars as it came from the House to \$315,000,000, and what have you? You are merely forcing all rival nations to larger expenditures, which in turn will compel us to still further increase our appropriations and thus again goad them on in the mad contest. Oh, what stupidity, what folly! What defense is there for it? I repeat:

MR. GRAY. Would not the same grounds exist after an increase for a further increase?

Admiral VREELAND. It would seem so.

MR. GRAY. There would be no advantage gained by any nation, then. How long could that be maintained, that even increase, and what advantage would it be to any nation?

Admiral VREELAND. If it continues to increase, the poorer nation will eventually exhaust itself, and the other nations, the United States included, will have a free hand—I mean be free to build in accordance with the changed condition.

MR. GRAY. Then it is only a question of the limit of taxation.

Admiral VREELAND. Yes, sir.

You are starting in upon a plan to build a Navy that violates all the precedents, all the principles, that this Government has followed heretofore.

The Senate can shut its eyes and vote to put through this program if it is willing to do so, but it will do it in the face of evidence that it is the beginning of a plan to build the biggest navy in the world.

NAVAL EXPENDITURES OF PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES SINCE 1900.

Why, Mr. President, a statement of our expenditures for the upbuilding of a navy placed side by side with that of the great powers of Europe tells the whole story.

From and including 1900 to and including 1915 the following enormous sums have been expended upon their navies, respectively, by the countries named:

Great Britain.....	\$2,740,368,467
United States.....	1,655,928,647
Germany.....	1,136,697,923
France.....	1,077,918,864
Russia.....	960,304,469
Italy.....	488,932,840
Japan.....	461,105,953
Total.....	8,137,448,146

We have invested in our Navy \$519,130,724 more in the last 15 years than Germany has invested in her navy during that time.

And, sir, in the last 15 years we have invested \$1,194,822,694 more than Japan has invested in her navy for the same years.

Shame on those who for their own selfish purposes disloyally cry down the American Navy!

FINANCIAL CONDITION OF COUNTRIES AT WAR.

There is not an economic reason; there is not a military reason; there is not, viewed in the broadest way, a question of world politics that constitutes a reason that anybody can possibly assign for practically doubling these appropriations in 12 months. The reasons are all the other way. The logic of the whole world situation is against the necessity for this increase.

Senators, the preparedness expenditures which are being forced through Congress are not for the purpose of defending against any of the powers of Europe. The facts and logic are all against it. The belligerents are weakening themselves financially. They are exhausting themselves in men, in military strength. Many of their battleships are at the bottom of the sea. There is not one of them that is keeping up with the destructive forces.

Just in proportion as they destroy the soldiery of Europe, just in proportion as they feed the men between 18 and 45 years of age

to the cannon, wiping out ten to twelve millions of the virile manhood of the world, just by so much the reasons diminish why we should begin an extravagant extortionate program of taxation upon the people of this country for what we call preparedness.

GREAT INCREASE IN EUROPEAN DEBTS.

What is the condition of the people upon the other side against whom we are supposed to be building the great Navy provided for in this bill? Listen! I read from an article which appears in the Review of Reviews for May. The writer is comparing the financial conditions of these warring nations with what their financial condition was before the war began. I will ask to print a table showing the war loans on the 15th of March, 1916.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENYON in the chair). It will be so ordered, without objection.

The table referred to is as follows:

War loans of nations at war March 15, 1916.

Country.	Amount.	Unit.	Dollars.
Germany.....	34,681,000,000	Mark....	\$8,254,078,000
Great Britain.....	1,662,600,000	Pound....	8,077,320,000
France.....	40,576,827,566	Franc....	7,425,559,444
Austria-Hungary.....	524,200,000	Pound....	2,547,500,000
Russia.....	8,073,000,000	Ruble....	4,117,533,110
Italy.....	8,212,000,000	Lira.....	1,478,160,000
Total.....			31,900,150,554

Thus in the short space of less than two years the powers now at war have contracted obligations one-third greater than the total of their indebtedness before the war began. Yet the latter group of obligations had been accumulating for more than a century. Considering the earlier debts and recent war debts merely as parts of the total liability, the aggregate national debts of the nations at war at the present time appear as follows:

Country.	Debt.	Per capita.
Germany.....	\$13,114,078,000	192
France.....	12,358,459,444	310
Great Britain.....	11,269,768,463	242
Russia.....	8,710,233,110	161
Austria-Hungary.....	6,338,300,000	124
Italy.....	4,015,080,000	113
Belgium.....	825,518,000	106
Total.....	56,631,437,017	2145

¹ Based on population of Russia in Europe.

² Average.

The per capita obligation of Great Britain already exceeds that of 1816. Should expenditures continue at the present rate, a third year of the war would add approximately \$40,000,000,000 to the eighty billion already accumulated, making one hundred and twenty billion in all. This is equivalent to one-third of all computed national wealth in those nations, and in Mr. Rossiter's opinion, probably represents fully half of all wealth capable of "mobilization."

The conclusion of Mr. Rossiter's article is suggestive:

"Finally, as the indebtedness of the warring powers becomes greater, the more helpless may become the possibility of payment. The mere burden of interest, indeed, under easily developed conditions, might prove a source of actual revolution. There are, in fact, grave possibilities, for it is clear that an indebtedness of over \$50,000,000,000 can not be materially increased without becoming a menace."

MR. GALLINGER. Mr. President, will the Senator permit me?

MR. LA FOLLETTE. Certainly.

MR. GALLINGER. I will ask the Senator if the per capita burden which rested upon the English people at that time included the colonies or only the mother country?

MR. LA FOLLETTE. I take it, Mr. President, it included the colonies, from the article which is before me.

MR. GALLINGER. Great Britain, of course, has added very largely to that. I notice she is now calling for \$1,250,000,000, I think.

MR. LA FOLLETTE. Oh, yes, Mr. President. This article was published four months ago.

MR. WALSH. I should like to ask the Senator from Wisconsin if he has the per capita national debt of Great Britain at the commencement of the war?

MR. LA FOLLETTE. I think this article does not show it.

MR. WALSH. I was desirous of knowing how much of that enormous debt was contracted for the purpose of actually carrying on the war, because, as I understand it, it is the argument of those supporting the policy represented by the legislation before us that these expenditures are made so that we shall not be obliged to incur the indebtedness that the Senator now tells us about.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, I find that this article answers the question of the Senator. Mr. Rossiter, who is cited by the Review of Reviews as an authority, says:

Should expenditures continue at the present rate, a third year of the war would add approximately \$40,000,000,000 to the \$80,000,000,000 already accumulated, making \$120,000,000,000 in all. This is equivalent to one-third of all the computed national wealth of those nations.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President—
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I do.

Mr. THOMAS. The Senator, of course, is aware that the indebtedness of the neutral nations has also been very considerably augmented because of their mobilization in order to protect themselves from the possible outrages of the warring nations.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. That is very true and very pertinent, Mr. President, to a statement of the general financial burdens that are placed upon the people of the whole world as a result of this war which is now in progress.

I have just read you the views of one financial writer on the enormous debt that Great Britain is incurring. I want to emphasize that by calling your attention to something which has been written by Mr. Ellis Barker, a recognized authority and writer upon economic subjects, in an article in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, for December, 1915—that is eight months ago. This writer is the author of *The Rise and Decline of the Netherlands*, *Modern Germany*, *Great and Greater Britain*, and of many other works that have given him a rank and standing as a writer of authority on financial economic subjects.

VISUALIZES SOME WAR EXPENDITURES.

Mr. President, I am dwelling somewhat upon Great Britain because the testimony which I read I think conclusively established on the highest naval authority which we have in this country that the Navy of the United States is next to that of Great Britain; that so far as the Navy of the United States is concerned it is superior to that of any other country. So I am offering for the consideration of the Senate this morning some facts upon the financial situation growing out of this war in Europe as it affects Great Britain—England. Says this author:

The vastness of Great Britain's war expenditures staggers the imagination, not only of people in general but even that of financiers and statisticians. It can be visualized only by comparison. The Franco-German war of 1870 to 1871, which lasted nine months, cost Germany \$60,000,000; the Panama Canal, the greatest and most expensive engineering undertaking the world has seen, cost the United States \$80,000,000; the Boer War, which lasted three years, cost this country \$250,000,000.

It follows that Great Britain spends on the war every two weeks as much as the total cost of the Panama Canal, and that she spends every two months considerably more than she did during the whole of the protracted campaign against the Boers. The war has so far cost about \$1,300,000,000. The national capital of Great Britain is usually estimated to amount to about \$12,000,000,000. As the struggle seems likely to continue for many months, it may eventually swallow a sum equal to one-third of the British national capital, if not more. Interest will have to be paid on the gigantic war debt. Its principal must gradually be reduced to manageable proportions by purchase; and, in addition, untold millions will be required every year for the support of the crippled and incapacitated veterans, and for the widows and orphans. Before the war, budgets of \$200,000,000 per year seemed monstrous. After the war budgets of \$400,000,000 may seem modest.

If we now remember that years of hard times followed the relatively cheap Boer War, we can well understand that statesmen and business men look with gravity and anxiety and alarm into the future, and at the mountainous debt which Great Britain is rapidly piling up, and that they are asking themselves: "Can this overtaxed country stand the additional financial burdens? Will the war destroy the British industries and trade, and drive the country into bankruptcy and ruin, or permanently impoverish Great Britain?"

In an article in the *Outlook* of the 28th of April, 1915, Mr. Theodore H. Price, another author, says:

Bluntly stated, the question is, Will the people of Europe repudiate the debts now being incurred either from choice or necessity?

For answer we must refer to the pages of history; but in them we can find no exact precedent for the present situation, as never before have any group of nations, or all the nations together for that matter, been in debt to the amazingly unthinkable total that the present belligerents will shortly owe.

In Europe the per capita indebtedness, if the war last only a year, will be nearly double that of the United States in 1869, and the average intelligence and wealth of the people is much lower.

Can they support the burden of the debt now being created?

If they can not, what will be the effect upon the world and upon America in particular?

It is to be borne in mind that if repudiation or default should take place there would be no destruction of accumulated wealth. The stock of productive or unproductive things that a nation owns is not diminished if it fails to meet its obligations. No one can sue a sovereign State without its voluntary acquiescence. Nonpayment of a national debt simply means that a certain portion of the world's population is freed from the compulsion of being made to turn over part of its earnings to another portion who are thereby enabled to live with less effort. In this view of the matter default would not be an unmitigated evil. The result would probably be higher wages for the working classes and increased cost of production in Europe, so that America would have less to fear from the competition of trans-Atlantic industry.

SHOULD BE MOVING FOR WORLD CONFERENCE.

So I say, Mr. President, that all of the conditions existing at this time argue against instead of in favor of excessive appropriations for military purposes. And, sir, it would not have been possible to have secured the votes of any considerable number of the Members of the Senate or House of Representatives for increased appropriations for this year over the appropriations of last year except for the fact that there has been conducted in this country an artificial, cold-blooded, selfish propaganda, made by interested organizations, to increase these appropriations at this time.

And, Mr. President, while Congress and the administration have yielded all too readily, I believe, to the influences set in motion by these hidden forces, there has been by far too great a lack of disposition to consider constructive measures which look to the removal of the causes of future wars.

Last session I introduced a bill and spoke for a conference of neutral nations. There has been a general consensus of opinion, a tremendously urgent demand for such a conference on the part of great masses of men and women who believe every effort should be made to awaken humanity, Christianity, and civilization to the evil of war and to the necessity of establishing other means of settling international difficulties.

Other neutral nations have intimated their desire for us to initiate such a conference, but the Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department have not given any public encouragement to what seems a most rational and natural first step to have taken in this world crisis.

PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE VOICE UPON QUESTION OF WAR.

Experience and reason alike demonstrate that since the people must pay the cost, must sacrifice their lives and their possessions in war, they should have a deciding voice in the declaration of war. I recently introduced a bill which offers opportunity for an advisory vote as to war against any nation with whom the President has severed diplomatic relations. I hoped to get a vote on it in the Senate, but have not been able to do so up to the present time.

OTHER PLANS TO AVERT MISUNDERSTANDING.

Hardly a day passes that there is not some scare headlines as to the Japanese menace. The fear of Japan has been one of the most effective means of working up sentiment for a great army and navy. Believing as I do that war should be the last resort in the settlement of international difficulties and that all other means of adjustment should be exhausted, I introduced a bill for an oriental commission. It may not be in the best form. I have a letter from a Japanese friend, formerly a student in the University of Wisconsin. I have great respect for his views on oriental relations. He was one of the originators of an international club at the university. He approves of the spirit of the bill, but objects to the provision for a joint commission including Japan and China. He thinks we should deal with each nation separately. The resolution could be modified to meet that objection. I have no pride of opinion about it. But the point is that no measure for solution of these obvious problems can secure consideration.

I would not have you think I am unmindful of the great responsibilities of the administration. I have taken occasion to express my appreciation and what I believe to be the widespread approval of the people of the country for the fact that the President has kept us out of war.

But I believe that because of our supreme position we might have exercised a more affirmative and effective influence in shaping the world policy and if we had not had such enormous selfish financial interests at stake I believe that much of this great energy and power now being expended in preparing for war would have been directed toward its prevention in the future. Who can tell with what result?

FIXING STANDARD FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

Mr. President, I have voted and shall vote for appropriations for adequate defense. But the rank and standing of our Navy, the strength of our coast defenses, the impossibility of any effective over-seas expedition, the purposes back of this program, challenges every Senator to study this bill as he never heretofore studied any naval appropriation bill.

Remember, when once you fix a standard of excessive naval appropriations, it is almost impossible to lower it.

I should like to urge upon the attention of Members of this body and of the people of this country that we are now fixing a certain measure of taxation for military purposes, below which we are almost absolutely certain not to go but on top of which from now on we are almost absolutely certain to pile millions and hundreds of millions in excess of the amount now named in this appropriation bill. If you watch the trend of the appropriations, if you make out a table of naval and military

appropriations, you will find that you can not very well get away from an increase after it is once adopted—no matter how large and unnecessary the increase—you add to it the next year and the next year and the next.

HOW OUR APPROPRIATIONS GROW.

In this connection, Senators, I invite your attention to our naval appropriations for the past 15 years. A reading of the tabular statement of these appropriations will demonstrate the tendency to steadily increase these expenditures. There is no turning back. They mount higher, higher, constantly higher. Year by year we have increased the tax burden for naval expansion. Here are the amounts we have expended on the Navy:

Fiscal year.	Amount.	Fiscal year.	Amount.
1900-1901.....	\$61,721,695	1909-10.....	\$122,247,365
1901-2.....	68,438,301	1910-11.....	111,791,980
1902-3.....	82,977,641	1911-12.....	133,559,071
1903-4.....	104,126,192	1912-13.....	129,787,233
1904-5.....	115,655,825	1913-14.....	136,858,301
1905-6.....	109,725,039	1914-15.....	141,872,786
1906-7.....	98,392,144		
1907-8.....	117,353,474	Total.....	1,655,928,647
1908-9.....	120,421,579		

The naval appropriation of last year was practically two and one-third times as great as the same appropriation for the fiscal year 1900-1901. The appropriation carried in this bill multiplies the appropriation of 1900-1901 by 4.1. It is \$315,000,000. It is an increase over the amount of 15 years ago of 410 per cent. It is \$55,000,000 greater than the largest appropriation made by England in any one year during that entire period.

This bill ought to be sent back to the committee that reported it. When the Senate votes, it should certainly go no further than to vote to substitute the House bill for it.

The great majority of the people of the United States are people in moderate circumstances. The great burdens imposed by this bill make a difference to these people. You add \$25 or \$30 a year to the amount of their taxes, and I want to tell you that all the little home economies that are now strained to the very limit under the enormously high cost of living will break down.

CONGRESS MUST CONSIDER THE PEOPLE WHO MUST PAY THE TAXES.

We must think of these men who have to shoulder the greater part of this enormous cost of building battleships and all the necessary supporting auxiliary craft provided for in the bill as amended by the Senate committee. The taxpayers will want to know of the men who put these burdens on them, sooner or later, what justification they had for doing so. And they will know. This is a representative government. You have no business to have any pride in supporting a committee. You have no business to have any pride in supporting a "slate" program. We should vote here for that measure of increase in the defense of this country which the conditions impose upon us.

Let me say, Mr. President, that it is these men, who are grunting and sweating under the burden of the doubled cost of living and who are sustaining a family on just a few hundred dollars a year, who are going to know what this is all about—the banners of preparedness parades; the gushing editorials, paid for by advertising in a controlled press; the billboards covered with lurid preparedness posters; the moving pictures created from the disordered imaginations of men hired to instill fear in the mind of the public—all of the costly propaganda work will not be accepted as a justification of your action. It must stand the acid test of world conditions and of the actual facts with respect to the status of our Army, our coast defenses, our Navy. Facts, not emotion, in the last analysis determine the action of the American people.

Mr. President, a hundred million people have nobody to look out for their interests here but the Senators and Representatives in Congress. The munitions makers, the great interests, and the world-wide power which they exert, are here and in every capital of the world. Their representatives play upon the fears of Members of Congress. They labor in every conceivable way to discredit the military strength of the Nation and appeal to the patriotism of the representatives of the people to increase these expenditures.

Mr. President, I have sometimes thought that they were not only in the lobby and before committees, in their true character as lobbyists, but I have sometimes been constrained to think, Mr. President, that they were on the floor of the Senate and of the House of Representatives drawing salaries as Members of the two branches of Congress. Of course I understand—I can conceive—that they may square their support of these ex-

traordinary expenditures with a proper regard for the people whom they represent.

If the great body of the people whom they represent are engaged in this line of business and of furnishing the means of equipping the armies and the navies of this country, I suppose they have a right to be represented here just as well as anybody else, as well as the great body of taxpayers who pay the bills. The only trouble is that they do not stand here quite in the capacity of lobbyists for that particular interest. They stand here as representatives of all the people, not only of their particular States but of all the States.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from New Hampshire?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Surely.

Mr. GALLINGER. I have no disposition to get into a controversy with the Senator from Wisconsin, but I am listening to him with interest. If I understood the Senator from Wisconsin correctly, I think the Senator from Wisconsin would wish to change some words that he uttered. If I understood him correctly, he went to the point of saying that he sometimes suspected that not only did Members of this body represent the great business interests of their States but he sometimes thought they received compensation.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Oh, no, no. Mr. President, I would not make a statement of that kind.

Mr. GALLINGER. I hope the Senator will revise his remarks, because I am very certain—

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I do not think it will be necessary to revise the remarks, I will say to the Senator from New Hampshire. I am quite sure I did not say anything like that.

You see, the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. President, has been a sort of disciplinarian of mine for a good many years. I have been in the Senate now about 10 years, and for a considerable time after I entered the body the Senator from New Hampshire, when I arose, used to take his book of rules out of his desk. He would open his book of rules and put his finger in the book at Rule XIX and have it ready to pull on me during the debate. That rule provides that you can not say what you think about Members of the Senate. That rule of the Senate provides that no Member shall question the motives of any other Member of the Senate. I presume that is a necessary rule of debate, because otherwise we might get to telling what we think about our associates here, and that would disturb the amities and the courtesies of the ordinary procedure of the Senate if we really told what we thought. So you know we have this wholesome restraint upon us; and no Senator is permitted to question the motives of any other Senator. Having been pulled up because I had, though not intentionally, violated the rule, but from want of discrimination in the exact form of my speech—having been pulled up a good many times by the Senator from New Hampshire, I have had a curb over myself. I do not believe I have in this instance violated any rule of the Senate, but if I have, I shall be sure to correct it when I come to look over what I have said.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, if the Senator from Wisconsin will permit me, he exaggerates the attitude the Senator from New Hampshire has taken toward him. At one time I was very solicitous to have the rules of the Senate observed. That was all.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. That may be.

Mr. GALLINGER. I think the Senator does exaggerate the matter. I have never meant to be discourteous to the Senator from Wisconsin, and have tried not to be so; but, however that may be, I think honors are easy in that regard, and we will let it go at that. I may have misunderstood the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I think the Senator did.

Mr. GALLINGER. But I think that inadvertently the Senator did say something that he may want to correct before it appears in the RECORD—something that reflects upon Members of both Houses of Congress. The Senator's words are going out to the country—

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I shall be careful about it.

Mr. GALLINGER. And the country will be more or less influenced by what the Senator is saying on the question. Whatever my relations with the Senator may be now or may have been in the past, I would not want the Senator, any more than I would want any other Senator, to intimate that Members of this body do not act conscientiously and honorably.

The Senator from Wisconsin speaks of New England very frequently in connection with munition factories. There are no munition factories in my State. Possibly I should regret

that, because I like my people to be busy and prosperous, and surely their interests ought to be protected so long as they are engaged in legitimate business operations.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Oh, no, Mr. President, I want to be very careful. I do not want to say anything that the rules of the Senate do not permit me to say, because this is not the only forum, you know; there are places where I can go out and free my mind, and I do it not infrequently. I read the roll call from time to time over the country. So I do not intentionally transgress the rules here. I will look over what I have said with very great care, and with the rules in my mind, and I will try to keep within the limit.

WHY "THEY" WANT "PREPAREDNESS."

I think I have cleared up and destroyed, if it required to be destroyed, any possibility of belief that this Government of ours has a Navy inferior to that of any other Government than Great Britain. If we are to build in competition with Great Britain, then we are to change our policy, which has not been a policy of aggression, which has not been a policy of acquisition of territory, which has not been a policy of imperialism. Great Britain may justify having a navy such as she maintains, but she can only justify it to protect her foreign possessions. So that, if in this change of plan under this administration we are to have a Navy commensurate with England, we are to have a Navy commensurate with England because we are going to adopt the policy that England has—of possessions abroad, of aggression upon other Governments. Mr. President, that fits exactly into the whole scheme of the interests back of the propaganda to create a public sentiment for a big Army and a big Navy.

The great financial interests in Europe have planned for big navies and big armies—navies to enforce the rights of the financial organizations in foreign countries. Combined with the banks and others seeking foreign investments were and are the great manufacturers of munitions who make profits out of war.

Mr. President, I propose to show that beginning 66 years ago a new policy was inaugurated in England with regard to enlisting the powers of government back of the financial operations of individual citizens who had made speculative investments for profit in foreign countries. Lord Palmerston, then the British secretary of foreign affairs, invented the new doctrine which has been adopted by practically all of the Governments of Europe, and is manifestly taking root in this country. The case in which the new departure was made is a very interesting one. Never before that time had any Government employed the power of its state department to prosecute a private claim against a foreign Government.

I have here a number of high authorities which call attention to the fact that it was at this time that the Government was first summoned to the support of private claims against foreign Governments. I shall read from only one or two.

ARMED PEACE FOR PRIVATE PROFITS.

I read from a work recently published by the MacMillans in this country. It is a republication of an English book published about a year ago. The author is Henry Noel Brailsford. The title of the book is "The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace."

The modern extension of the principle—

That is, the principle that the Government will protect the private investments of citizens in foreign countries—

The modern extension of the principle was first enunciated by Palmerston in an historic speech in 1850.

The case which Palmerston had chosen for the establishment of this principle was painfully, even absurdly, remote from any national British interest. Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew resident in Athens, who in some obscure way had acquired British citizenship, had a fantastic claim for financial compensation against the Greek Government. He refused to sue in the Greek courts, called in British diplomatic aid, and so far succeeded that a British fleet was sent to the Piræus with a peremptory demand for a settlement. Palmerston's doctrine, looked at askance in his own day, has become the unchallenged dogma not only of our own but of every other great power. In the heroic age Helen's was the face that launched a thousand ships. In our golden age the face wears more often the shrewd features of some Hebrew financier. To defend the interests of Lord Rothschild and his fellow bondholders, Egypt was first occupied, and then practically annexed by Great Britain. To avenge the murder of a missionary by a Chinese mob, the Germans annexed the town of Kiaochow and a district stretching 100 miles inland; the town, it may be remarked, was noted not merely for its dislike of German missionaries, but also for the fact that it is a very valuable port. To protect investors who had speculated in its debt, a foreign financial control was imposed upon Greece. The claims of various financial adventurers who had grievances against President Castro's government induced Britain and Germany to conduct a naval expedition against Venezuela. When in Persia a civil war broke out between the Shah and his revolted subjects, Russia, with Sir Edward Grey's assent, claimed and exercised the right to send her troops into Persian territory to protect her subjects from the possible accidents that might befall them in these internal commotions. The comparatively recent history of Turkey tells of a naval expedition undertaken by France to the island of Mytilene to collect a usurious debt due by the Sultan to a pair of Levantine financiers with Italian names—MM. Lorando and Tubini.

The extremest case of all is, perhaps, our own South African war. The quarrel between our subjects and Mr. Kruger's government was extensive, but it turned mainly on two points, the objection of the mining industry to the dynamite monopoly and the claim of the Outlander community that it should be allowed, on easier terms, to divest itself of its British citizenship in order to acquire a vote in the Burgher republic. An odder application of Palmerston's doctrine could hardly be imagined. The *Civis Romanus* conceived it to be his interest to become a barbarian, to weaken the empire by leaving it, and the empire actually backed his claim. The law forbids a man to weaken the State by committing suicide, for it is supposed that the subtraction of one broken life from the sum of its forces is somehow a loss. Here the State actually insisted that British subjects should be encouraged to withdraw their support from the empire, and it backed its insistence by arms. What the mine owners really at bottom desired was cheaper labor, and their effort to acquire political power through the franchise had no other object. "Good government," as one of them reckoned, would mean two and a half millions a year in dividends.

In one way or another capital which expatriates itself will desire to control the territory where it is employed. It is often content with the informal offices of diplomacy. In graver cases it demands some form of foreign control to foreign employees or a foreign commission. In the Transvaal it thought for a moment of securing its interests by means of the votes of a foreign population composed mainly of its own employees. The same proposal has been put forward (see p. 123) by Lord Cromer as a method of reconciling the claims of foreign finance with Egyptian self-government.

Palmerston's doctrine has, in short, become a pretext which may excuse any and every act of aggression and interference. The extent to which it is carried in any given instance depends not so much on the character of the interest involved and the nature of the injury which it has suffered as on the mood of the imperial power, the weakness of the State assailed, the tolerance of the other great powers, and the amount of influence which the interest affected can exert upon the diplomacy of the power which protects it. The application of this doctrine is apt to attract attention only when it happens to lead to some catastrophe involving the visible use of force. But for one overt and public application of force, most modern empires use their strength a hundred times in less violent but equally effectual ways. If a power coerces once, it may dictate for some years afterwards without requiring to repeat the lesson. It is the first duty of diplomacy abroad to protect the interests of its subjects, and these interests are now usually concentrated in the hands of great banks. The banks in their turn work in concert with the groups of capitalists who are seeking concessions to construct railways and ports, to install electric plants, to open factories to work mines, to supply armaments, or to subscribe to loans. Palmerston's claim that a State should protect its subject from "injustice and wrong" sounds plausible. But better than cure is prevention, and the real business of diplomacy is now rather to support these interests, so that no "wrong" shall be done than to rescue them by an angry intervention after the wrong has been done. The method by which support is given varies indefinitely, and each power has its own characteristic technique.

Sometimes the financiers merely introduce and recommend it to the notice of the foreign Government, and this process is clearly simplified when the venture has at its head some noted social or political figure. A British bank operating in Egypt chooses Lord Milner as its chairman. A bank which aims at serving Turkey has at its head Sir Ernest Cassel, who was often King Edward's host. Lord Cowdry, battling in Latin America against the Standard Oil Trust for concessions, sends out as his ambassador the late Capt. Whit, of the Liberal Party. "Protection" in such cases means often much more than support against the government of the weak and possibly unscrupulous States in which our financiers are operating. It means also support against European rivals, who, in their turn, have diplomatic backing. In Turkey rival embassies compete like business houses for concessions, loans, and orders, and mix inextricably their politics with their finance. The French and German ambassadors in Constantinople engage in an incessant conflict over the rights to supply Turkey with armament on the forges of Creusot or Essen. The banks take their share in the competition, and the usual procedure now is that Turkey is offered a loan by a French or German bank on condition that the proceeds are expended in buying cannon as the case may be from Schneider or Krupp. Austria has been known to make a condition of concluding a tariff treaty with Serbia that she should buy her cannon from the Austria works in Skoda.

WARS MADE TO ENFORCE PRIVATE CLAIMS.

Mr. President, there is abundant proof for the statement that practically all the wars of modern times have grown out of Governments using their military and naval power to enforce the claims of private interests—powerful interests, powerful with the home Government, powerful enough to control cabinet ministers, powerful enough to command the support of court circles. What caused the war between Russia and Japan? The Russian people did not want the war, the Russian bureaucracy did not want the war, the Russian ministry was opposed to the war. Gen. Kuropatkin, minister of war, published his memoirs, the first edition of which ran in McClure's Magazine. The first edition published in the magazine contains most interesting and noteworthy material that is not found in the expurgated edition afterwards permitted to be published:

The inner history of the Russo-Japanese War is an even more instructive revelation of the working of the personal factor in foreign affairs. The facts are fully stated in the translation from the first unexpurgated draft of Gen. Kuropatkin's memoirs which Mr. George Kennan contributed to McClure's Magazine for September, 1908.

The causes of the war between Russia and Japan were the refusal of Russia to observe her pledge to evacuate southern Manchuria, and her stealthy encroachment on the Japanese sphere of influence in northern Korea. These memoirs show that all the ministers of the Tsar, Count Lamsdern, foreign secretary; M. Witte, minister of finance; and Gen. Kuropatkin, minister of war, were sincerely disposed to evacuate Manchuria, and no less opposed to any advance toward the Yalu River and Korea. They failed because the timber enterprise, which was the attraction of the Yalu district, was a court adventure.

The authority for this statement is a cabinet minister of the Russian Government, the Russian minister of war, Gen. Kuropatkin. Listen further:

They failed, because the timber enterprise, which was the attraction of the Yalu district, was a court adventure. These wealthy forests, made over to a Russian promoter in 1896, when the Emperor of Korea was a fugitive in the Russian legation at Seoul, had passed into the hands of a courtier named Bezobroff, an intimate of the Grand Duke, the Dowager Empress, and the Tsar. The company which he formed to work this concession had several of these people among its shareholders, and there is little doubt that the Tsar himself was interested to the extent of £200,000. Admiral Alexieff, a creature of Bezobroff's, went to the Far East a viceroy, overruled the ministers at home, and conducted the timber enterprise as an imperial undertaking. It was neither the Russian people nor the Russian bureaucracy which had determined to keep the Yalu district and to fight Japan for its possession. The resolution to possess it came from a little group of interested courtiers, who were using the national resources to further a private financial end.

Mr. President, the Russo-Japanese War is one instance. If I chose to take the time I might cite many other examples that prove what is really back of these great military preparations which have been under way for many years in foreign countries and are now under way in this country.

For the sake of brevity, Mr. President, I shall read, first—and perhaps it will be all that I shall find it necessary to read—a summary of the cases of the exploitation of weak governments by the strong.

I read from a work by Frederick C. Howe entitled "Why War?" published very recently by Scribner & Sons. I purpose to put into the RECORD his excellent summary of the operations of the financial interests in the weaker Governments of Europe particularly. I hope all who have not read this valuable and convincing work will take occasion to study it. You will find all the facts given and the record verified beyond dispute. In the summary to which I referred the author says:

Certain forces have been set in motion by the European war whose coincident appearance seems hardly a matter of accident. These forces are:

1. The billion-dollar war orders that have filled every available shop and factory with the most profitable orders that have been received in years.

He might have said the \$3,000,000,000 war orders. These orders now total this enormous amount.

2. The agitation of preparedness, involving the expenditure of millions of dollars for an increased army and a navy equal to that of the strongest European power.

3. The promotion of powerful financial organizations for foreign exploitation and over-seas financing. These, as we have seen, are the forces of imperialism.

COLOSSAL PROFITS IN MUNITIONS.

The agitation for a greater navy and the organization of over-seas trading corporations were so simultaneous in their appearance as to suggest cause and effect, especially as the classes most active in promoting preparedness include the leading stockholders in the new promotion corporations of munition factories and banking institutions which are reaping such colossal profits from the present European war.

Here is the same merger of interests; here is the same invisible government which for the past 20 years has been waging war on democracy. It is the merger responsible for insurance scandals, the railway bankruptcies, the Alaskan land frauds, and the monopolization of industry that menaces our life and our institutions. It is an old enemy in new clothes; it is the same merger that for 30 years has involved the great powers of Europe in war and in preparation for war.

I am tempted, Mr. President, every moment to turn aside from each one of these pungent paragraphs to review what has been taking place in this country, resulting in unlimited fortunes for the few, through a control of all of the prices of the products that the people have to sell—the products of their land and of their labor and the control of all the prices of the things they have to buy. These colossal fortunes in the hands of combinations and trusts have caused a surplus of wealth in this country like the surplus wealth created in Great Britain and in other European countries.

BIG FINANCIAL INTERESTS BACK MUNITIONS TRADE.

The tying together of the manufacturing, transportation, traction, banking, and other interests of the country has been demonstrated over and over again. Yet it was made the subject of scorn and ridicule when eight years ago upon this floor I undertook to prove the menace of the interlocking directorates of the financial, the transportation, the traction, the industrial, and the commercial organizations of this country. I named directors and the different corporations upon which they were members of the board of directors, and pointed out that there were 23 members of the board of directors of the National City Bank, of New York; that that bank was the head of a group of banks in New York and a group of financial trust companies, about two dozen in number, that was known in every broker's and banker's office as the Standard Oil group; that the National Bank of Commerce, with, as I now remember, 40 directors, was the head of what was known and is known to-day as the Morgan group; that associated with that group, and owned and controlled by it, were a dozen of the leading banks and a dozen of the leading

trust companies. The roll of the men on the boards of directors of these various groups and the various manufacturing, industrial, and commercial enterprises resolved itself into a little handful of men who appeared on all these different directorates, as I now remember, to the number of 98, who, operating together, controlled the business of the country. I prosecuted my investigation into the various cities of the country to get the financial measure of these 98 gentlemen who controlled the board of directors of all the big business of this country, and it turned out that 14 men were the big power after all—only 14. And then, Mr. President, a little further investigation disclosed that those 14 men lived in terror of two big forces in this country that had grown powerful and gigantic within a few years—Standard Oil and Morgan. Those two great groups had been built up, Mr. President, when there was some rivalry between Standard Oil and Morgan.

There is none now. These interests, consolidated, rule to-day in this country. Their power is at work behind the scenes for a great big Army and a great big Navy. They, sir, make the profits out of the building up of the Navy and the Army. They are back of great investments in Mexico.

I will continue my reading from this author.

Mr. TILLMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator tell us from what he is reading?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Yes, sir; I am reading, as I said before, from Dr. Frederick C. Howe's book, entitled "Why War?" recently published by Scribner's. And let me say, Dr. Howe is one of the Nation's ablest writers, thinkers, and publicists. He is a practical statesman. He was a member of the Ohio State Senate, a devoted friend of Tom Johnson's, a coworker in and supporter of his reforms—

Since the outbreak of the war European war orders have been placed with American firms in excess of \$1,000,000,000. The profits on these orders are colossal. War securities have advanced in price on the stock exchange by nearly \$1,000,000,000. That much has been added to the wealth of a small number of persons who hold the controlling interest in the greater companies which have the important war contracts. The banking firms of Wall Street have been the financial agents of the allied powers in the handling of these contracts. They have floated the \$500,000,000 allied loan and carried through all of the transactions for the allied Governments since the outbreak of the war. The largest war orders have been placed with the Bethlehem Steel, Midvale Steel, General Electric, Du Pont Powder, Westinghouse Electric, and American Locomotive Cos., all closely identified with Wall Street interests. Hundreds of millions of orders have gone to lesser companies.

Before the war Bethlehem Steel fluctuated around \$40 a share. It has since sold as high as \$600 a share. Under the stimulus of war orders, Savage Arms rose to \$340 a share, Du Pont Powder to \$422. Colts Arms to \$840, and Winchester Repeating Arms to \$2,400 a share.

Mr. STONE. What was the value before the war of these other shares?

BIG BUSINESS BACKS CAMPAIGN FOR BIG NAVY, BIG ARMY, AND UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. The writer does not say what the market prices of any of them were before the war, except Bethlehem Steel, but the statement shows them to be enormously above par. I suppose it will be an easy matter to look up in the files of papers the quotations made two years ago on these securities. The author continues:

One of the results of the war has been to identify the financial powers with the munition makers, as in the warring nations of Europe. Coincident with the advance in the value of war stocks, the cry of unpreparedness was raised against an unnamed power that threatened us. The cry sprang as it from the earth. It was born with the formation of various leagues for its promotion whose officers and promoters are closely identified with the great banking houses and munition makers of the East. The press echoed the hue and cry. The Navy, which prior to the war was said to be second only to that of Great Britain, is now said to be that of a third or fourth rate power. The Army is a paper Army. Our coast defenses will not withstand an attack. Any one of the great powers could land an army on our shores and bring us to our knees in a few weeks' time, and 100,000,000 people separated from these powers by 3,000 miles of sea would be powerless to prevent it.

We must have a Navy equal to that of the greatest power on earth, is the demand. Even that seems far from adequate to some. Hundreds of millions must be immediately spent. There must be a large standing Army, some say, of 400,000, others say of 1,000,000 men. Universal conscription is insisted on by some.

I noticed in this morning's papers, Mr. President, in the dispatches, that the Military Committee—I do not know whether it is of the Senate or of the House—is considering now some plan of conscription.

Enlistments are not very rapid these days. Recruiting does not go forward on the run. Contrast the people who are willing to enlist in a preparedness parade—or who do march, whether willing or not—with those who are appealed to to come to the colors and enlist for service in the Army. It is rather discouraging, is it not? The reason is, Mr. President, that everybody knows that there is not any real occasion for enlistment.

PEOPLE NOT DECEIVED.

If all these evidences of apprehension of danger put up in the artificial parades that have been staged over this country had any foundation in fact, you would not have any trouble to enlist men. Should some real trouble come upon this country men would stand out in line at every recruiting station in every State, from ocean to ocean, for the privilege to enroll themselves to go to their country's defense. Do not be misled, fellow Senators, by this noise about danger to our country.

The mass of the people of this country have not been convinced by the false alarm. Congress has been moved by it. The administration has been moved by it. The real sentiment of the people as a whole has not been rightly estimated. In the agricultural districts where the day is spent by the farmer following his plow or his harvester, mixing his thinking with his work, in the quiet and hush of country life, where the blast of the bugle and the roll of the drum has not disturbed the serenity there is a wiser judgment, a truer test. In the shops and factories and mines men who understand the part they play in war, ever ready to respond to the call of genuine patriotism, are much too wise and intelligent to be deceived by a counterfeit call to serve selfish interests.

I confess that I do not think any man can quite be indifferent to the sight and sound of a vast concourse of people following the Stars and Stripes, keeping step to the rhythm of music. He is thrilled by it; he should be, but he should not forget to think.

It was not so long ago, Mr. President, that the great political parties of this country uniformed their voters and they marched by the hundreds of thousands in torchlight parades. Why? They sought to get the emotional effect of a moving display upon the voter.

Mr. President, that came out of the war; but when the new economic issues—grappling with the trusts, dealing with transportation, those problems that followed the settlement of the differences that had arisen in that unhappy strife known as the Civil War—began to take the stage there was no longer any place, sir, for the torchlight parade. Men were thinking.

A false military situation has been seized upon to produce the same effect upon the voters of the country that the old torchlight campaign procession produced upon the voters of that time.

HOW MICHIGAN ANSWERED.

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. TOWNSEND], coming in a moment ago to his seat, reminded me of the fact that when that State, bordering on the Great Lakes, midway between the two oceans—a pretty fair barometer of the northern section of this country, I should say—had a chance to express itself upon this condition of things, what did it do? Overwhelmingly and almost on the instant it rose up and repudiated this war business by giving its vote to Henry Ford, who in these times has the courage to stand against the jeers of the unthinking and the denunciation of his own class, who want war at any cost.

Mr. VARDAMAN. And never in politics.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. And never in politics—a man who said he was not a candidate. It was an expression of the pent-up feelings of the people of a State, a measure of its average sentiment. Michigan is largely agricultural, but it has some manufacturing; it has some munition plants not engaged in making arms and ammunition. It is getting some profits out of this war, and yet a wave of protest against this thing you are about to do in this bill swept that State and carried it against a favorite son—a respected Member of this body.

It is very significant, Mr. President, and it was noticeable in the presidential primary; wherever there was opportunity for clean-cut expression on this issue it broke loose and asserted itself in condemnation of all this great war preparation.

KANSAS WAS UNMOVED.

When the President of the United States was swinging around the circle, as they called it, his itinerary took him to the city of Topeka, Kans. I think it was one of the last dates that he filled on that trip, perhaps the last. His meeting was, we will say, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, in what is known as the Auditorium. There was a farmers' convention assembled there that day. Two thousand five hundred prominent farmers from every section of that State sat in that convention transacting the business of the hour. Four o'clock came. The presiding officer rose in his place and said:

Members of this organization, I have been notified that at this hour the President of the United States is to speak from this platform. We must conclude our session.

An adjournment was taken. They had pretty good seats, and they held them. The doors were opened and the Auditorium filled up. The President and his party came in and

he spoke from that platform, and I suppose he made much the same kind of a speech that he had been making at other places. He was out for that purpose, and it was an appeal for support for this kind of a program. The man who presided at that meeting before the presidential party arrived sat on the platform. He is a supporter of the President. Shortly after that meeting he told me in the Marble Room that he watched that farmer audience in the body of that Auditorium, and that there were just three hands given in applause to the President, and that was when he uttered some general patriotic sentiment. He told me that otherwise those men gave no approval to anything that the President said in support of a great military program.

Now, that is a fact, Senators. It is reported to me in a way I know to be true. The very next day that organization went on record unanimously with a resolution condemning the program the President had put forth.

NORTHWESTERN FARMERS EXPRESS REAL ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE.

I think I mentioned it once before here, but it will bear repetition at this time. On the 9th day of last December I spoke to seven or eight thousand farmers in an auditorium in the great city of St. Paul. Those farmers came from North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, northern Iowa, northern Wisconsin, and Minnesota. They were there for the purpose of breaking, in so far as they could break, the power—a part of this same power I have been talking about—that controls the prices of their grain, that controls the grading of their grain, that robs them upon weight, that robs them upon inspection, and cheats them upon the selling price of the day. Those farmers were there to lay the corner stone of an elevator to be built by themselves, costing some \$500,000. They had been organized largely through the efforts of one of the most remarkable men I have ever met.

I know the Senate will pardon me if I pause for just a moment to say that that man who day before yesterday passed out of this life in the very middle of a career of wonderful usefulness was George S. Loftus. He had traversed those States back and forth, up and down, appealing to those men to rear that structure and through cooperative organization to market directly the products of their farms. He had felt the power of combination in his business. He was buying the grain of the farmers in competition. He had orders to pay dictated prices. He fought. The banks took his credit away from him. Then that man went out and gave his life to the building up of an organization to break that power. He was one of the bravest spirits I have ever known.

I spoke to that audience on the 9th of December. The President had just delivered his message here to Congress in joint session, and he had changed from the position he had taken in the other message, when he said he would not see this country made an armed camp. A resolution was passed through that farmers' body unanimously disapproving of the message so far as it related to a great military program.

CHANGING THE DESTINY OF OUR COUNTRY.

Mr. President, this debate, the action of this body, is a turning point in the life of this Republic. Enlist, enroll yourselves under the banners of the munition makers and financial organizations that want great armies, commit yourselves to putting into the waters of our seaboard a Navy to match England, and forever and forever, unless there be revolt, you have changed the destiny of this country.

Mr. President, may I remind you that when I was diverted I was reading from Dr. Howe's book of the transactions and the financial operations of the organized money power? I have given you his statement of the enhanced value of the stocks and his views on this question of our Nation devoting itself to preparation for an invasion of which there is no possibility. Continuing, he says:

The fact that Europe is prostrate, with an indebtedness fast approaching \$75,000,000,000, that from 8,000,000 to 10,000,000 people have been killed or incapacitated, that the end of the war seems as far off as ever, and that all Europe is so sick of war that a revolution would probably be the result of further aggression, is only another reason for still further preparedness.

No device of the munition makers of Europe for awakening fear, in the promotion of war scares, in the agitation to "scrap" existing armaments, in the lobbies and press control is wanting in the campaign that has been systematically carried on for the last few months. Every attack on the alleged weakness of the Army and Navy can be duplicated in the disclosures of the tactics of the war traders of England and Germany. Line by line and paragraph by paragraph, the stories of the Krupps and Maxims, the shipbuilders and the munition makers of Germany, England, and France, have been copied by our scare makers. The bankers and the munition makers augment the hue and cry. Only a handful of Congressmen have exposed the activities of the munition makers and their practices in this and other countries; they have shown the international monopoly which exists, the colossal profits enjoyed, and the gains to be expected from the thousands of millions to be spent on the Army and Navy program of the next few years.

Is the preparedness urged by the merger of high finance and the munition makers only another device of the privileged interests to secure an indorsement by the Government on the back of one billion of paper securities by providing war orders for the munition plants after the war?

THE BIRTH OF FINANCIAL IMPERIALISM.

I can remember, Senators, when I was in public life before I came to the Senate, that whenever there was a proposed subsidy for promoting our shipping interests we were told it would develop our commerce. The slogan then was that trade follows the flag. That has been reversed. Now the flag follows investments; the flag of the country takes with it the man-of-war.

To proceed:

The second element in the program is the organization of forces for the promotion of over-seas finance under the guise of promotion of trade. The first expression of the movement is the organization of a gigantic \$50,000,000 international corporation—

You have noticed it, have you not?—

organized and financed by interests closely identified with the munition firms and the financing of the present war. This organization, as its promoters announced, is for the purpose of enabling the United States to take a larger part than heretofore in the industrial development of other countries where capital is needed.

Do you know why you have this scheme for a big Army and a big Navy here?

Such countries are certainly not Great Britain, France, and Germany.

We do not need a big Army to take care of our investments in those countries or in any of the great investing nations of Europe.

The countries where "capital is needed" are the weak and helpless peoples of Mexico, Central and South America, of Morocco, Tunis, Persia, Africa, China, and the insular possessions of the United States, and elsewhere.

Now, quoting from this announcement that foretells the organization of this big \$50,000,000 scheme to push investments and trade and business in all the countries where capital is needed, occurs this:

Wealth is accumulating so rapidly that a portion of it can be spared for investment abroad. The experience which our people have had in large-scale production and in expensive construction work has especially fitted us to carry on development work in other countries.

Now, the author sums up the operations of some of these wealthy organizations of Europe. He says:

Surplus wealth lured Great Britain into Egypt. The English financiers—

Now, this is just a short condensed statement of it, but the facts are given in a chapter of this book—

The English financiers made a loan to the Khedive in 1873 of \$410,000,000.

Now, put those figures down somewhere.

They gave the Khedive \$105,000,000 "and kept \$305,000,000 as security."

Surplus wealth bankrupted that country; it destroyed the Egyptian independence; it was followed by intervention and the bombardment of Alexandria to protect the loan.

That is history. There is no questioning it.

This was the beginning of financial imperialism 34 years ago.

STORY OF MOROCCO.

I wonder if Senators would like the details of that affair. I can give it to them from any one of these authorities.

Surplus wealth led France into Morocco. In six years' time the indebtedness of the Sultan to the European financiers was increased from \$4,000,000 to \$32,500,000. The Sultan received but a small part of the loan. He went bankrupt. He could only pay the interest by wringing it from the wretched natives, who finally revolted. France intervened at the demand of the bankers. Thousands of Moors were slain. Germany sent a gunboat to protest. Europe was on the verge of war in 1911 as the result of this conflict. The Morocco incident is one of the hidden causes of the present European war.

In 1904, it will be remembered by Senators who followed that affair, France and England consummated a treaty, certain sections of which were kept secret. Those sections deprived the Moroccan Government of its sovereignty. That was not known until 1911. It concerned Germany. German citizens had invested heavily in iron properties in Morocco. Germany needed the raw material. She was not concerned about any treaty made by France and Great Britain with Morocco so long as it did not contain provisions which might subject her to exacting conditions that would impair the value of her investments. When these secret provisions, with which all the literature upon this subject teems, became known it was the occasion of that famous declaration that a policy had been entered into of "hemming Germany in," of shutting her out from the possible development of her industries by preventing her from getting the ore with which to keep them running. The Atlantic Monthly, the World's Work, and the leading serious journals of the country have carried articles written by able publicists of England, loyal to their country, but denouncing that secret treaty and pointing to it as the great underlying thing that has brought

on the present war. Little things sometimes are productive of tremendous consequences; but that was not such a little thing.

I understand Germany, if confined to her own territory, so far as the known deposits of iron ore in Germany are concerned, can only account for the operation of her iron industries for a very limited period of time. Therefore, unless she secures raw material she must shrivel up industrially, her people must be driven to the wall, all of the great industrial establishments which she has built up must crumble to nothingness. So some years ago she began casting about for some place to supply herself with iron ore, and among others a number of her leading iron masters made extensive investments in the Moroccan iron fields. All they needed was just an equal chance with other investors, untrammelled by her industrial and commercial rivals.

I have no doubt, Mr. President, that a profound study of this subject will make the issues growing out of the affair loom large as an underlying cause of the break when it came.

GERMANY LURED TO TURKEY.

The author continues:

Surplus capital lured Germany into Turkey. There were railroads, mines, docks, harbors, and trading concessions awaiting to be exploited. Banks earned \$25,000,000 in commissions in building the Bagdad Railway, and, besides, saved \$45,000,000 more in the cost of construction—

An entire chapter is devoted here to a detailed history of Germany and the Bagdad Railway, and one or two volumes have been written upon that subject alone—

all of which was charged to the Turkish Government. The banker was followed by the Kaiser and his armies. Turkey has lost her independence; the Balkan States have been embroiled, and Europe is now warring over the conflicting interests of England, Germany, and Russia in Turkey.

SIX-POWER LOAN TO CHINA.

Surplus capital negotiated the six-power loan to China. The loan was accompanied by demands by the bankers for control of the internal administration and revenue system of China. It struck at her very life, and China declined the terms. President Wilson lifted American diplomacy into its proper place when he refused to give his sanction to the participation of American bankers in the loan. He ended dollar diplomacy so far as we are concerned; but the same bankers are now loudly clamoring for a return to the dollar diplomacy of a former administration.

And I regret to say, Mr. President, that I saw only a week or 10 days ago the statement that the President's attitude had changed with regard to this Chinese matter and that there was to be a change of policy in the State Department. There was a paragraph or so of ridicule of Bryan's policy against the exploiting of the weak Governments of the world through the agency of the diplomatic arm of the Government. I do not know that there is any warrant for that article, and I trust there is not; but for a day or two it was quite prominent in the papers.

Says Dr. Howe—

"Surplus wealth" aided in strangling Persia. It ended the independence of Tunis. The Italian was against Tripoli had its motive, in part at least, in the speculations of the Bank of Rome.

"Surplus wealth" for foreign investment drained France of capital needed for internal development. It weakened her in her war with Germany.

It was "surplus wealth" invested in South Africa that brought on the Boer War. "Surplus wealth" led to the spoliation of Mexico, the taking of her lands, mines, oil wells, and the richest portions of the country.

Dollar diplomacy, navalism, and the exploitation of weaker peoples, ending finally in the European cataclysm, have gone hand in hand during the last 20 years. The darkest pages of this story will never be written, for the records lie buried in the graves of weak and defenseless people in every part of Africa, in Asia, in Turkey, Persia, Asia Minor, and the Balkans; it is a story that would have been written in the subjugation of Mexico, in Central and South America, had not the Monroe doctrine intervened.

We should be slow to accept the statement that this is a movement for the promotion of foreign trade, as the organizers of these corporations declare, and as patriotic business men have been led to believe. As has been seen, none of the countries of Europe have materially advanced their trade and commerce by the organization of banking institutions for that alleged purpose.

Rather the foreign banking agencies of the great powers are engaged, almost to the exclusion of everything else, in obtaining concessions, building railroads, securing mining land and oil grants, in the making of loans to weaker powers, and in cooperating in the sale of munitions. And an examination of the interests of the banking institutions that are promoting the new corporations shows that their relations are not in the field of manufacturing, trade, and commerce at all. They are in the fields of monopoly, finance, and speculation.

WE FOLLOW EUROPEAN METHODS.

I shall read another page or two, including this paragraph, on this subject:

As happened in Europe, it is necessary to give a patriotic sanction to financial imperialism to identify the Nation with its program. Wall Street can easily finance a dozen \$50,000,000 corporations. But that would leave them Wall Street corporations. The flag would not willingly follow the investments; the Nation would not be a complacent collection agency for such questionable claimants, so the new international corporation is to include as many other interests as possible. Such strength is needed, the announcement says, as can only be found by arousing the interest and securing the cooperation of the entire country. It is necessary to make it a national undertaking and appeal to the confidence, enterprise, and patriotism of the American people.

No element is lacking in this new imperialism of finance, which, under the glamour of patriotism, aims to exalt America to the dignity of Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and France as a "world power." Line by line the history of the exploitation of defenseless people is foreshadowed in the program that privilege would have us enter upon. High finance, the making of munitions and colossal profits, over-seas exploitation, dollar diplomacy, and the great Navy ready and willing to demand the open or the closed door as the immediate advantage may dictate, these are the elements of financial imperialism that have brought Europe to its present end. The logic is inexorable, the results are inevitable. Every nation of Europe that armed for defense has used its preparation for offense. The record of "Preparedness for defense" is written all over the map of Africa, it is written in Turkey, Asia Minor, Persia, Manchuria, and China. It is written in the blood of millions of men in the present European war.

Only the chance election of a President might determine the uses as to which this preparedness would be put, with the power of high finance, the control of the press, and the invisible powers of privilege ready at a moment's notice to urge the unleashing of guns in the name of "dignity" and "national honor." This is the program of preparedness offered by those who have monopolized the railroads and public-service corporations, who have seized the iron ore, coal and copper deposits of the Nation, who have inclosed the public domain and laid their hands upon the banks and credit resources of the Nation, and who, having exploited prostrate America, are now turning wistful eyes to the virgin opportunities of weak and defenseless peoples in other parts of the world.

It is these that are most active in urging a colossal naval program and a large standing Army. They assail the President and Congress for the inadequacy of their defense program, and attack any one as unpatriotic who questions their demands. Yet these same classes are unwilling to bear their share of the cost of preparedness; they cry confiscation when taxes are suggested on the things they own no heavier than England and Germany were carrying in times of peace. They suggest that the cost should be borne by a higher tariff and by indirect taxes on the things the people consume. They even meet proposals for the manufacture of armor plate by the Government by the threat that they will increase the cost of that commodity by \$200 a ton. This is the answer of privilege to the demand that preparations for war should involve equal sacrifice.

Democracy has a right to insist that preparedness is not merely a demand for private profit; that an increased Navy is not designed as an agency for the promotion of over-seas finance, and that militarism shall not be the grave of the things we hold most dear.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator whose book that is? I did not hear the author's name.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Dr. Frederick C. Howe, the author of "Socialized Germany," "European Cities at Work," "The Modern City and Its Problems," "Privilege and Democracy in America," and so forth.

OUR NAVY SHOULD NOT BE USED TO INTIMIDATE WEAKER COUNTRIES.

Mr. President, my amendment proposes to restrict the Navy of the United States, in so far as the new ships to be constructed under this bill are concerned, from being used to collect the debts of speculative investors in Mexico and in Central and South American countries. The great influence in this country which has sought for four years to bring on war between this country and Mexico has been the financial interests in the United States which have made investments in Mexico. All of the nagging on this floor, all of the nagging of the administration in the press of the country, all of the derision and ridicule of a "sickly, attenuated, anemic Mexican policy" has been instigated by the interests that have their investments in Mexico but who live in this country. That is the fact about it. They want war with Mexico for financial reasons—for profit—and the amendment which I have pending before the Senate is to put a stop to that thing. It is to write on the records of this Congress that the battleships for which we make appropriations, taxing the American people, shall not be used for financial adventurers who go into the weaker countries of this hemisphere to exploit them.

Back of all modern war is practically the one policy, financial imperialism—the scheme of using the surplus wealth wrung unlawfully from the people of the country by the financial interests that dominate that country, the use of that surplus wealth through investments in the weaker undeveloped Governments of the world—lies back of this great military program, not only in this country but in the other countries of the world. It is behind the present war in Europe; it is the underlying cause of that which has converted almost all of Europe into a human slaughter pen. And I stop just a moment to remind Senators on this floor who are eager for intervention and war with Mexico that England entered upon the conquering of the Transvaal with the assurance of the military party of Great Britain that it would not take six months, that it would cost but \$50,000,000, that the armies of Great Britain would eat their Christmas turkey in Pretoria if they were only given orders to march.

WHAT WAR WITH MEXICO WOULD MEAN.

Let the people of the United States who want war with Mexico consider the striking parallel as made by Norman Angel: The people of Mexico inhabit a mountainous country; the Boers live in much such a country as that. The people of Mexico are the best horsemen on this hemisphere. They may not be the

best shots, but they are the best horsemen. There are 15,000,000 of them; I think there were about 400,000 of the Boers. England undertook to subjugate the Boers and to conquer the Transvaal. The military party in England stated that it would cost \$50,000,000 and take a few months; it cost \$1,250,000,000; it took four years; it took 400,000 soldiers; and then, Mr. President, they discovered that they had "conquered"—that they had conquered the Transvaal, but had not conquered the Boers. They found that the only way to keep the Transvaal "conquered" was to maintain a standing army of 500,000 English soldiers there all the while; and Great Britain gave it up.

What did they do? They established a sort of colonial government that enabled the Boers to govern themselves, nominally under the foreign office of the British Empire, but the man who had led the forces of the Boers in the field against Great Britain was put at the head of that government. There were some English officials retained there, but they did not last very long. The Boer head of the government arrested every Englishman connected with the government, loaded them onto a train one midnight, and shipped them to England, with orders that they should be deposited on the sidewalk in London. That was done. Parliament ordered an investigation, and the foreign secretary was called before Parliament and questioned. He was asked as to what had become of all the expenditure of money, all the sacrifice of life to conquer the Transvaal. The foreign secretary replied it was found that they could not keep the Transvaal conquered without maintaining perpetually a standing army there, and that therefore it had been considered wise to give them a form of self-government and to put the general who had been commander of all the Boer forces against Great Britain at the head of that government. He advised that they had better accept the situation just as it was, unless they wanted to start another affair with the Transvaal. And Great Britain accepted it.

COST AND RETURNS OF THE BOER WAR.

The Boer War, which lasted three years, cost Great Britain \$250,000,000.

And it did not accomplish anything. I should like the Senate to keep that in mind when some of the gentlemen who are speaking for American investments in Mexico want to prevail upon you to vote for war with Mexico. There is a momentous lesson in the events of the past few days—the efforts of the representatives of two nations to arrive at an understanding and avert the consequences of war. But if there should come some flaming up of passions, if there should come some opportunity for the representatives of those who have bought Mexico with American money and want to rule it—want intervention, then I should like to have in the minds of the Senate this little hasty sketch of what happened to England in an effort to subjugate the Boers.

If you ever enter upon the conquest of Mexico—and the office of prophecy is a somewhat hazardous one—but let me say that in a hundred years you will not conquer Mexico; that you will maintain for a hundred years a standing army of a million men in Mexico; that you will place the burden of that on the American people. If the time ever comes when you shall attempt to invade Mexico, it will be because American capital has gone down there and invested. No other fair reason can be given.

MEXICANS HAVE RIGHT TO THE KIND OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT.

So far as preserving order is concerned, you can patrol the border, you can keep an army there, with soldiers to cover every foot of it better and at a cost far less than you can carry on a war with Mexico. Such a war would last beyond the life of everybody now living. The Mexican people will fight to the last man for their rights, as they see them. They may not be their rights just as we see them; they may not have the kind of government which we think they ought to have; but it is their country and it is their government, and the intrusion of American capitalists in it for the purpose of making money does not give us any right to go in there and change the form of their government. It may be the kind of government best suited to people of that type.

Mr. LEWIS. I only have one question, and it is very brief. I understand from the Senator's observations that he approves of the policy of President Wilson in not entering upon a course of military intervention in Mexico under the circumstances?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I do, Mr. President; I do, most emphatically. I sincerely hope that the standard bearer of the Republican Party in this campaign will not feel himself constrained and will not under any circumstances take the position that it is the duty of this Government to put the flag of the United States behind the investment of speculators in Mexico or elsewhere.

Mr. Wilson declared in his speech at Detroit that he would not stand for that policy, that he would not become the collecting agent of investors in Mexico. The American people, if that issue is made between the Republican candidate for the Presidency and President Wilson will, in my opinion, overwhelmingly stand with President Wilson on that issue.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Yes.

Mr. NORRIS. I should like to ask the Senator, in connection with his idea that the Army should not be used in Mexico for the benefit of speculators, whether he believes that the Army or the Navy of the United States should be used in Mexico for the purpose of having some discredited bandit salute the American flag?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. No; most emphatically not; and, Mr. President, I was one of a very limited number of Senators who voted against indorsing President Wilson when he ordered the troops to Vera Cruz. I could not bring myself to do it. I did not believe it was warranted. I am satisfied in my own mind that the matter of the salute to the American flag had nothing to do with the ordering of the troops to Vera Cruz. Why, Mr. President, Mexico at that time offered to fire a salute to the American flag. I recall the speech of former Senator Root upon that subject on the night we were considering that resolution, when he said that the difference between firing a salute of 5 guns, which Huerta offered, and 17 guns, which we demanded, would not warrant the shedding of a drop of blood or the invasion of the territory of another country.

Mr. President, I do not believe that was the issue at all. I believe that the real issue at that time was a desire to keep out a German vessel loaded with munitions of war for the Huerta government. I believe that was behind the putting of the troops of this country into Vera Cruz; and I believe that there was a misconception of what could be accomplished by it, and of the responsibilities that went with the action. I believe that there was a sort of feeling that this Government could take charge of the customhouse, and stop the landing of those munitions of war, and not violate the sovereignty of Mexico.

THE FLAG MUST NOT FOLLOW THE DOLLAR.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, will the Senator permit a question?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Oh, yes.

Mr. GALLINGER. I note the attitude that the Senator takes in reference to the obligations that Mexico may be called upon to meet at some time on the part of Americans who have invested their money in Mexico. I shall not controvert that; but I will ask the Senator if he does not think that at some time, in some way, Mexico may well be called upon to make reparation for the 300 or more American citizens that have been murdered in that country?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, I expect to come to that a little bit later, but I might as well say right now that I think the people who have gone into Mexico have gone there to make money, to make big money. They have gone there to speculate.

Mr. GALLINGER. Some of them have gone there to work.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I think they have gone there to speculate. Of course some laboring men may have been lured there by the capitalists, who have gone there to speculate. I do not know about that phase of it; but the primary incentive behind every dollar of American money invested in Mexico is big profits.

Now, Mr. President, it may be a new doctrine to the Senate of the United States, but I think it is pretty nearly time to have the issue made. It may not win in the first struggle here. It will win ultimately, because it is everlastingly right. That is the reason for the amendment I have offered.

I BELIEVE EVERY DOLLAR THAT GOES INTO A FOREIGN COUNTRY AND EVERY MAN WHO GOES INTO A FOREIGN COUNTRY WITH HIS MONEY LOOKING FOR PROFITS SHOULD ACCEPT THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY AS THE ARBITER TO WHICH HE WILL APPEAL FOR JUSTICE IF HE FEELS AT ANY TIME THAT HE IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT HIS RIGHTS IN THAT COUNTRY.

The thing that attracts capital to Mexico is its rich natural resources. They have an unstable government there. That unstable government lowers the value of property. American money there can buy for \$100,000, because of the government conditions, property that is worth a million dollars. Now, if this new doctrine that the flag shall follow the investment of the citizen is to prevail, then our Government is to be called upon to guarantee the speculative investments of its citizens in the countries where the governments are weak, and so to make those speculative investments worth face value.

INTERESTS FOMENT FRICTION BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES.

The people of the United States do not want war with Mexico. The Mexican people do not want war with us. And both President Wilson and Carranza have manifestly done everything in their power to avert war.

What is it, then, that menaces the peace of these neighboring countries?

It dates far back of the Columbus raid. That outrage upon the residents of one of our border towns was the logical outcome of conditions for which the Mexican people were in nowise responsible. Worse than that! Both Governments were the victims of traitors in our midst. For it is charged upon the highest authority that the raid was inspired and arranged for in our own country.

Do you get the full meaning of that statement? Benedict Arnold was not more guilty of treason.

The secret service of this Government has a long arm and a strong arm. The net may yet be drawn on the "higher ups." It is fair to assume that President Wilson did not disclose all of the facts in his possession when he declared officially a few days after the raid that—

There were persons along the border actively engaged in creating friction between the Government of the United States and the de facto government of Mexico for the purpose of bringing about intervention in the interest of certain owners of Mexican properties.

There you have it! The gentlemen who want war with Mexico are the gentlemen who "have Mexican properties." They are a very powerful lot. They own most of the United States and a good big slice of Mexico. They are our captains of industry; our masters of finance. They own or control our great newspapers. They are for a "strong Mexican policy," a "strong foreign policy," a big army, a big navy.

They prate about "patriotism." They clamor for "preparedness." They have tried to plunge the country into a hysteria of fear that we are going to be thrown into war with Germany or England or Japan. They have Congress "on the run."

These privileged interests are not taxing the people of the United States for their great Army and Navy scheme to fight Germany, England, or Japan. They have other plans for the present. They have the irons on the American people. They control the prices of labor and the products of labor. They control the cost of every necessary of life. They own the coal, the oil, the timber, the water powers. Their profits are so enormous that they must lower interest rates or else invest in foreign countries. The timber, oil, coal, and mineral wealth of Mexico and of the Central and South American countries are most inviting in every way. The Governments are poor; the labor is cheap as slave labor.

There is just one risk, and that is a large risk. The Governments are most of them weak. Revolutions in many of them are frequent; property rights are insecure.

But a scheme has been worked out by the masters of finance to make foreign investments as good as a Government bond. Just put the Stars and Stripes back of them!

We will protect our citizens abroad. Assuredly! That is our bounden duty if we are to uphold the standing and dignity of our Government among the other nations of the world, strong or weak. But if the protection of "citizens" were our only concern there would be no "border raids," no "mobilization," no "war talk." There would be no occasion for the clouds that darken so many American homes to-day. "Investments," in these plutocratic times, are vastly more important than "citizens." And it is not to protect "citizens" but to protect "investments" that our boys in khaki have been forced into action. That is the truth of it.

AMERICAN INVESTORS WORK FOR INTERVENTION.

These American "investors" in Mexico—millionaires—are using every instrument they can control—their money, their newspapers, their magazines, their political influence, all their "dark and devious ways"—to bring about "intervention." Intervention means war. War means blood and killing and bereaved families and unmentionable horrors. And all for what? Profits! Privilege profits!

Privilege exploits us folks here in our own United States. And privilege makes so much money out of us that it creates a huge surplus. Privilege, never satiated, wants this surplus to be at work bringing in still more profits. Weak and undeveloped (and unexploited!) countries offer the biggest returns. So privilege buys a foreign "concession." Cheap! The system looks to that bargain! But to maintain the great profits it is ordinarily necessary to resort to "strong-arm" methods. Sometimes people (like the workers in the mining districts of Colorado, Michigan, and West Virginia) resist oppression and ex-

plottation. Machine guns become the order of the day. And, after all, our present "Mexican situation" is only a "Ludlow" on a bigger scale. Privilege is to-day trying to shape public sentiment so that "our boys" shall be made to march down into Mexico and offer up their lives for the purpose of placing the guaranty of the United States Government behind the smelters, gold mines, rubber plantations, railways, and other concessions and to make the profits of privilege certain.

CARRANZA'S FAR-SIGHTED PROPOSAL.

Mr. President, we hear a lot of talk about Carranza. Here is what Carranza did within a short time: He sent to South America his former secretary of foreign affairs, Señor Isador Favola, to propose an agreement among the Latin American countries to the effect, generally speaking, that when a citizen or a company or a block of capital of one of these countries shall go to another of them, the citizen, corporation, or property shall not be followed by a man-of-war or an army, but shall pass under the laws and under the conditions of the country he visits, risking his own life, perhaps, and his own property, but not the lives and the property and the peace of his fellow citizens at home. And I understand that when this Latin American agreement is consummated Mr. Carranza, the obstinate, proposes that the United States of North America shall be invited also to join in it.

Sir, as a Senator, I pledge the authenticity of that statement. I received it last night from one who knows, a citizen of this country, who received it from Carranza. There is broad statesmanship for you; there is statesmanship which looks to the preservation of those governments for their own people. Shall the power which has acquired the natural resources of this country—our timber, our oil, our coal, and which is now reaching out for the water powers; shall this power which is connected by a system of cross investments with the power that controls transportation of every nature and kind—traction, shipping, and steam transportation; which is connected and tied up in investment with the power that owns and controls and makes the prices of all the products of the factories and the mines and the smelters; the power that dictates, through its control of the grain markets, the prices which the farmer shall receive for the products of the soil; the power that by its combination can say to labor, "Work at such a price or eat grass," as did the aristocracy just before the French Revolution—shall this power, now that it has exacted its tribute from our people, that can create its wealth without limit, take that which it has wrung from the American people, depleting the capital of this country by that amount, advance interest charges, tighten up credits—shall it take that money, that excess of capital ground out of the helpless, struggling citizenship of this country, down into Mexico and Central and South America, and buy with it the national wealth and resources of those countries?

"Buy," did I say, sir? Volumes of testimony could be spread upon the records of the Senate showing the spurious concessions made to these great interests in Mexico. Under the Diaz government concessions were secured by bribery, concessions were secured by fraud, people with good titles were dispossessed. Ah, sir, unlimited wealth in a weak government is UNLIMITED POWER.

We know what the power of concentrated wealth is in this country, where we boast of our democracy and of the power of the citizen with his ballot to make his Government represent him and his interest. How is it with Mexico and with the Central and South American countries? Oh, sir, it gratified me beyond expression that President Wilson, speaking at Detroit, used these words as reported by the press:

What makes Mexico suspicious is that she thinks we do not want to serve, but possess her—

President Wilson understands this new doctrine manifestly—and she has justification for these suspicions in the way some gentlemen have sought to exploit her possessions. I will not serve these gentlemen, but I will serve all Americans by trying to serve Mexico herself. The way to establish our sovereignty is to respect hers.

Judged from those sentences which fell from the lips of the Chief Magistrate of this country at Detroit only a few days ago, the restraining influence of the amendment which I have offered here will not be necessary; but, Mr. President, times change; conditions change. There is a chance now for this great, free democracy of ours to write into the law a denunciation of the practice that has enabled the rich nations of the Old World to pillage the weak, and which has been back of most of the plans and schemes for big armies, big navies, and big military equipment.

WHO OWNS MEXICO?

Mr. President, I have always been very much interested to know who owns Mexico—really owns it. I have hunted about a good deal to get data on the subject, and have found it exceed-

ingly difficult. Almost always, as it happens, one finds that right at hand he has overlooked something. On the 18th of July, 1912, a consular report was issued upon this subject by Consul Marion Letcher at Chihuahua. He transmitted to the Department of Commerce a table showing the wealth of Mexico according to the nationality of the ownership. This table was prepared, he states, by William H. Seamon, late of Chihuahua, who, according to the statement of the consular report, "has had long experience in Mexico as a mining engineer."

Mr. Letcher is now foreign trade adviser in the Department of State here in Washington. I have not been able to see him myself; but through a friend I had him interrogated about this report, as to whether he had other information that might qualify the data which he had transmitted to the department in this document. He said that while some three or four years had gone by, his increased knowledge upon the subject simply confirmed him as to the accuracy of the report.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for just a moment?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Certainly.

Mr. VARDAMAN. In reference to the character of Mr. Letcher, I will state that I have the pleasure of knowing him and have for the last 12 years. He served during the Spanish-American War as the first lieutenant in my company. He is, and was then, a young man of extraordinary accomplishments, and gave promise of great usefulness; and since his connection with the Government in the Consular Service in Mexico he has fulfilled the promises that he made then. I want to bear testimony here to his very splendid work.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I am very glad to have that statement from the Senator. The party who saw him at my request returned with an exceedingly favorable impression of him, both as to his intelligence and as to his accuracy of statement.

He says in this report that the several investments which are set forth in detail are given in the following amounts as owned by the people of each of the following countries:

MEXICAN INVESTMENTS IN 1912.

United States	\$1,057,770,000
England	321,302,800
France	143,446,000
Other nations	118,535,380
Mexico	793,187,242

In other words, foreign countries have invested in various lines of business—railroads, banks, mines, smelters, national bonds, timberlands, ranches, farms, live stock, houses and personal property, cotton mills, soap factories, tobacco factories, breweries, miscellaneous factories, tramways, power and electric-light plants, stores, wholesale and retail, the oil business, the rubber industry, professional outfits, insurance, theaters, hotels, and institutions—public and semipublic—these various sums.

American financiers have more money invested in Mexico than the Mexicans themselves have—\$264,582,758 more.

American investments are biggest of all in that unhappy, system-ridden country.

This American money is found in railroad stocks and bonds, mines, national bonds, ranches, smelters, timberlands, factories, oil, rubber, insurance, and other enterprises.

Let us glance at a few more figures from the same authority: Railway stocks: Mexican money invested, \$125,440,000; American money invested, \$235,464,000.

Railway bonds: Mexican money invested, \$12,275,000; American money invested, \$408,926,000.

Mines: Mexican money invested, \$7,500,000; American money invested, \$223,000,000.

National bonds: Mexican money invested, \$21,000,000; American money invested, \$52,000,000.

Smelters: Mexican money invested, \$7,200,000; American money invested, \$26,500,000.

Timberlands: Mexican money invested, \$5,600,000; American money invested, \$8,100,000.

Factories (miscellaneous): Mexican money invested, \$3,270,200; American money invested, \$9,600,000.

Oil: Mexican money invested, \$650,000; American money invested, \$15,000,000.

Rubber: Mexican money invested, \$4,500,000; American money invested, \$15,000,000.

Insurance: Mexican money invested, \$2,000,000; American money invested, \$4,000,000.

In the ownership of Mexico we find the real menace to the peace between Mexico and the United States. American capitalists are desperately attempting to have the flag follow their investments.

They who own Mexico are the ones who want war.

Mr. OVERMAN. Mr. President, it might be interesting to know who are the parties that made these great investments in Mexico, if the Senator has that information.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. They are not given in this document. But, as therein stated, foreigners, outsiders, aliens, have owned, so far as property and business interests are concerned, about three-fourths of Mexico.

Mr. President, there is something of that sort going on in this country. I understand that foreign concerns are investing in oil lands in this country. I understand that very wealthy foreign organizations are buying up extensively unimproved and improved farm lands throughout the West.

Mr. TILLMAN. The Senator said outsiders "have owned" these interests in Mexico. That is in the past tense. Do they own them now?

ALIEN INVESTMENTS SHOULD BE MADE UNDER THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Yes; they profess to "own" them now. But I believe that every country should enforce this rule against any alien who comes into that country to invest in business, that such investment must be under the laws of the country, subject to the same conditions that apply to the natives of the country in the protection of their property and the enforcement of their rights.

The interests of this country are confronted with the alternative of loaning their surplus wealth to the farmer, to the merchant, to the small enterprise at a constantly lowering interest rate or of withdrawing the surplus capital from this country, keeping interest rates high here and going down into the weak Governments of Mexico, Central and South America, which are rich in natural resources, minerals, oil, timber, coal, and iron, surpassing all imagination, we are told, and acquiring control there.

As a protest against the use of our Navy to enforce the claims of these interests, I have offered the following amendment:

Provided, That no battleship, cruiser, scout cruiser, torpedo-boat destroyer, or submarine herein appropriated for shall be employed in any manner to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature, or to enforce any claim or right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States against the Government of Mexico or of any Central or South American Government.

I concede the right of the owner to invest his capital where he pleases. But I say now that either at this time or in the near future this Government will be called upon to declare a policy against using the State Department and the military arm of the Government to collect private claims for gentlemen seeking large profits in foreign countries. I say that the present policy is an everlasting wrong. When the people once understand its significance, they will thunder at the doors of the Capitol of this country to reverse the policy of Congress upon that subject.

When our capitalists withdraw their money from this country to stake it on the turn of fortune's wheel in some foreign land, let them take the gambler's chance.

If money is to be spent to make their foreign risks secure, let it be their own money.

If lives are to be risked to protect their Mexican mines—their Central and South American concessions—let it be their own lives that take the hazard.

Believing in democracy, in the right of self-government—ready to defend the precious heritage of our own sovereignty—let us here and now resolve and declare that we will never permit the armed forces of the United States to be used to despoil our sister republics of their property, interfere with their right to govern themselves according to their own standards, or violate their sovereignty—as sacred to them as American sovereignty is to us.

During the delivery of Mr. LA FOLLETTE'S speech,

Mr. CLAPP. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Yes.

Mr. CLAPP. Before the Senator takes up that phase of the question, I desire to suggest the want of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Ashurst	Dillingham	La Follette	Oliver
Bankhead	du Pont	Lane	Overman
Beckham	Gallinger	Lee, Md.	Page
Brandeggee	Gronna	Lewis	Penrose
Chamberlain	Hardwick	Lippitt	Phelan
Chilton	Husting	Lodge	Pittman
Clapp	James	Martin, Va.	Poinindexer
Clark, Wyo.	Johnson, S. Dak.	Martine, N. J.	Pomerene
Culberson	Jones	Newlands	Ransdell
Cummins	Kenyon	Norris	Robinson

Shafroth
Sheppard
Sherman
Shields
Smith, Ariz.

Smith, Ga.
Smith, Md.
Smith, S. C.
Stone
Swanson

Taggart
Thomas
Tillman
Townsend
Vardaman

Warren
Williams

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-seven Senators having answered to their names, there is a quorum present.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Wisconsin has not yet concluded his remarks. I expect to offer a substitute for this amendment before it is voted on, and I would just as lief state it now, to take up the time in the absence of the Senator from Wisconsin.

I feel in entire sympathy with the object which the Senator from Wisconsin has in mind in offering this amendment; and I think, as it has been modified by the two amendments that have been agreed to, that it has been improved. At the same time, it seems to me that if we adopt any procedure by which the Navy and the Army are limited in the collection of debts or claims, there ought to be some provision similar to the one that was included in the amendment that the Senator from Wisconsin gave notice that he would offer.

I can see that there might be conditions and circumstances under which the present amendment, if applied to all the Navy and the Army—and it ought to be applied to all the Navy and the Army, really, if it is a good thing—might work a hardship; and I wish to state to the Senate that before the vote is taken I am going to offer, as a substitute for the pending amendment, the amendment that the Senator from Wisconsin gave notice he would offer.

As the Senator from Wisconsin is here now, I will not take it up at the present time.

After the conclusion of Mr. LA FOLLETTE'S speech,

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. SWANSON. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. LEWIS rose.

Mr. NORRIS. Does the Senator from Illinois desire to address the Senate?

Mr. LEWIS. Had the Senator from Nebraska intended to offer an amendment?

Mr. NORRIS. I intend to offer a substitute and I would just as lief offer it now unless the Senator prefers that I should withhold it.

Mr. LEWIS. If the Senator will offer his substitute, I will then see if it meets the views I expect to express.

Mr. NORRIS. I offer as a substitute the proviso which I send to the desk.

The VICE PRESIDENT. It will be read.

The SECRETARY. As a substitute for the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin insert the following:

Provided, That the Army and Navy of the United States shall not be used to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States against any foreign Government with which this Government is at peace until said citizen, copartnership, or corporation shall have exhausted his legal remedies in the courts of the foreign Government or if a denial of justice after the exhaustion of such legal remedies being alleged the foreign Government shall decline an offer on the part of the Government of the United States to submit the case to arbitration.

Mr. SWANSON. I raise a point of order against that amendment, that it is general legislation.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, since the Senator from Virginia has made a point of order I will be compelled to modify the amendment somewhat. I will offer it in a form in which it is not subject to a point of order, but, of course, it can not apply, as I think it ought to apply, to all the Navy. One of the objections to the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin is that he has been compelled to have it apply only to the vessels appropriated for in this bill. That, of course, puts a part of the Navy under a different rule from that which applies to the balance of it, and it is to that extent inconsistent. But I concede that the point of order under the rule ought to be sustained, and that the Chair was correct in his ruling. I now offer the following amendment, which is not subject to the point of order.

The VICE PRESIDENT. It will be read.

The SECRETARY. As a substitute for the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin insert the following:

Provided, That none of the naval vessels herein appropriated for shall be used to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States against any foreign Government with which this Government is at peace until said citizen, copartnership, or corporation shall have exhausted his legal remedies

in the courts of the foreign Government or if a denial of justice after the exhaustion of such legal remedies being alleged the foreign Government shall decline an offer on the part of the Government of the United States to submit the case to arbitration.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. President, I have a few words to submit, and they are to be submitted in the short space of time before the hour of 6.30 arrives. Unless some other Senator entertains the Senate, there will be sufficient time at the end of what I shall say for the opportunity of a roll call.

Mr. President, I should like to call the attention of the Democrats on this side of the Chamber, first, that if this amendment of the able Senator from Wisconsin prevails you will write yourself down as having impeached the conduct of your own administration in the affairs of Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Haiti, and you, Senators on the Republican side, will have written a judgment against that of the preceding administration.

There was no craftier scheme of politics I ever saw devised than this artful amendment of my distinguished friend the Senator from Wisconsin. There is no impeachment of any acts of administration that has been so cleverly concealed as that which lies in this amendment.

On its face it indicts the administration for the use of any ships which have heretofore been used where marines have been landed for the purpose of preserving peace in any of the Central American countries, and wherever the power has been used to enforce the honest collection of indebtedness in the full fulfillment of the faith we owed other Governments who themselves or their subjects were the creditors.

I listened to the very able speech of one for whom I have had admiration for years, and, so far as the speech of the able Senator from Wisconsin relates to the Navy, there is much to be said in justification of his views if the premises laid down by him are conceded; that is, that there is no justification or reason in any existing facts for the increase of the Navy. On that subject I do not intend to enter.

The very long speech and very able speech of my able friend brought to my mind the observation that when Lord Bailey in Geneva had observed the third volume of Gibbon's Rome he sent a message back to England which said, "Gibbon has written another damned fat book." My very eminent friend from Wisconsin has made another very fat speech. It is not damned; it flows with ease, bearing with it much volume.

But if it was addressed, if I am not in error, to that which I now charge and say to the able Senator that if this amendment should prevail the Monroe doctrine must die; if this amendment prevails, war is inevitable to the United States; if this amendment prevails, the United States must either surrender all pretenses to executing the Monroe doctrine on the one hand or observing the concentrated and combined creditors of the world seeking to collect their own debts where we would not aid in enforcing honest obligations. They will be present in Central and South America in their combined forces in order to enforce their claims. We would have to declare war then to vindicate the Monroe doctrine and prevent foreign Governments from having a foothold by seizure of land for the collection of debts in America.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Illinois yield?

Mr. LEWIS. I yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. The Senator, I am certain, has not read the amendment. I neglected to read it to the Senate myself, and it has not been printed and laid on the desks, I believe, although it appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. But when I bring to the Senator's attention the fact that this amendment relates to no investment made by any foreign citizen, syndicate, corporation, or copartnership he will see that the criticism that he is making can not have application. It is limited only to a prohibition against using the vessels provided for by the appropriation in this bill to collect the claims of our own citizens, so that the question of the Monroe doctrine can under no circumstances be raised by my amendment. I think the Senator will agree with me in that when he sees the language of the amendment.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. President, I should like to see the amendment as changed to ascertain if it is different from the provisions we have discussed. Does the Senator from Wisconsin assume that the amendment is intended to be limited to only the claims of those who are citizens of the United States?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I do.

Mr. LEWIS. Then, Mr. President, if the able Senator's contention be that it is limited to that, the provision, as I at first understood it, applying to all parts of the world, has evidently been superseded.

Now, Mr. President, I invite the attention of the able Senator to the fact that if this amendment is the successor of the one tendered, he is now limiting to American citizens. We could not protect our own citizens in their interest in the Panama Railroad or bondholders in the Panama Canal.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I do not wish the Senator to misapprehend the matter. This is the amendment which I had printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and which I gave notice that I would offer, and it is the only amendment which I have offered. I gave notice that I might offer another amendment, broader in its terms than this as to the restrictions made upon the use of the Army and Navy, because this limits the use of only the vessels provided for in this appropriation bill, while the other was broader and applied to the use of the Army and Navy as a whole. It was limited, however, as this is, so that it would only have application to the claims of American citizens and American corporations. I carefully excluded from both amendments the investments of foreign citizens or subjects, because I did not want this issue clouded by any consideration of its interfering with the Monroe doctrine.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator from Connecticut if he can recall that this morning, while he was discussing some of the parliamentary phases of the matter, I asked that the amendment be read, and upon being read, I understood that it imposed a prohibition against using the Navy for the enforcement of any claim from any part of the world. Am I wrong as to that?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, I do not think the Senator from Illinois is wrong in understanding that the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin has been modified by striking out all reference to Mexico and Central and South America. That, I was informed by the Chair, was the fact.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. But that is not the point.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. No; that is not the point. Of course, I am simply answering the question asked by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. LEWIS], that my present understanding is—and the Chair so stated this morning—that the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin has been modified by striking out any reference to specific countries. I understood the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. NORRIS] agreed this morning that that was the case. What the fact is, of course, I do not know. The Senator from Wisconsin is the best authority as to his own amendment.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I beg pardon. Will the Senator from Connecticut permit me to make a suggestion?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I yield.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. If my amendment was modified in that respect, it was by an amendment to the amendment offered by some other Senator. About that I do not know.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I certainly did not mean that the Senator from Wisconsin modified his own amendment. I was informed by the Chair that it had been modified, and I supposed it had been done by a motion to strike out the reference to Mexico and to Central and South America. I do not know the facts. I am telling the Senator from Illinois what the Chair told me this morning.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. But even if modified in that respect, in either form, it does not raise the question of the Monroe doctrine, and can not do so.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I do not see how it relates to what the Senator from Illinois started to say; but I will say, in passing, if I may, that if the effect of this amendment is, as I understand the Senator from Wisconsin now admits it to be, that American naval vessels will be prevented from collecting the claims of American citizens, but will be subject to be called upon to aid in collecting the claims of foreign citizens if it should become America's duty to use them for that purpose—

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Not in the form in which I offered it, and I do not believe in the form in which it has been modified, if it had been modified at all, because all that has been done with regard to it has been to make it applicable to other countries than those on this hemisphere.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, not having cogitated very deeply upon the amendment, I withdraw from any office that may have been thrust upon me to act as its interpreter. I will let the Secretary read the amendment at the proper time, when we can see how it stands at present, and each Senator can draw his own inference.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Illinois will allow me—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Illinois yield to the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. LEWIS. I yield to the Senator, but I should like to know the parliamentary status of the amendment.

Mr. NORRIS. I offered the amendment to the amendment, which was agreed to. If the Senator will look at the Con-

GRESSIONAL RECORD of July 19, page 11316, near the center of the left-hand column, he will find the amendment printed as the Senator from Wisconsin offered it. I moved to strike out the words "against the Government of Mexico or of any Central or South American Government." That amendment was agreed to.

Another amendment was agreed to this morning, which does not in any sense change the amendment in the respect in which the Senator from Illinois is discussing it; so that as it stands now the amendment reads as follows:

Provided, That no battleship, battle cruiser, scout cruiser, torpedo-boat destroyer, or submarine herein appropriated for shall be employed in any manner to coerce or compel the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class, or nature, of any individual, firm, or corporation, or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copartnership, or corporation of the United States.

Mr. SWANSON. Mr. President, if the Senator from Illinois will yield, it seems to me that it is evident—

Mr. LEWIS. Of course I yield to the Senator.

Mr. SWANSON. That the amendment is subject to different interpretations and concerning it varying views are held. It materially affects our Navy and is a matter that ought to be disposed of in a different manner than is now proposed. If there is going to be much more debate on it, in view of the fact that it has already been discussed for a considerable length of time, I shall be compelled to move to lay it on the table.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I will say to the Senator, Mr. President, that of course he can make that motion, and he can dispose of this amendment in that way, but I have not taken any time upon this bill except upon this amendment; I have discussed it in good faith; I want a vote upon it, and I hope the Senator will give it to me.

Mr. SWANSON. I prefer a vote on it, and I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment when the question is put.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, I assume the question first comes under the substitute offered by me.

Mr. SWANSON. I presume the Senator from Wisconsin accepts the substitute of the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. No; I can not accept the substitute.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Illinois has the floor. Does he yield to the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. NORRIS. If the Senator from Illinois has the floor, I do not care to take him off the floor, but I merely desire to take a few moments on the subject.

Mr. LEWIS. I do not wish to interfere with a vote, and, since there seems to be a general misapprehension of the amendment, in view of the changes which have been made, I do not wish to urge observations that may be inapplicable. I do not wish to postpone a vote on the matter, and there seems to be such difference as to the meaning of the amendment that I do not wish to characterize the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin without further absolute knowledge of its contents—as twice amended. So I yield the floor to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, the only modification made by the substitute that I have offered is this: It follows the language of the amendment, and then adds a provision that the person, firm, or corporation must first exhaust his legal rights in the foreign country, and then, if he claims he has not had a fair chance in the courts of that country, he can appeal to the State Department, and the State Department can, if they desire, ask this foreign Government to arbitrate; and if they refuse to arbitrate, then it would be proper for the naval vessels to be used in the enforcement of the debt.

In other words, the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin will limit the use of these vessels in any case. The substitute does not go quite so far. Therefore it seems to me that even though you are opposed to the original amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin, believing it to be too stringent, you ought to favor the substitute, because it provides for other methods before the vessels can be used to enforce a debt.

Mr. CLAPP. Mr. President, I can not support the substitute of the Senator from Nebraska, because it recognizes that in the last analysis the Navy may be used to collect private debts. To my mind, I would not exchange the life of one American boy for all the debts, real or fictitious, that can be created through the connivance of officials in other countries. For one, I am opposed to the Government continuing in the collecting business.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the substitute of the Senator from Nebraska for the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. NORRIS. On that I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were not ordered.

The substitute was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question now recurs on the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. GRONNA. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I should like the yeas and nays upon the amendment, if I may have them. We have a quorum here. I hope the Senator from North Dakota will withdraw his suggestion. We can tell on the roll call whether we have a quorum or not.

Mr. GRONNA. I withdraw it.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is the demand for the yeas and nays seconded?

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll. The Secretary proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAMES (when his name was called). I have a general pair with the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WEEKS]. I have been informed that if present he would vote as I shall vote on this question. I therefore feel at liberty to vote. I vote "nay."

Mr. STONE (when his name was called). I transfer the pair I have with the senior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. CLARK] to the senior Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HITCHCOCK] and will vote. I vote "nay."

Mr. THOMAS (when his name was called). In the absence of my pair, the senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. McCUMBER], I withhold my vote. I ask to be counted for the purpose of making a quorum.

Mr. TILLMAN (when his name was called). I transfer my pair with the junior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. GOFF] to the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. LEA] and will vote. I vote "nay."

Mr. WALSH (when his name was called). I have a general pair with the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. LIPPITT]. Being advised as to how he would vote were he present, I vote notwithstanding his absence. I vote "nay."

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. MYERS. I transfer my pair with the junior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McLEAN] to the senior Senator from Texas [Mr. CULBERSON] and will vote. I vote "nay."

Mr. GALLINGER. I have a general pair with the senior Senator from New York [Mr. O'GORMAN]. I transfer that pair to the senior Senator from Utah [Mr. SMOOT] and will vote. I vote "nay."

Mr. DU PONT. I inquire if the junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BECKHAM] has voted?

The VICE PRESIDENT. He has not.

Mr. DU PONT. I have a general pair with that Senator, but I am at liberty to vote on this question. I vote "nay."

Mr. PENROSE (after having voted in the negative). I note that the senior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS] has not voted. I am paired with that Senator. I transfer the pair to the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WEEKS], who is absent, and will allow my vote to stand.

Mr. REED. I have a pair with the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. SMITH]; but under the circumstances and after consultation with his colleague I feel that I am relieved from the pair. I therefore vote "nay."

Mr. CHILTON. I transfer my pair with the senior Senator from New Mexico [Mr. FALL] to the junior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. HUGHES] and will vote. I vote "nay."

Mr. WALSH. I announce that the junior Senator from Delaware [Mr. SAULSBURY] is unavoidably absent from the Senate.

Mr. CLAPP (after having voted in the affirmative). Observing the absence of the senior Senator from North Carolina [Mr. SIMMONS], with whom I have a general pair, I feel constrained to withdraw my vote.

Mr. LODGE. My colleague [Mr. WEEKS] is unavoidably absent from the city. If present, he would vote "nay."

Mr. GALLINGER. I have been requested to announce the following pairs:

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. HARDING] with the Senator from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD];

The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. COLT] with the Senator from Delaware [Mr. SAULSBURY];

The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CATRON] with the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. OWEN];

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. DILLINGHAM] with the Senator from Maryland [Mr. SMITH];

The Senator from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] with the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. GORE];

The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CURTIS] with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. HARDWICK]; and

The Senator from Utah [Mr. SUTHERLAND] with the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. CLARKE].

The result was announced—yeas 8, nays 44, as follows:

YEAS—8.			
Chamberlain	Kenyon	Lane	Norris
Gronna	La Follette	Martine, N. J.	Vardaman
NAYS—44.			
Ashurst	James	Overman	Shields
Bankhead	Johnson, Me.	Penrose	Smith, Ariz.
Brandegee	Kern	Phelan	Smith, Ga.
Broussard	Lee, Md.	Poinexter	Smith, S. C.
Chilton	Lewis	Pomerene	Stone
Cummins	Lippitt	Ransdell	Swanson
du Pont	Lodge	Reed	Taggart
Fletcher	Martin, Va.	Robinson	Tillman
Gallinger	Myers	Shafroth	Townsend
Hollis	Nelson	Sheppard	Walsh
Husting	Oliver	Sherman	Warren
NOT VOTING—43.			
Beckham	Dillingham	McCumber	Smoot
Borah	Fall	McLean	Sterling
Brady	Goff	Newlands	Sutherland
Bryan	Gore	O'Gorman	Thomas
Cañon	Harding	Owen	Thompson
Clapp	Hardwick	Page	Underwood
Clark, Wyo.	Hitchcock	Pittman	Wadsworth
Clarke, Ark.	Hughes	Saulsbury	Weeks
Colt	Johnson, S. Dak.	Simmons	Williams
Culberson	Jones	Smith, Md.	Works
Curtis	Lea, Tenn.	Smith, Mich.	

So Mr. LA FOLLETTE'S amendment was rejected.

RECESS.

Mr. SWANSON. I move that the Senate take a recess until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 29 minutes p. m., Thursday, July 20, 1916) the Senate took a recess until to-morrow, Friday, July 21, 1916, at 10 o'clock a. m.

SENATE.

FRIDAY, July 21, 1916.

(Legislative day of Wednesday, July 19, 1916.)

The Senate reassembled at 10 o'clock a. m., on the expiration of the recess.

NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 15947) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes.

Mr. LIPPITT. Mr. President, I offer the following amendment—

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Ashurst	Hollis	Page	Swanson
Brady	Husting	Penrose	Taggart
Brandegee	James	Ransdell	Thomas
Chamberlain	Johnson, Me.	Reed	Thompson
Clapp	Jones	Robinson	Tillman
Colt	Kenyon	Shafroth	Townsend
Culberson	La Follette	Sheppard	Underwood
Cummins	Lane	Sherman	Vardaman
Dillingham	Lippitt	Simmons	Wadsworth
Fletcher	Lodge	Smith, Ga.	Warren
Gallinger	Martin, Va.	Smith, S. C.	Williams
Gronna	Martine, N. J.	Smoot	Works
Harding	Norris	Sterling	
Hardwick	Overman	Stone	

Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey. I wish to announce the absence of the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. JOHNSON] on official business.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifty-four Senators have answered to the roll call. There is a quorum present. The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. LIPPITT] offers an amendment, which will be read.

The SECRETARY. On page 125, at the end of line 16, insert the following:

That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to sell at cost and issue lubricating oils and gasoline to vessels of the volunteer patrol squadrons duly enrolled in several naval districts; and that during maneuvers or practice drills, when any of the vessels of said patrol-boat squadrons shall be acting singly or as squadrons under the direct command or control of an officer or officers of the United States Navy, gasoline fuel shall be supplied to them free of charge.

Mr. SWANSON. I will accept that amendment for consideration in conference.

Mr. LIPPITT. I should like to have several communications I have received in regard to the amendment printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks on the subject.

The matter referred to is as follows:

THE PATROL SQUADRON.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,

New York City, July 19, 1916.

Hon. H. F. LIPPITT,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: At the request of the governors of the Patrol Squadron, I beg to advise you that at a meeting of the organization held July 19, 1916, Mr. Guy Norman, of Newport, R. I., one of our members, suggested that a communication be directed to you for the purpose of enlisting your aid in rendering more effective the relationship now existing between the Patrol Squadron and the Navy Department. For your information I would say that the Patrol Squadron is a complete and operative organization formerly enrolled as a part of the United States naval forces for the second naval district. I am inclosing a copy of the report of Lieut. Puleston to the Navy Department, which will indicate to you the nature of the work of the squadron and its effectiveness; in addition, I am inclosing a letter from Rear Admiral A. M. Knight, formally accepting the Patrol Squadron for enrollment, as well as a copy of the by-laws of the association. I would ask you to return these documents for our files when they have had your consideration.

The purpose of this communication is respectfully to request that, if possible, a rider be added to the pending Navy bill, enabling the Patrol Squadron to receive certain material assistance from the Government in the form of fuel supplies when the squadron is in service or maneuvers. You will doubtless appreciate that this request is not unreasonable in view of the fact that the owners of these boats have gone to considerable personal expense in building the same and equipping them.

Knowing that you are naturally interested in all matters pertaining to the second naval district, which extends from Chatham, Mass., to New London, Conn., we believe that this appeal on our part for cooperation will receive your serious consideration, and to place the same in concrete form I beg to submit the following proposed amendment to the Navy bill, subject, of course, to your revision:

That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to sell at cost and issue lubricating oil and gasoline to vessels of the Volunteer Patrol Squadrons duly enrolled in the several naval districts; and that during maneuvers or practice drills when any of the vessels of said patrol-boat squadrons shall be acting singly or as squadrons under the direct command or control of an officer or officers of the United States Navy, gasoline fuel shall be supplied to them free of charge.

I would also suggest, provided, of course, that it meets with your approval, that you interest Senators TILLMAN and SWANSON in this matter; doubtless these gentlemen will approve of our organization and its purpose, and will lend whatever assistance they can to further its objects. Should you desire additional information we would suggest that you get in communication with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, who has cooperated with us in effecting our organization.

Assuring you that any courtesy or assistance which you may give us will be deeply appreciated, I am,

Yours, faithfully,

ORSON D. MUNN,
Secretary of Patrol Squadron.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND NAVAL DISTRICT,
COMMANDANT'S OFFICE,
Newport, R. I., July 6, 1916.

From: Commandant second naval district.

To: The Secretary Patrol Squadron, 233 Broadway, New York City.

Subject: Enrollment of the Patrol Squadron in the second naval district.

Reference: (a) Your letter of June 29, 1916.

1. In accordance with your request of June 29, 1916, I have enrolled the Patrol Squadron in the second naval district.
2. To give effect to this enrollment please report in full the number of boats, officers, and men in the squadron.
3. Suitable exercises will be arranged by my aid, who has been directed to communicate with you concerning this matter.
4. I inclose herewith a copy of Lieut. Puleston's report of the exercises, which was forwarded by me to the Navy Department.
5. I believe the Patrol Squadron will be of great assistance to this district, and I assure you that I will cooperate in every way to increase its efficiency.

AUSTIN M. KNIGHT.

UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, NARRAGANSETT BAY,
COMMANDANT'S OFFICE,
Newport, R. I., June 24, 1916.

From: Lieut. W. D. Puleston, United States Navy, aid to commandant.

To: Commandant Naval Station, Narragansett Bay, R. I.

Subject: Cruise of Volunteer Squadron No. 1.

In May Lieut. Commander V. A. Kimberly requested the War College

to suggest a series of exercises for Volunteer Patrol Squadron No. 1.

On May 29 a tentative list of exercises based upon the probable war-time activities of such a squadron was furnished to Lieut. Commander Kimberly.

On June 6 Lieut. R. A. Koch, the commander of the second division of the Submarine Flotilla, in reply to a request for the services of one submarine for these exercises, volunteered to cooperate with the second division the D-1, D-2, and D-3, the *Tonopah*, the *Worden*, and *Macdonough*, as this force was planning to operate in Block Island Sound during the same period of time and as he wished the submarines to operate against patrol boats and in conjunction with such boats as scouts.

A second set of problems was then drawn up, which were designed (a) to use the Patrol Squadron in a drive against submarines; (b) to use the Patrol Squadron as scouts to lead the submarines to their prey; (c) to use the Patrol Squadron to patrol the line Block Island-Gay Head for surface craft. In arranging these problems Lieut. (junior grade) R. T. Merrill, commanding U. S. S. *Tonopah*, cooperated, and his practical knowledge of the capabilities of the submarines plus a knowledge of problem solving gained through the correspondence course of the War College made his assistance of great value.

On June 10 Lieut. Commander Kimberly reported that the Patrol Squadron would arrive June 13, ready for work on June 14.